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*Historical Play*

SHE CAME TO COMMAND

*History*

CHINESE HISTORY IN BRIEF \*

*Historical Novel*

VICTORY IN RETREAT \*

*Narrative Verse*

THE LAST HARMONY \*\*

\*Listed for Spring 1947.

\*\*Listed for Summer 1947.

# HAPPINESS BY EXPERIMENT

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26 CRAVEN STREET, LONDON, W.C.2



15/-  
10.00  
Amitt.

22.11.1942

B5x42

B535

C.1

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### ERRATA.

Page 135, line 28 : *for* "Shelley" *read* "Pope."  
 Page 168, line 2 : *for* "recognises" *read* "recognise."  
 Page 172, line 20 : *omit* "a."  
 Page 179, line 29 : *for* "understood" *read* "understand."  
 Page 190, line 6 of text : *for* "Than" *read* "Then."

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## PREFACE

REPROVING government officials and publishers such as obstructed publication of his *Treatise of Christian Doctrine*, John Milton in 1644 denounced censorship in the following words:

"Lords and Commons of England, consider what Nation it is whereof ye are and whereof ye are the governors: a nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit; acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to. Therefore, the studies of learning in her deepest sciences have been so ancient and so eminent among us, that writers of good antiquity and able judgment have been persuaded that even the school of Pythagoras and the Persian wisdom took beginning from the old philosophy of this island. And that wise and civil Roman, Julius Agricola, who governed once here for Cæsar, preferred the natural wits of Britain before the laboured studies of the French. Nor is it for nothing that the grave and frugal Transylvanian sends out yearly from as far as the mountainous borders of Russia and beyond the Hercynian\* wilderness, not their youth, but their staid men, to learn our language and our theological arts.

"Yet that which is above all this, the favour and the love of Heaven, we have great argument to think in a peculiar manner propitious and propending towards us. Why else was this nation chosen before any other, that out of her as out of Sion should be proclaimed and sounded forth the first tidings and trumpet of Reformation to all Europe?

"Behold now this vast City: a City of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompassed and surrounded with his protection; the shop of war hath not there more anvils and hammers working, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of beleaguered Truth, than there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps,

\* North German.

## PREFACE

musings, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty, the approaching Reformation\*; others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soil but wise and faithful labourers, to make a knowing people a nation of Prophets, of Sages and of Worthies? We reckon more than five months yet to harvest; there need not be five weeks; had we but eyes to lift up, the fields are white already." (*Areopagitica*.)

His stated object in writing *Areopagitica*, and thus praising the mentality of the ordinary thinking Englishman, was "that the power of determining what was true and what was false, what ought to be published and what to be suppressed, might no longer be entrusted to a few illiterate and illiberal individuals, who refused their sanction to any work which contained views or sentiments at all above the level of vulgar superstition."

Men may well look back on the era now ended and say again, that the fields are "white already" with a harvest of thoughts to be reaped after a long war and a year of uneasy peace. It is to exercise the ordinary, thinking Englishman's mentality in sorting out thoughts that must have been forced up in many thousands of minds that this book is now offered.

Statements in it are to be understood only as being subjective in the sense given in Chapter xiv.

M. B.

WESTMINSTER.

June, 1946.

\* Charles I defeated at Naseby and the power of Parliament established 1645.

# PART ONE

## CHAPTER ONE

### DEMOCRACY WITHOUT MUDDLE

THE DIFFICULT IDEAL. Discontents of individuals—the atoms of which society is constructed—are the forces of construction and of destruction alike. They combine and evolve in peace, or explode in war. For individuals to combine, common tastes are necessary ; but tastes differ. Some people like tidiness, others prefer untidiness. Our national habit of muddling through is admired by some, because it makes our next step unpredictable, mystifies our enemies and has always led to our final victories in war. But others observe that it involves inefficiency and that inefficiency is costly in lives during war, and at least in money and useful effort and therefore in the means of human satisfaction, during peace. Opinions on muddles thus differ.

Perhaps our muddling is an effect of the many voices, sometimes in discord, of our democracy; and perhaps this democracy, with the collection of our variegated genius, is a source of strength. Our opponents in policy and war, dominated by a few men, may think too narrowly to succeed in the long run against the broad and endless genius of freely united peoples; and, in the past, it was not until the French were dominated by the single mind of Napoleon, that we decisively defeated them. But muddle is not essential to democracy, and the variegated genius should be capable of deceiving the enemy by planned deception, instead of confounding itself with confusion.

A feature of untidiness is that it makes cleanliness difficult of achievement. It is not quite so easy to dust a room hung with chandeliers, ornaments, medallions and miniatures, crammed with furniture and littered with papers or teacups, as it is to keep clean a tidy and simply furnished one; and the high importance set by people on cleanliness is expressed in the saying "Cleanliness is next to godliness".

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It may be urged, on the other hand that it is better to live in an untidy and undusted room, than in the tidiest and cleanest pigsty; and that the mixture of good and bad in democracy is superior to the orderly, unmixed evil of some other social systems. But democracy should be able to separate its good from its bad, to act on the one and reject the other. The question is, how?

It is in an attempt to answer this question that the following thoughts all combine. And the importance of the matter lies in this, that unless democracy can in the future muddle itself less than at the present, its inefficiency in war may cost many lives—better, in the purity of sacrifice, than those of many who live comfortably at home—a cost that could be saved. This is the blood penalty for inefficiency. And, during peace confusion in democracy may permit, at first unnoticed, the political dictatorship of a Party, economic dictatorship by men of business, or the all-pervading dictatorship of civil servants. This is the political penalty for disunity and muddle. In some degree we are paying both penalties already. If democracy cannot distinguish between its good and its bad motives and operations, there can appear little hope of improvement; and if good does not grow it will die. The world is a changing place, and rot is the only alternative to growth.

Some of us may wish that both we and things could remain unchanged, or change back so that any change would be a mere temporary interruption of changelessness. This wish arises from fear that a change may not be for the better, a wish fit only for our moments of cowardice, laziness and blindness. Its vanity is displayed by the course of history, which is the story of unending changes. The continual struggle between the Yang and the Yin, the principles of good and evil, is the basis of Chinese philosophy, conflict between right and wrong the foundation of every religion and ethic, and to grasp what is good and avoid what is bad, the intention of every human activity. Failure is the only alternative to success, and human society is perpetually subject to this alternation. It was in trying to escape change that we came to the crisis of 1939.

In the nineteen thirties, one of the most popular songs in England was the hymn, "Abide with me". Its harmonies

were learned and vocalised for the British Broadcasting Corporation. Crowds outside St. Paul's Cathedral sang it on New Year's Eve. Perhaps some who desired as they sang, "Thou who changest not, abide with me" were taken prisoners at Singapore or Hong Kong and six years later in their minds, craving company other than Japanese, still echoed it. When they sang the hopeless words, "Change and decay in all around I see", did they foresee possibilities of the future for themselves? Did they—did we all—love that hymn, which is no longer so painfully topical, because it helped us to ask for help amid the decay which we ought to have been preventing? Some of us, surely, loved it because we were consciously guilty of that decay of intelligence which enabled Mr. Baldwin to be misinformed about German rearmament, Mr. Chamberlain to be surprised at the course of history as his friend Lady Oxford and Asquith has described, and Sir John Simon or Sir Samuel Hoare, whichever it was, to describe with the slang word "jitterbug" those who anticipated war. It was a dirge for the end of a twenty-years' peace; peace forfeited by our many-voiced but otherwise inert democracy, and, of all, the hymn most appropriate to Britain in the threatening thirties: appropriate in its confession of decay, and its reliance on God who in fact saved us in the persons of "The Few".

But few of us are now to be satisfied with this decay of democracy, this softening of the brain and sinew of the body politic which allowed an intelligent nation to attempt, without arming, to appease Germany, and a brave people to play coward to the grieved audience of Czechoslovakia. It is a true saying, that a country gets the government that it deserves. We have suffered for the folly and ignorance which allowed in the place of a great statesman the foolish negotiator, who bartered honour for time but made use of neither, and the ignorant politician who called Czechoslovakia a distant country "of which we know little". We all have triumphed under a Government knowing its own mind, as we knew ours, and are destined to have such a government in future, when unified once more for a purpose. We have no intention of suffering again the loss of motive and sense of bewilderment that weakened us after the 1914 war. Neither will our Government have any intention, if it is to

remain in power, of allowing us to relax so quickly or so completely in these days, as we relaxed in 1918. Either our democracy will recover from decay, or Britain will abandon democracy; because no decayed system will survive in the world of the atom. Britain will be governed by a clear and purposeful mind, because no Government lacking clear direction will survive the force of British, American and Russian ambitions. We must be governed by a clear mind, or cease to be a people of importance. But will it be our mind, or the mind of the Cabinet, or will these be at one? The answer to this question depends on whether we improve our democratic system or let it decay.

People in 1943, as well educated as university graduates, were saying things such as, that democracy is finished; that real democracy has never existed, and that democracy and the House of Commons are a farce. If and in so far as they are right, they and we are in peril of the totalitarianism of our enemies and of a regression of ideas as far as to those of the days of King John before he signed the Magna Carta. If the common saying is true that there is a spark of divinity in all of us, failure of democracy implies government in the light of one or a dozen sparks of divinity in one or a dozen men, instead of government in the light of the millions of sparks of divinity in the millions of us, a succession of sparks instead of continual illumination.

We, in our priceless heritage of wisdom, say that two minds are better than one; and that too many cooks spoil the broth. It is by the aid of such paradoxes alone that absolute truth can be expressed. It is apparent to all of us that no individual or dozen individuals can possess as much knowledge as can a whole nation, and that therefore, they cannot govern a nation for its benefit as wisely as can the whole nation. But, since individuals and nations possess misinformation as well as knowledge and folly as well as wisdom, the possibility of wise government depends on the separation of wisdom from folly. A banal little analogy may serve to emphasize the point. Everyone who has ever met a cook must know that cooks have minds. In 1942, Lord Woolton, Minister of Food in one of Mr. Churchill's Cabinets, once returned to a certain kitchen a portion of cabbage, which he described as a sodden mass unfit to offer to a dog. In this,

of course, his mind differed from that of the cook. Had Lord Woolton become a cook and taken united council with the other, there are few of us who will doubt, that they would have produced something at least fit to offer to a dog. If all the cooks in London were to pool their ignorance and knowledge, a majority would surely have sense enough to recognise the one from the other, and their efforts thereafter would resemble more closely, than at present, the performance of the half-dozen or so who already can make cabbage fit for human consumption.

In small daily affairs as well as in great operations lasting years, much ignorance and folly are shown by their possessors, who would gladly adopt improvement from a common stock of knowledge and wisdom. All, together, know more than a few; this is the reason for democracy. It is unanswerable and eternal.

**THE WORKING OF DEMOCRACY.** But democracy in Britain has permitted slums and fallen ill-armed into war. "Great tasks await us . . .". Such are the measured and forceful phrases in which our Secretaries of State address us in war. To be informed of this kind of thing is greatly preferable to being called "jitterbugs" with that mixture of idiocy and petulance which characterised a government that we deserved and got in the days when we inertly slid into our bath of blood and tears. But it is not enough.


We must look for a cleaner bath after the war. Great tasks certainly await us, as remarked by one of our Secretaries of State on the 25th February, 1943. Great tasks will always await us until we have done what Blake tried to describe when he wrote the song about building "Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land" without mortar, but with his chariot of fire, his sword, his shield and his arrows of desire. Blake took material well-being for granted. We must provide ourselves first and indispensably with material well-being, but war has taught us how little is necessary. We must provide good homes containing something better than futility furniture; we must provide security in employment, a fair and equal chance to improve our economic position, an income on which we can depend, convenient

means of transport, interesting places of amusement, and shops stored with good food, good clothing and pleasing amenities; but war has taught us how easily these things are destroyed. If we are to do ourselves any permanent good—and it was this that concerned Blake—we must first refresh ourselves with something purer and more perpetual than spilt blood and tears. We must wash and be clean. We must establish truth and justice, not prejudice and oppression; goodwill and beauty not mere promises and pomp; knowledge and understanding, not propaganda and conceit. The uses and the power of all these things are infinite. They survive all wars, and their existence is as old and as durable as the human race. We must separate the good from the bad, choosing one and rejecting the other.


This is no work for a muddler. Can a democratic people perform it, or must democracy be a comparatively impotent muddle?

In the following chapter there will be opportunity to consider the historical argument by which it appears that a tendency of our race is towards a united democracy, towards a single-minded and purposeful commonwealth not only of gold and iron, field and forest, island and continent, but also of understanding, kindness and imperishable power.

But it appears that this purposeful unification can be achieved only in one way. This requires the people, constituting the democracy, to unite and rule themselves. It is, therefore, the acknowledged method of all who advocate democracy, although unfortunately neglected and forgotten. The difficulties under a democratic constitution which prevent 999 in 1,000 from uniting and ruling themselves will be examined in Chapters IV, V and VI. Remedies to overcome these difficulties are the subjects of Chapters X and XI. But, of these remedies the most essential legislative action is to ensure correct representation of the people in Parliament, such as was not really achieved in the commoners elected in 1935 or, naturally, in the peers elevated for reasons of which we know even less than Mr. Chamberlain knew about Czechoslovakia. As for the hereditary peers, unless we can recall their parents from the grave, we can never know by whom or why it was intended even that they should exist. It is ridiculous, that both Houses should be as little repre-







OUR SERVANTS

*From Illingworth's cartoon in 'Punch.'  
26th September, 1945.*

sentative of the people as they are. Such is the fault of our system of election, which allows undue advantage to individuals with large financial backing; and which enables a Member to sit for a constituency in which more than half the voters prefer other candidates, his majority being merely the largest of three minorities. This system prevents democracy.

It is because parliamentarians know that they are not representative of the people, that they sometimes appear to us an unsuccessful, changeable, incoherent, pompous, empty-worded, gullible, insincere, cavilling, snarling pack of muddlers, when not a collection of silent morons. If they are members of a Party, in the House of Commons they are obliged to vote as desired by Party leaders, to whose control of costly publicity they chiefly owe their seats and whom alone, therefore, they are obliged to represent if they desire the same favour at the next election. If they are members of the House of Lords they are representing only themselves. None of this monopoly of representation is the intention of democracy, but a perversion of it. It is easily remediable, and the sooner it is remedied the better.

Mr. Churchill, on returning from each of his self-imposed missions to the Middle East and adjacent theatres of war, described himself in 1942 in the story of these travels as our servant. If the most powerful man in the world at that time was our servant because he was our Prime Minister, there is no doubt that all other Cabinet Ministers also are our servants. It follows that their subordinates the Heads of Departments, the million civil servants and all the members of the fighting forces also are our servants. Are decisions in our public affairs to be taken only by our servants? The answer of a democratic people must be: No. We rule.

In political and economic matters at least, surely the idea of a country or an Empire as a unit comes naturally to men and women who have fed and clothed and fought for one another? The fact is that we are a unit and are shareholders in this unit. Together we own it and must manage it as surely as any business proprietor would manage his business.

What result would a man like Mr. Gordon Selfridge expect, deserve, and get from his departmental store if he



had always contented himself with eating, drinking, grumbling, sleeping and so living, leaving all his decisions to his employees—would it have favoured himself or his employees? His employees surely, and himself only by coincidence. What right then, has a public, which takes no part in directing public affairs, to expect from its directorial servants whom it pays but does not supervise, except by coincidence, anything better than prosperity of these long-prospering servants and the hollow sounds which have echoed back from Geneva, Munich and Singapore and gurgled up from the carcasses of a thousand ships under the sea? No right; and none has been generally claimed. A country gets the government that it deserves.

It is essential in a democracy that the people should rule. It is not necessary for Mr. Selfridge's success that he should do all the work of body, mind and spirit required by his great enterprise; nor is it necessary or possible for all of the people to know all the facts or make all the decisions or do all the work of government. That is why servants are employed. But it is possible and absolutely necessary that the people as a whole should effectively rule and that in so doing their power should be felt; that they should make, see and correct their own mistakes, and each of them exhibit and thank his own divine spark, at each public triumph. In this inexhaustible source of sensibly applied effort lies the virtue of democracy as Cromwell and the pious, stout-hearted founders of New England before him knew.

The purposeful and united democracy whose critical importance for the future we noticed on page 12 cannot come into being until the first essential of democracy of any kind, namely the rule of the people, is in operation. The way to achieve this, as we saw on page 14, is acknowledged by all who desire democracy. As the required legislation was worked out in the minutest detail the better part of a hundred years ago, it is time for the most conservative mind to have found fault in it if there is any. J. S. Mill could find none but in the merest detail.

This measure described briefly in Chapter X and quoted in the Appendix is to enable every elector to feel that he is represented in the House of Commons, and every Member of that House to feel the necessity of representing his consti-

tments and no views but theirs. It or something very much like it is necessary and fundamental to democracy.

On how soon we insist upon and obtain this, or something very much like it, depends the rate of growth of the effectiveness of our democracy; and, therefore, the number of disappointments, disasters and humiliations which we may deserve, expect and suffer meanwhile.

We may now turn to the history whose continuation promises us success in the end. In tracing this history and the succeeding argument the reader will continually notice references back to previous pages. These are to aid critics who may wish to analyse in detail the connected argument before accepting or rejecting it; other readers can readily disregard these references.

## CHAPTER TWO

### BRITISH PROGRESS IN SOCIAL PRACTICE

*This chapter is simply an argument from historical premises, that increasing unity is to be expected among us.*

INNOVATIONS. If a people or a nation is to govern itself democratically—that is according to its own will—it is evident that it must have a will. Whether this will is unified by spontaneous agreement of all the individuals, or whether it is artificially obtained by propaganda, the effect of unity is enormous. Suppose that every Briton including Mr. Brown desires to win a war and that winning the war requires Mr. Brown's farm to be turned into an artillery school, Mr. Brown's desire to win the war will overcome his desire to farm his farm; not only because of Mr. Brown but because the will of a united people is united, while Mr. Brown's will is divided. In discovering the way by which we may obtain the power of a united will in peace time it will be worth while to remember that as in 1939 we went to war against totalitarian Germany, about 150 years ago we went to war against Republican France.

The purpose of this country in the war of 1793 was to defeat the French Revolution, in order to preserve the monarchic and aristocratic system of government in Europe, and especially to prevent the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity from upsetting our own social structure. After twenty years or so we succeeded, inasmuch as we defeated Napoleon and restored a Bourbon to the throne of France. Yet the principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity persisted in France and grew more powerful in this country, even than in France when peace came.

Since then, the personal power of the British monarch has steadily declined, the privileges of aristocracy have become less and less exclusive and the once-high gaps between the extremes among our people, in education and physical wealth, have continually declined towards equality. We

defeated the military power of the French Revolution, but the levelling principle of the Revolution victoriously altered our social structure. The power of France failed when in the Pope's presence in Paris, Napoleon haughtily crowned himself in 1804—Waterloo 1815; and the power of England failed when in 1774, George III tried to govern by decree—Loss of the American Colonies 1781. The final result was the fall of France and the rise of British and American democracy.

A similar division of success has been occurring in the fight between the Democracies and the Totalitarians. Before the outbreak of war, we heard much of the "un-British" nature of everything in the way of regimentation. This ordering of private lives for the benefit of the State was described as being characteristic of Germany and Italy, and we thought of their people as being little better than slaves. But they were slaves of the State, which united them in ambition. The German ambition was to extend totalitarianism to the whole world; and the purpose of this country in the war to frustrate that ambition. Yet, after three years of war, we were already boasting that half of us were in the direct or almost direct employment of the State and considered any activity not doing good to or fulfilling the will of the State to be the business of odd, selfish and inferior people. Our Defence Regulations confer on the State despotic powers over private lives, yet resentment against these powers is rare. In the fury of their unity, the French democrats in 1793 secured the Home Fronts behind their victorious armies with the Law of the Maximum and the Law of Suspects; and it is only in so far as we are democratic and united that we very patiently preserved those legacies for the 1939 war and called them Price Control and the Official Secrets Acts. The Home Front of Totalitarian Germany was secured by powers no more arbitrary than the "suspect" clauses of the Official Secrets Acts. She was no more united than we.

If eventually we become more wisely and more permanently united than the Totalitarians, it need cause no surprise. It has long been our practice to watch what is going on in the world and make use of the experience of others.

In this way we allowed the Spanish to discover America and the Portuguese to discover the Cape of Good Hope. We have gained far more from America than has Spain, and

far more from the Cape than Portugal. Similarly, the first Protestants were Germans; but it was for Britain that Protestantism became that national spiritual force which did more than guns alone could do in defeating the Spanish Armada. Other examples abound. The Chinese who discovered gunpowder thought it only fit for fireworks. We got an Empire with it. It was a Frenchman who first flew the Channel; indeed, even in 1938 our cross-Channel air liners were so much behind the times and so odd that a German tied a tin can on the tail of one of them and all nations laughed. Yet five years later German airmen were driven from the sky and bombers flew across France unharmed in daylight to destroy Italians on the Mediterranean coast.

Because more wisely, we have more effectively developed and used Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, America, gunpowder, Protestantism, aeroplanes and many other things, than have their discoverers or the first European States to experiment in them. The same happy result for ourselves may be expected in our development and use of national and empirical unity; the root of the word "empire" being roughly translated from its Latin, Greek and Sanscrit history to imply "an experiment".\*

But the question is, how shall we develop and use unity? Some have advocated the Russian method, some the German, others have hoped and perhaps still hope, that we may drop the idea altogether after the war. But history, as we have seen and shall see more convincingly, the further we look, teaches us to expect that we shall neither abandon an idea which we have adopted nor merely imitate methods from abroad in using it. We are great improvers. We see that unity is necessary in total war, and some of us foresee that it may be equally indispensable for total peace.

\* Empire = imperium (*Lat.* empire) = in + paro (to design, to bring) cf. phero (*Gr.* to bring) and bhar (*San.* to bring); also, poros (*Gr.* a means of achieving or discovering), and para-a (*San.* to lead, to further.)

Empirical = empiricus (*Lat.* experimenter) = em + peira (*Gr.* an experiment) cf. peiraikos (to accomplish) and peira (a goal, an end); also para- (*San.* to lead, to further).

See Lewis & Short's, also White & Riddle's Latin Dictionary; Liddell & Scott's Greek Lexicon and Macdonell's Sanskrit Dictionary (Oxford University Press).

What we like about unity in war is that it unites us in a common purpose and offers to us greater and speedier victories than could be achieved by any other arrangement. What we dislike about it is the submission of our wills to those who govern us in the name of the State.

This dislike is, of course, the crux of all doubt regarding our use of unity. In briefly scanning our history of adaptation of other people's experiments, so far we have not taken time to notice our methods of dealing with experimental results which we have disliked. It is essential to understand how these dislikes have been overcome or modified if we are to foresee from a basis of history the steps by which unity may be adopted by us permanently.

**METHODS OF ADAPTATION.** If we return to our random examples from the past we shall see that in most of the discoveries there were thorns as well as roses. In the case of America the thorns of sharp-edged independence were so large that, so to speak, we let the roses grow at a distance. If we may carry the metaphor further, the great husbandman Roosevelt plucked the blossoms to place beside our own for the garland of the Victorious United Nations. Those blossoms grown in the soil of a land found by a foreigner are our great gain; but we did little to produce them beyond sending some roots to the new soil. Something similar may be said of the blooms from South Africa presented by Smuts. But when we adopted Protestantism our method of development and use was quite different. Instead of planting roots of the new thing and then, with pricked fingers, leaving it alone, in this case we imported the new thing and grafted it on to something already existing among us. The dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII, although at least as drastic as the seizure of the Church lands in France under the Revolution, left a religious tradition and most of our present cathedrals as well as a church in every parish to supply the early life of the new religious order. Nor was the relationship between the new and the old only that of grafting. The Thirty-nine Articles of State Religion, handed to us from Queen Elizabeth's bishops, contain so nice a mixture of Roman and Lutheran tendencies, that different doctrines over whose clashes blood was spilled



in earlier days, grew amicably side by side under the toleration and protection of the State, except under the luckless Stuarts. The united forces of a great established Church have thus been available to influence and support the policy of the State ever since that judicious Queen's reign.

Our methods of planting and grafting in the cases of America and Protestantism bring us to the third of our examples chosen perfectly at random, namely, our methods with gunpowder. But the story of our adoption of gunpowder contains nothing concerning avoidance, dilutive mixture or any other method of dealing with distasteful elements. This new thing was wholly to our taste and we may, therefore, pass to the subject of aviation.

What we liked about aviation was the help which it gave us in the war against Germany in 1914-18. What we disliked about it was the risk of engine or other failure bringing sudden death to the patrons of air travel. Our method in this case was to leave air travel entirely to private enterprise, while setting up the Department of Civil Aviation, an organ of considerable hindering power. Development of the Royal Air Force was hampered by economy. The result was that our aircraft design lagged far behind developments in other countries. In de-icing, radio aids to navigation and ground organisation we were backward and in general we were hardly able to follow at the distance of a year's progress behind the state-subsidised achievements of other countries. Many individuals overcame their personal dislike of the risk of being killed in an aeroplane, counting the chance of progress worth the risk. With extreme daring and endurance, Brown and Alcock flew the Atlantic; Amy Johnson to Australia. John Grierson, completely unaided, flew an 85-h.p. machine to India and back; and in a 135-h.p. seaplane pioneered singlehanded the Iceland Route to America. Lord Rothermere, impatient of our out-of-date air liners, commissioned the Bristol Aircraft Co. Ltd. to build an all-metal monoplane, which developed a few years later into our best, if not our only, medium bomber. Lady Houston, even more impatient, financed the development of a machine to compete for the Schneider Trophy. This won the Trophy and led to that knowledge which has made British fighters superior to others without which the Battle of Britain could

OPPOSITE : *John Grierson greeted in Canada after his lone flight in 1934.—See 'High Failure,' Hodge & Co. Ltd.*







not have been won in the air by us. But for the same victory we have also to thank the foresight of individual aircraft manufacturers. The initial orders for Hurricanes and Spitfires were too small to justify machine tools for quantity production. These tools were made at the manufacturers' risk, and soon after war was declared it was possible to turn out these aircraft in useful numbers.

Finally, let us look at our adaptation, development and use of the French revolutionary principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. These are most relevant and important because like Unity, they are political principles. In these principles there was much that we mistrusted. There was also room for misrepresentation of ideas and thence doubt, so that we suspected evil even more than we mistrusted the offered benefits. The principles need definition, and the subject was a wordy battlefield. Liberty—very well, within bounds; but we already had it within bounds. Equality, if it meant that everyone was equal or equally deserving, was unsound. Fraternity—it depended on what kind of treatment one expected of a brother.

But what were the bounds of our liberty to be? In general, they argued in the younger Pitt's day, we had economic liberty under the law, every man free to earn as much as he could, when he could, however he could, without risk of endangering the peace—either by working for or by supplying capital to others—ever since the commercial age of Elizabeth succeeded the feudal system. Our political liberty was already flourishing when the Stuart kings vainly asked money of the freely elected Commoners in Parliament nearly 200 years before the French Revolution; and this liberty has been extended gradually by electoral reform to the great majority of the adult population. Religious liberty came later, with the admission of Roman Catholics to offices under the Crown. If Liberty was to be no more than Napoleon allowed to the French, the English had possessed it for centuries and were continually extending its bounds.

As for Equality, the idea was not new in Britain when more than 300 years before the French Revolution, Jack Cade raised a Kentish mob against Henry VI and marched to Smithfield proposing destruction of the aristocracy and an equal share-out among citizens of all material wealth.

Equality of opportunity has in some measure been practised by us, since the foundation of the great public schools for this purpose, whence their name was derived. But no son of bad parents can have the same opportunities as a daughter of good parents. They start differently and they themselves are different.

The practice of Fraternity is at least as old as Christianity which has fostered it and given it a higher purpose than mere mutual benefit. It has shone among us in arms, from the days of Henry's brotherly appeal to his soldiers at Agincourt to those of Nelson's "band of brothers" in the war against the French Revolution itself and our own day.

Not only were these principles more familiar to us in 1792 than to the French, but they have lasted with us longer. About 40 years ago a pun on the word *point* meaning "full stop" and "not at all", was current in France. A Frenchman was supposed to be drawing attention to a civic inscription in which the three words were separated by full stops, exclaiming, *Vous voyez que nous avons Liberté point, Egalité—point, Fraternité—point*. Under Pétain, the Vichy Government even discontinued the use of these three words on the coinage.

Liberty—we know all about it. Our method of adopting it has been one of gradual progress enlightened by a due sense of reality. When the great new world of commerce opened before the Elizabethans they saw the advantage of the State in economic liberty for all kinds of productive venture. Economic liberty was, therefore, tried, approved and increased. It brought us the greatest visible riches in the world, the greatest system of long-distance communications in the world, the first railways in the world and the aircraft which won the Battle of Britain. Political liberty has increased step by step as education has awakened wider classes to the sense of political responsibility. And education received its greatest impetus from the wealth amassed by private capital under this economic liberty; both the great public schools which were founded by private initiative, and the use of complex machinery in industry, have been major factors in keeping British people generally the best informed in the world during the past three hundred years. Religious liberty has been given in measure as our people have become

unwilling to commit treason or cruel outrages for the sake of alleged errors in Christian doctrine—an outcome of education.

Equality. We are beginning to sort out our ideas about it. With the same wise regard for opportunities presented by facts, Equality has been readily admitted where possible, especially in battle, where commoner and nobleman alike depended on sinew and courage; and among the wounded and sick where pain is the dominant leveller and each may expect to face death equally naked. Equality as to means of survival has been the general rule in cases of shipwreck, modified only by precedence of women and children, and equality of opportunity for self-distinction has been the common rule for rich and poor in most crises, where the ability of the poor to avert a common disaster has been as evident as that of the rich.

Fraternity. We have long called it "playing the game". So also with Fraternity, where the makings of brotherly relationship have been observed our forefathers have put them to use. Mutual aid and a friendly rivalry were the rules of the guilds of craftsmen when common interest led to the formation of these societies. Doctors abandoned competition for patients with the formation of the British Medical Association and it is seldom that a doctor speaks ill of or fails to support another. The co-operative societies of the nineteenth century afford splendid examples of mutual aid where no one dreamed of haggling over prices, much less of shop-lifting, and where the idea of adulteration, short weight or deceptive appearance of quality would have revolted the sellers as much as the buyers.

The three social principles, not inseparable from barbarism, are as old as barbarism—it may be said, as old as the herd life of animals. It is our habit to put these and other principles into practice when we see two things: the necessary human material among us and the opportunity that cries for human exploitation. The French Revolution did nothing to advance liberty, equality or fraternity among us except to make us more watchful of the facts of the times. It did this to such effect that our own gradual adoption of these principles has given us in war much freedom, much unity and a moderately easy national conscience; while those who swallowed the three principles whole in 1792, if

they looked up from their graves, saw their descendants in 1940 reduced to slavery divided and a prey to an unquiet conscience.

It may take five years or it may take five hundred. That depends on us. But to take up an idea as we have taken political unity into our democracy and then suddenly drop it would be unlike us. Our historical methods of developing ideas after experiment abroad when the idea contains something contrary to our appetite, therefore, suggests that we may treat unity in one of four ways:

- (1) Establishing unity abroad, watching development and awaiting its reflux;
- (2) Importing and grafting the new unity into our system of old institutions.
- (3) Leaving unity to private enterprise.
- (4) Gradual assimilation of unity into this or that part of our national life as we happen to notice the necessary material and opportunity among us.

No one need be surprised if we develop and use political unity to our lasting strength and advantage, by one or other of these four processes.

\* \* \*

**THE MOST PROBABLE METHOD.** Which of the four methods examined in the foregoing sub-chapter is likely to be adopted by us in the case of uniting democracy?

One of them, namely, leaving the matter to private enterprise is in its nature hardly applicable. Private individuals or even groups of individuals might dedicate themselves wholly to the service of the State and subordinate every private interest to this service. That would be magnificent, but it would not be a united democracy. It would not be a social order at all, but only a voluntary way of life of individuals within some social order. This method must, therefore, be dismissed.

It will equally quickly be observed that the method of planting roots abroad and awaiting developments is hardly more applicable; because although it might be applied as, for instance, in Canada the Social Credit experiment has already been tried, unity is in some degree already among us in this country. What we are seeking is the likeliest

method by which we may develop it here; not at a distance.

There remain to be considered (1) the method of grafting and (2) that of gradual assimilation into one detail of our national life after another. If the method of grafting is adopted, it is necessary to have a social order into which the new unity can be grafted. Can vigour and skill in the use of the knife enable social and political unity to be grafted into democracy?

To answer this question we must first observe that democracy is the government of a State by the people, so that it may be according to the will of the people. We have already understood that a united democracy requires supremacy of the good and the will of the State over the good and the divided will of all individuals. A conjunction of the two would, therefore, imply that the people collectively would govern with absolute power over all individuals for the good of the whole, subordinating to this good, or perhaps neglecting entirely, the good and the will of undecided individuals. There is nothing preposterous in this idea and we may answer at once that social and political unity can be grafted into democracy, in theory. We will consider practice in Chapter IV.

The only method of our four which remains is that of gradual assimilation into one part of our national life after another. Let us see whether this is applicable to our purpose, even in theory.

Our social life may perhaps be divided into five main parts:

- (i) Economy: production, distribution and use of food, shelter and clothing;
- (ii) Medicine: preservation of physical health.
- (iii) Police: preservation of civil order and prevention of enemy invasion.
- (iv) Progeniture: begetting and educating children to inherit the physical and spiritual things that we can give them, and
- (v) Philosophy: pursuit of wisdom including the mental refreshment and the learning necessary for that pursuit.

Is it possible for a people to be united in, say, Economy, without being united in the four other parts of national life?



Let us take a deep breath and plunge into this novel thought. It would mean that all laws regarding industry, agriculture, commerce, transport of goods, and some laws regarding finance and transport of people would be made primarily and perhaps solely for the public good. In these matters, individuals, even under the greatest hardships, would have no rights. In other matters, namely, Medicine, Police, Progeniture, and Philosophy, individuals would have rights and protection which might be contrary or unnecessary to the good of the whole.

Or, in the case of Medicine, is there any impossibility about unity regarding this part of life by itself? It would imply that the health of individuals was primarily a national concern. The purpose and the number of laws affecting all the work of doctors, surgeons, hospitals, nursing homes, child-welfare centres, and much of the work of chemists, nurses, mothers and sports organisers, would be decided according to the good or the will of the State; and individuals would have no rights in regard to their own or their children's health opposed to that good or that will. At the same time in matters of commerce, civil order, mental education, religion, etc., they would have rights which might not necessarily coincide with the good of the State.

Such arrangements might have their merits and their disadvantages, but no one could call them intrinsically impracticable. So with the other cases of unity only in matters of Police, Progeniture or Philosophy, there is no impossibility. We may, therefore, answer that the method of gradual assimilation into one part of our national life after another is one which we could adopt, in developing and using social unity.

We can now be sure not only that a united Britain is possible, but also that there are two methods, both practical and characteristic of us in history, by which this might be brought about. Questions which, therefore, present themselves are: which is the better method of the two—? and, is there any indication that we are choosing one or the other?

The method of grafting as we have already seen, was our choice in the case of Protestantism; and the method of gradual assimilation in the case of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Grafting was the method with the spiritual

force; gradual assimilation with the social relationships. Is social unity a spiritual force or a social relationship? Undoubtedly, it is the latter. But may it not imply a spiritual force as well? Let us examine social unity in the case where a youth was conscripted into the German army. It is true that he had certain rights—If ill-treated he might appeal to a superior officer—but no rights opposed to the good or the will of the State. He was surrounded entirely by others in like circumstances, each knowing that although perhaps no one cared about his welfare as an individual it was the duty of everyone to care for his welfare inasmuch as he was part of the State. Similarly, it was his duty to care for the welfare of all other members of the State. We know that in the case of the German army where this relationship was imposed by a despot and supported by propaganda, a spiritual force was generated. The fighting spirit of the German army remained high, if not in all circumstances, at least in adverse conditions and without the religious aids which have inspired the soldiers of other countries.

How much more, then, must this relationship imply a spiritual force when a democratic nation chooses it! Instead of feeling it his duty to care for the welfare of a mass of people under the same duty as his own, the individual feels it his duty to care for the welfare of a mass of people voluntarily subordinating individual to public interests—a far more inspiring and attractive duty. We must, therefore, admit that social unity must imply a great spiritual force, and we have seen no reason why it might not as successfully as Protestantism, be grafted on to democracy.

Having noticed a precedent in history for each of two methods of adoption, we may wonder whether there is in the nature of the thing to be adopted anything which recommends one or other method. The thing to be adopted is a social relationship, implying a spiritual force. What else is it?

It is a thing which many might not like; but so was Protestantism. It is a thing with a foreign history; but Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were as much identified with foreign ideas. It is antagonistic to individual liberty; but so is every social system. It is a system ideally requiring complete unselfishness; but so are the moral codes of Christianity and many other forms of religion. We shall find



difficulty in naming anything in our history or in the nature of social unity itself, that would offer any assistance in the choice between the two methods in question.

Our last inquiry, so far unanswered, is whether there is any indication that we actually are choosing one method or the other.

For war purposes we have introduced conscription, rationing, censorship and power of the State summarily to suspend newspapers, together with many other restrictions of individual liberty. The effect of these is that in two parts of our life which we have called Economy and Police, both the good and the will of the State are understood by law to be placed before the good and the will of the individual. In another part, which we have called Philosophy, some of the previous rights of individuals have been destroyed. For example, the will and even the good of an individual may require the publication of certain sorts of knowledge and arguments, which can be suspended at the will of the State, and he has no remedy until the will of the State is altered.

But in the remaining parts of our national life, which we have called Medicine and Progeniture, liberties of individuals continue, although they may not coincide with the will or even the good of the State. There has been no law to compel people to listen to propaganda as there was in Germany, although this might be in the interest of the State as it was considered to be in Germany. There is no law compelling an individual to wear spectacles, although the public might be better served if he or she did so.

This examination discloses the fact that for war purposes we have chosen the method of gradual assimilation into one part of our national life after another.

Some believe that all our previous liberties will be restored and that wartime measures indicate no permanent tendency. Let them remember the legislation, expressly intended to end with the 1914 war and passed by Parliament only on the understanding that it would end with that war, which nevertheless survives to this day. Besides, the liberties of individuals were much restricted by legislation in peacetime, between the two wars. For example, in the choice of what manner of building a farmer should build to house his cows if their milk was to be sold, the good and the will of the

farmer were entirely subjected to the good or at least the will of the State.

If we look at all the facts we shall have to acknowledge that although we may, if we wish, undo what we have done, we have begun to develop and use unity as a permanent characteristic of our social order by the method of gradual assimilation.

In history we have not been noted for quickly taking or retracing our steps, and we may confidently expect ourselves to become increasingly united by this method which we have already adopted.

## CHAPTER THREE

### DESTINY

*This chapter is an interpretation of great poetry as prophesying British political unity.*

HITLER is reputed to have said that he pursued his destined course like a somnambulist, presumably expecting to wake up in some pleasant situation. The same thing might be said of ourselves except that we regard waking up as a thing to be avoided. One day we awoke and found that we were at war with Germany. We quickly dozed off again. Then followed the Battle of Britain. It was a nightmare and we walked in our sleep seeing visions. Destiny set a somnambulist to catch a somnambulist. Not knowing our strength or what we were doing at the time, we shattered Hitler's hopes of a pleasant situation in which to awake. One day, shall we wake up for a moment and find ourselves completely united?

Few, if any, little men, but many great men, have believed in what they called their destiny. Few nations similarly have believed in what they have called their destiny. We are one of these few nations and the Germans are another. Both have been great. But we have been singing, "Britannia, rule the waves!" for a century; and Shakespeare called our home not ours but Nature's fortress "built by Nature for herself". Our belief in our destined security and advantage over what he makes John of Gaunt call "less happier lands" is four hundred years old. The Germans' belief in themselves as *herrenvolk*, like the somnambulism, was an imitation but five years old when it became the first real German world-joke.

But Milton believed in our destiny as something more than physical. What, he says, does (God) do then but reveal himself to his servants, and as his manner is, first to his Englishmen . . . ? (Vol. II, p. 90.)\* There are tens of thousands of English-speaking people who to-day believe

\*Bohn Edn.

that however unaware of it the majority of us may be, we are destined to reveal for the good of mankind a truth at present beyond exact human knowledge and a way of life happier than that of any present or past social order.

If Shakespeare, Milton and their modern followers are right, may this destiny not lead us to—and may this new way of life not be found in—a united democracy? Let us examine this question.

We noticed on page 21 that what we like about social unity is that it offers greater or speedier success than could be achieved by any other social system—which is our reason for having adopted it partially in war; and on page 29, that it is a thing requiring unselfishness of individuals and implying a spiritual force. Is either of these characteristics inconsistent with Shakespeare's or Milton's or our own idea of what is British? On the contrary, these characteristics are wholly British. We are winners of great, if not always quick success. The basis of our national games which for a hundred years and more have been practised and taught at our great public schools expressly as an idealised type of life, is unselfish team work expressed in the word "sportsmanship". This is so wholly British, men of other thought and language have no word for it; the French hardly grasp our conception of it when they speak about "*le sport*". And we are considerable wielders of spiritual force—apart from being the greatest missionary nation consciously by means of societies—unconsciously by comparative honesty in politics and commerce and by comparative goodness in dealing with colonial and other peoples physically weaker than ourselves. We have wielded the force of example by considering what is right as well as, and sometimes even before, our own advantage.

Yet there may be those who will say that the abandonment of our individual liberties, inherent in unity, would be contrary to the aspirations of Shakespeare and Milton and unfaithful to ourselves. This feature of the thing is un-British, they may say. We certainly noted on page 21 that submission of our wills to those who command us in the name of the State is what we dislike about it; and although we have partly adopted the thing and, as we saw in Chapter II, show signs of retaining it permanently, those who regard it as un-British believe and hope that we shall keep it only temporarily.

This belief and this hope would have some foundation in our character and history if abandonment of personal liberty were really contrary to the aspirations of Shakespeare or Milton. But in fact both were members of the Church of England, and in the Liturgy of that Church occurs a prayer beginning with the words, "O God . . . whose service is perfect freedom . . ." These words offer to convert the minds of those who regard a united democracy as un-British. If the words are a little confusing, it is not surprising because they are a paradox. Service is nothing without obedience, and obedience requires abandonment of freedom in order to follow directions received. The giver of directions may have perfect freedom; it is the servant who abandons it. But it is possible to abandon freedom and yet keep it, and this is what is meant by the Church which Shakespeare and Milton acknowledged.

For example, when a small capitalist decides at all costs to become as quickly as possible a big one, he must not spend a penny on himself, he may not amuse himself, he is forbidden to take holidays, he may neither smoke, drink, laugh, grumble nor praise, except in so far as these actions are calculated to aid him to his purpose. He is bound to save, compelled to work, forced to smoke, drink, laugh, grumble and praise, whenever these things are necessary to his purpose. He is a slave to ambition; yet perfectly free to be otherwise. But it is his own ambition. Service is perfect freedom when we serve only purposes identified with our own.

Shakespeare and Milton believed themselves to be composed of mortal body and immortal spirit; and they believed the service of God to be perfect freedom only when their own spirit was identified with what they regarded as the spirit of God. Humanists, agnostics and atheists to-day may, in the language of to-day—or, scientists in the language of science, or mystics in the language of mysticism—may describe, or attempt to describe, and believe in what Shakespeare and Milton tried to describe and believed in as God, having their own words for their own conceptions. The experience of perfect liberty simultaneously with abandonment of liberty for the service of something greater than individuals or groups of individuals, is therefore not confined to those who share Shakespeare's or any other religion. The

paradox of service in perfect freedom is an experience open to all, individually or in groups, however large.

For this reason we must conclude, that the abandonment of personal liberty in favour of the State, in a united democracy, is not contrary to the aspirations of Shakespeare or Milton; for those who abandon liberty are identified with the State. And, where this identity exists, there is neither ground for regarding unity as un-British, nor foundation in our character or history for the belief or the hope that our adoption of it will only be temporary.

If we may suppose Shakespeare and Milton to have been right in their views of our destiny, our answer to the question—May this destiny lead to a united democracy and therein a new way of life happier than any before known?—must be that it may. Such an outcome would be consistent with their beliefs. We have not asserted that Shakespeare was right in believing us to be destined to safety as a people or Milton in believing us to be charged with revelation of divine knowledge. But there exist substantial numbers of people willing to assert these things, either in this language or the language of some science or mystery. Supposing them to be right, we have not stated unity to contain the secret of an undiscovered and happy new way of life towards which we are moving. But we have seen that we have begun to adopt this new social factor and that it unites with other British characteristics the possibilities of a spiritual force. We have noticed also, however, that its British character depends upon individuals being identified with the State which they would serve. Government, in fact, must be completely representative.

The British nature of a popular unity and the un-British nature of an imposed unity, would remain, even if Milton, Shakespeare and their fellow-believers in our destiny were wrong.

Shakespeare makes John of Gaunt call our country "demi-paradise". Milton, in similar language, not the language of modern war, must have been describing something very like the Battle of Britain when he wrote:

"The towers of Heaven are filled  
With armed watch, that render all access  
Impregnable; oft on the bordering deep



Encamp their legions, or with obscure wing  
Scout far and wide into the realm of night . . ."  
(*Paradise Lost II*, 129).

The Battle of Britain has been fought and our tendency is towards a new way, which may be a happier way than those of the past. We have tasted the satisfaction of victory in unity, and, when as a people we next wake from our somnambulism, if we find that the country in which we walk is no longer demi-paradise but Paradise—the Heaven on Earth for which the Russians have been striving these past twenty-five years—we need feel no surprise. If we suffer nightmares meanwhile, we shall have ourselves to blame for bad habits that cause nightmares. We shall justify the trust of Milton and Shakespeare if we look well to our habits and have faith in our destiny.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE FIRST OF THREE DIFFICULTIES : DISUNITY OF PURPOSE

PARLIAMENT, THE SEAT OF DIFFICULTY. In the foregoing chapter, we have been engaged with paradox, poetry and prophecy, matters on which it is wise to be reluctant in making precise statements. When approaching the whole and final truth of a matter, either paradoxes or other doubtful elements are always found. If we have used our brains to the best of our ability, these doubts may offer some hope that we are approaching final truth. Action may be modified by doubt. But voluntary action must be based on knowledge and in our moments of emergence from somnambulism, as on Election Day, we must take voluntary positive or negative action. Day by day and month by month at present we are, perhaps unconsciously, taking action. We are assimilating unity into one part after another of our national life. What knowledge of social unity have we now collected which we can state precisely?

First we know that social unity has been largely adopted by us as being necessary in total war, and that, whether in war or peace, it offers greater and quicker success than are possible without it. This much we observed in Chapter II. In the last section of the same chapter we noticed the more likely of two methods by which we may adopt and keep it permanently; we noticed there also that we dislike the necessary submission which may be un-British. But in Chapter III we found that its British or un-British character depends on individuals being able to identify their own with the purpose of the State.

In a democracy this identification should not be difficult. The people should tell their minds to their paid servants, the legislators; the legislators should make and abrogate laws accordingly. The Executive—in this country, the Ministers responsible for Departments, instructed by the voting at the last General Election and subsequent utterances of legislators—should direct the Heads of Departments to fulfil the people's

will, for which purpose powers are given by the laws. The Heads of Departments with these powers should give orders to the people for the fulfilment of this, their own will.

By this process, the will of the individual would become the will of the State, and the individual, renouncing all freedom would find in complete devotion to service a perfect freedom. In this happy condition, he would proceed to enjoy the full benefit of unity, namely, the sum of his own physical and spiritual power to achieve his own will, multiplied by the number of individual members of the State. Any disobedience on his own or anyone else's part would injure this power and therefore the perfection of this freedom.

Three difficulties occur in practice. First, all the members of the State do not always wish the same thing, so that it is not possible for their wills always to be identified with that of the State. Second, the legislators sometimes think that they know better than other members of the State, and wilfully represent as the will of the State, something different from the will of members other than themselves. Third, when members cease to wish a thing they fail to acquaint their legislators with the fact, so that the will of the State, as represented by the law and carried out by the executive, ceases to be the will of the members.

The first of these difficulties is for individuals, the second for the legislature and the third for both individuals and the legislature. As in this country the members of the State comprise millions of individuals and the legislature only hundreds, it is natural that the first and third difficulties should be thousands of times more difficult to obviate than the second. All three are great difficulties. They are precisely the difficulties through which in 1938 a nation which desired to be well prepared for war, remained ill-prepared for war. But are they insurmountable?

**EFFORTS TO UNIFY DESIRE.** The first difficulty may be solved by unity of purpose among the millions of individual members of the State. We can already see something like this taking place in broad issues. For instance, most of us have desired to win the 1939 world war more than anything else, so that we would willingly sacrifice anything, even life itself,

if by so doing we could achieve that desire. This is the reason why we were able to adopt a large measure of unity for war purposes. In 1914-18 we were not nearly so much united; we had nothing like the Battle of Britain, and infringement of personal liberty could not be pushed so far. In the war of 1793 neither unity nor abandonment of personal liberty was noticeable at all as a major factor. Napoleon had scarcely begun to remind Europe of the total wars of Jenghiz Khan.

The difficulty of unity is not confined to democracy, but is evident wherever total human effort is required. It was noticed during the twenty years preceding 1940 in the Russian and German social experiments. For years, Germany's blatant propaganda was employed to unite the people in a sense of wrong suffered and passionate desire to right it. In Russia, continually repetitive propaganda was used to unite all in belief in the greatness and wealth of their country, and their possession of this greatness and wealth under the guidance of loveable leaders, endangered by certain enemies; possessive agricultural workers, lazy factory workers, etc. It was the simple call to fight for one's own and to fight under good leadership. Even the difficulties of economics and industry were made familiar to the unlearned by means of the simple language of war. There was a struggle for bread, a fight against clandestine storage of corn, a shock brigade for increasing the productivity of labour in this or that factory, a victory when the five-year economic plan was completed in four.

As Russia at that time complained of no external war and her internal order was well maintained, this language of war can be regarded only as being highly metaphorical. Flights of the Government into this literary style, instead of remaining content with calling a spade a spade and a shortage a shortage, was evidence of a need to appeal to something more powerful than reason alone. The need for unity was very urgent.

It was not until the third year of the most nearly total war in our history, that the British Government departed so far from plain statement as to issue a poster bearing the words, "The Battle for Fuel". This poster did not, as it might be supposed to do, encourage citizens to assault one another for the purpose of capturing fuel. It encouraged them to avoid fuel, as far as possible. The whole purpose of this poster lay

in the possible non-existence of fuel for private purposes. The intention was not that people should employ their brain on the difficulties of obtaining fuel. It was to employ their imagination, to instil the idea that by doing nothing they could assist the real soldiers who were fighting real battles and to picture themselves as taking part in these battles, feeling the excitement which battles cause. This idea is sensible enough to be expressed in plain language, appealing to reason for results. It was expressed in metaphor to excite as passionate desire for results.

UNITY ACHIEVED IN WAR. Such have been efforts to constitute unity of desire in this and other lands. Thoughts of fighting have been a constant feature of social unity under dictatorship both in Germany and Russia. This warlike element has been necessary in order to inflame a sense of danger and a passion to oppose injury in some detail of national life without which men's self-protective instinct might have turned against the harshness of their dictators. A similar sense of danger and a simple passion have united us in war and overcome our distaste for imperfections of our wartime arrangements, where some of our wishes have diverged from those enforced as being the wishes of the State.

But if our unity were perfectly democratic there would be no divergence. We need not suppose that every action of a united democracy must be inspired by an enemy. The wishes of a democracy are likely to be peaceful and its genius is most naturally employed in time of peace.

In peacetime, how can we have this unity of purpose day by day? At election time we allow Parties and candidates to tell us what we want; and the organs of State propaganda in Russia and Germany have continually told people what to want and what to avoid. Shall we make this, a perpetual function of the Prime Minister and allow no newspaper to print anything except to assist these ideas? We have tended to do so in war. For example, we wanted a Second Front in the summer of 1942. Our idea was to defeat Germany in 1942 and such a front was almost or quite the most formidable thing feared by the German army. But the Prime Minister said, wait. Thereafter no one who counted for much in the



country said anything but, wait . . . . Leave it to the experts! And, suddenly, we considered that we were well enough off without a Second Front in Europe in the summer of 1942. A Second Front somewhere else or at some other time became our new desire.

This change of desire was caused by no infirmity of purpose. Our purpose remained to defeat Germany and to frustrate the German ambition of world totalitarianism. Our desire as to immediate action changed because we were reminded of the experts. After three years' obvious preparation, Germany had enveloped Europe, and we believed that after three years of war production we were in a position at last to maintain a second front in Europe. This belief gave way to doubt. All relevant knowledge was provided for the Prime Minister by the experts and kept secret from us. We did not know whether we had enough material to meet the German army in Europe, whether the Navy had up-to-date aircraft, whether our intelligence was good or whether we had shipping enough to maintain a front against the Germans in Europe. We were reminded that there had been shortage of material at Singapore, that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* escaped the Navy's out-of-date aircraft in the Channel, that our Intelligence cost lives at Dakar and that losses of shipping by U-boat action could not be published. The facts of these matters in the summer of 1942, we knew, might be in the favour of attacking some weaker enemy than the German army in Europe, at some date later than the summer.

In war we are content that the Prime Minister should have this monopoly of facts leaving ourselves to be influenced by such parts of them as he may wish to publish, or to grope, if we so wish, among vague ideas of possibilities. We do not even ask for facts, for fear that some resident among us might allow them by obscure means to reach the enemy and perhaps\* delay the very victory which is our chief desire. Few questions were asked when we were told that we had gained information by a landing at Dieppe, in which almost the whole of the force of several thousand men landed fell prisoners into the

\* Issues of the official *Parliamentary Debates* for 1943-4 are worth re-reading as records of the Prime Minister's manner, up to his defence of the Churchill tank on 2.8.44.



hands of the Germans, and there was no public outcry, when a Member of Parliament who asked about defects in the new type of tank abandoned there received only a frivolous answer from the Prime Minister. The monopoly of information with which the Prime Minister enabled him to change our day-to-day desires. He or his adviser had only to tell us that the best place for a renowned gunnery expert at the Admiralty was not at the head of the Gunnery Division but the Naval Air Division, for us immediately to wish to see our naval air force continue to fly in the manner desired by this expert. In the same way we were persuaded to desire to help our fighting men by the rationing of fuel. The rationing of fuel was prevented by a group of Conservative Members of Parliament known as the 1922 Committee, who knew more than the public knew. They decided to break the monopoly of information; they drew attention to faults in the information given to the public by the Minister for Fuel, the Press took up the tale, and our desire for fuel rationing at once changed into a desire to prevent the rationing of fuel.

These incidents show not only that our day-to-day desires can be controlled by control of information, but also that control of information is essential to the control of desire. It is, therefore, indispensable where democracy is to be united. In war, we allow our wishes, as to means, to be dictated to us by the Prime Minister because we are certain that the end desired by him is identical with that desired by ourselves.

But in peace time we have never shared with the Prime Minister an object so dear that we have been willing to abandon to him the monopoly of relevant information in order to achieve the object. We have, therefore, never experienced the factor necessary for national unity in our day-to-day desires in peacetime.

The peaceful object to be shared with the Prime Minister, so dear that for its sake we would abandon to him this monopoly, would have to be of an immensity equal to that of our object in the war declared in 1939. We have never given it on account of anything less; and we cannot be expected to do so.

THE COST OF MONOPOLISED INFORMATION. Its cost is enormous. Under cover of secrecy from the public, blunders

can be made by technicians, scathless and uncorrected if they can convince one to whom all knowledge is available—but who may not be a technician—that they are blameless. The Prime Minister may seek the advice of other technicians within the secret-laden ring; but without provoking discord, they can only give advice agreeable with the first. Discord is, of course, completely contrary to unity and the plan of setting a technician to catch a technician, even in a system of partial unity, if employed, has not prevented the wholesale waste disclosed by the Committee on National Expenditure, nor the loss—scarcely noticed—of \*British warships that cost more to construct than the whole German Navy.

The result in war includes a loss of life and material that is incalculable, but some idea of it may be obtained by a glance backwards through history. During the period 1793–1803 when there was little unity, three years of mistakes led to public discontent, increased by political divisions, with resultant changes in the Government, the Admiralty and the naval Commands, followed immediately by the victory off Cape St. Vincent and those of Nelson won at astonishingly little cost. This train of events was started by the Opposition, led in the Lower House by Fox and in the Upper by the Marquis of Lansdowne and Lord Lauderdale who were “more than ever convinced of the incompetence of His Majesty’s Ministers”. Major Maitland accused the *Gazette* of dishonesty in its account of the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1793 and wanted to know the number of cannon left behind on the occasion. The thanks of Parliament were refused to Lord Hood who captured Corsica in the same year without securing the safety of British ships in the Mediterranean, and returned home in the *Victory* which afterwards earned her name at Trafalgar. Those who desire to pursue this subject may care to read *Victory in Retreat*,† where it is treated with the liberty possible in a novel based on State Papers as well as the standard histories.

If we turn to the war of 1914–18, we find less public information, less discontent and no such victory as that of the

\* See the War Losses Section of *Jane’s Fighting Ships 1943-4* (Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd.).

† In preparation.

Nile or Trafalgar. No admiral risked his reputation by accepting great odds in battle impelled as Sir John Jervis was by the thought "England stands in great need of a victory to-day". Less regard of the public and greater dependence on the Admiralty induced a less generous but more obedient mentality.

In the recent war, episodes like the Battle of Britain, the defence of Tobruk and the fight of the *Jervis Bay* have shown the fighting qualities of our men and their officers to be on the highest level known to man. But we have been bewildered by tendentious official information, uncritical war correspondents and official silences after defeats with the effect of drowning public interest in a sea of acknowledged ignorance. As a result, half the world's shipping has been sunk by an inferior navy—a navy costing far less than our own in terms of primary commodities and sterling—and tens of thousands of our troops have been so placed as to surrender themselves to the enemy with scarcely a word of indignation on our part.

These comparisons between wars give some measure of the cost in regard to day-to-day action obtained by the method of monopolising information and thus swaying the popular mind. There is no need here to point out the debasing nonsense that can be published through unscrupulous use of this monopoly. But, for those who care for the psychology of propaganda, the idea is developed by the bureaucrats in *She Came To Command* (Simpkin Marshall), Act III, Scene I, and summed up by the lyrical Sofia when she begins:

My aim is to weaken the popular will  
 With a patent poetical laxative pill  
 And thus to diminish the popular rage  
 At the numerous blots upon yesterday's page;  
 I want to bamboozle the popular brain  
 With a torrent of verbiage crassly insane.  
 I want to re-educate popular thought

To be not what they think but what I think they ought.  
 If the unpleasant girl had only kept to prose, however, she would not have differed much more from some of our wartime publicists, than a caricature. Could any peaceful object justify toleration of the propagandist's fatuity and bombast?

THE EFFICIENCY OF UNITY. To answer this question, we must balance gain and loss in terms of efficiency. Has the

torrent of verbiage done us much harm? What we have observed in the past few pages as resulting from our growing unity in war since 1793, has been the increase of executive inefficiency covered by secrecy and controlled information. Waste in modern war is prodigious. But this is not all that we must notice. There has also been increasingly effective unification of opinion and desire so that, in the three wars considered, increasingly large proportions of our population—bamboozled or not—have been united in service of the country. Progressive adoption of this new social system in time of war has placed progressively larger means in the hands of our Governments, which they have used with declining efficiency. But even after the greater loss of inefficiency, in, say 1942, a larger proportion of our people's total effort was turned against the enemy than in 1805 or 1918. That is to say, as regards the single aim of victory, the total power of our people has been more efficiently employed at each step in history towards complete unity. The increase in taxation is a measure of the increase of this canalising efficiency; and these increases may be judged by the fact that in 1793 there was no Income Tax whatever. Propaganda plays its part in making people willing to pay for public efforts.

In debating whether efficiency in pursuit of any peaceful object would justify the required monopoly of information—which we may notice again in Chapter IX—we must, therefore, remember that a much larger object is attainable than would be attainable without a method of unifying the popular will in day-to-day matters.

**MULTIPLE OBJECTS OF DESIRE.** The first of the three difficulties which we are examining in the present chapter can be overcome, as we saw on page 38, by unity of purpose; and, on account of its cost, we saw on page 42 that this unity requires a purpose at least as great as our object in the war of 1939. We may now add, that it must be our sole object. The history of the eighteenth century clearly indicates the effect of divided purpose.

In the war of 1793–1802, the members of our State had many objects as dear as the defeat of the French. Merchants desired to prosper and therefore to trade with France; war

impeded trade, and they, with the Marquis of Lansdowne, called the war "fatuous". Members of the London Corresponding Society desired to introduce social reforms of very Republican colour and had no quarrel with France. Although farmers and industrialists generally were willing to attack the Republic as such, they had also their profits to get.

As the will of the country was an agglomeration of the unified wills of such people, divided effort was required to fulfil it. The merchants, knowing their business, adapted themselves to wartime circumstances so efficiently, that Income Tax, though not yet introduced, became a lucrative possibility for the State.\* The London Corresponding Society's affairs were conducted so efficiently, that it threatened the social structure of the country; the Royal coach was mobbed in St. James's Park, and the liberal reforms favoured by Pitt and the Duke of Richmond ten years earlier, including an early form of proportional representation in Parliament, were shelved, as being tinged with the dye of that formidable Society. Farmers, industrialists and the war effort also met with the success earned by efficient experts; good crops were harvested, money-saving machinery was developed and isolated captures of French territory made.

For attainment of these diverse objects, centralisation of the national effort would have entailed intolerable inefficiency. We have obtained some idea of the cost of monopoly and centralisation in the 1939-45 war, in which at least the nation had only one main stated object. The task of a Government having five conflicting objects—those of the avid merchants, the London Corresponding Society, the farmers, the industrialists and Fighting Services—we may safely say, would never have been fulfilled. These objects were attained by the enterprise of individuals, often antagonistic to the Government. The object of a unified democracy must be not only very great but also the nation's sole object; and it is precisely in attaining a great and single object, that the unity of large-scale centralisation is efficient. It is inasmuch as our Government has considered other objects, such as the prestige of politicians, the rivalry of allies and the advantage of com-

\* Imposed in 1798 for the war only; taken off in 1816. Reimposed in 1842. To have been abolished (1853) by 1860, but kept on for Crimean War, 1854.



merce, and not only our great and single object in war, that our progress in war has been slow, waste of material prodigious, and of lives unpardonable.

**THE NATURE OF A NATIONAL OBJECT.** Greatness is a relative matter, and the greatness of the peaceful object for which we are looking will depend on the total power of the State concerned. But the nature of the object may be studied on a smaller scale. On page 34, we were helped to understand the possibility of freedom in service under social unity, by considering the case of a small capitalist. Not only a human being, but every healthy animal is a good example of unity on a small scale. The good of each member and organ is wholly subject to the good of the whole; and the reflexes, or nearest approach to will, of each member, equally subject to the will of the healthy animal. The operation of these members in gaining the object of an individual, therefore, may have its parallel in the operation of members of a united State; and this in turn may help us to see the kind of object which a united State can attain.

For example, cold as the fingers may be, they do not let go, to warm themselves in the sailor's trousers pocket—if they did, he would fall from aloft and end as quickly as the shattered unity of his system. If any organ or member has information—such as the fact that it is cold—this is immediately passed to the brain; and no other member knows about it. The brain decides on action. The sailor is a unit. His sole object is to overcome the difficulties of work aloft, and this occupies his whole body and mind.

When the fist strikes the jaw of the opposing boxer, it does not tell the other fist that the wrist has been sprained, but only the brain, which decides that the opponent must be felled with a shrewder blow. Consequently, instead of being afraid, the other fist, better prepared, strikes as hard as the first, but with better aim, and the opponent collapses. Neither does the brain allow any loose talk by the tongue for the information of members, but keeps its monopoly of knowledge to itself, except where a man talks to himself—which is accepted as a symptom of lunacy; but the brain issues a mass of propaganda, so that the boxer's face grins, frowns or looks stony, not as the brain is amused, angry or stolid, but accord-



ing as it deems the opponent likely to be weakened and its fellow members encouraged by the sentiments suggested. The boxer is a unit. All his faculties are matched against an opponent equal to himself.

THE ANIMAL ANALOGY. In the united animal, each member leads a life of complete freedom inasmuch as the whole animal is free. The members unite in complete and instant obedience to the brain, except in the case of paralysis. It is the healthy, not the unhealthy animal, that is at unity with itself. But complete health—and therefore complete efficiency in action—depends also on the brain distributing orders properly among the members. Pit ponies become blind through not using their eyes. The object served in life by the fully efficient animal must occupy all its organs and members. Similarly, the great and peaceful object for which we are looking should occupy all the members of the State.

If we accept the foregoing history and analogies, we must conclude that the first of our three difficulties can be solved by a peaceful national object having three qualities, namely:

- (i) Greatness in proportion to the total power of the State
- (ii) Supremacy as the sole object of the State, and
- (iii) Capacity to employ all the members of the State.

Further consideration of this third quality appears in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE FIRST DIFFICULTY FURTHER CONSIDERED : A SPIRITUAL AIM

*In this chapter we look for an object fit to inspire  
all people with unselfishness in peacetime.*

**THE DEPARTMENTS OF LIFE.** The Latin *civitas* is a State, and civilisation is the formation of States as opposed to the disunity and conflict of barbarism. We have seen that a healthy animal has in its members the exact relationships found in a proper internally united State. And, as we concluded, the object for which we are looking must occupy all the members. These members individually have special functions in social life, for it takes all sorts to make a world, all sorts of characters and abilities: the Latin *socius* is a companion, and social life is nothing but life in a civilised condition. Civilised life is a disguised barbarism, unless it is life in a state of companionship. The mutual help of this companionship enables people to specialise in their occupations instead of being all huntsmen, or all fighters like the barbarians.

As we saw in Chapter II, social life is mainly divided into what we have called:

- (i) Economy: production, distribution and use of food, shelter and clothing.
- (ii) Medicine: preservation of physical health.
- (iii) Police: preservation of civil order and prevention of enemy invasion.
- (iv) Progeniture: begetting and educating children to inherit the physical and spiritual things that we can give them.
- (v) Philosophy: pursuit of wisdom, including the mental refreshment and learning necessary for that pursuit.

**KNOWLEDGE OF SUPERHUMAN LAWS.** The higher animals exhibit all of these five divisions of life, and even insects such

as ants, several of them. But here we must be careful not to pursue the analogy beyond the real resemblances. In the pursuit of wisdom man has, so far as we know, been alone in one particular. The study of nature and abstract science has convinced him that laws exist which no known creature could have made, and of progressive tendencies in an ordered universe, which suggest some power controlling, or attempting to control, the universe. Partly because the control seems to be incomplete, partly because the progress seems sometimes to be retrogressive, and partly for other reasons, he is unable to describe this suggested power at all perfectly. Theologians and atheistic philosophers disagree with one another's descriptions of this power. But all agree that the Law of Gravity has been caused by a power—even if called only Chance—more far-reaching than anything animal, or vegetable or mineral.

Are beasts ever aware of this power?

After swallowing a goat, for all we know to the contrary, the dozing python may ponder the origin of the natural laws. But pythons are extremely illiterate and the sum of such meditations, if any, has been handed down by succeeding generations of pythons with no effect on the conduct of pythons. If this heritage of pythons exists, therefore, it amounts to nothing effective. The conduct of higher animals is equally unchanging. The conduct of man, on the contrary, under the influence of the meditations of Chinese sages, Greek philosophers and Christ has changed enormously; and under influences, all exercised by men acknowledging the existence of superhuman laws, even such men as Jenghiz Khan and Torquemada, conduct has varied even more, sometimes retracing its steps, but always at least moving throughout the history of the nations. This constant changing of conduct reveals among human beings in the last of the five parts of life named above, a function which beasts do not possess. It is obvious, therefore, that this function must operate in attaining the object suitable to be the purpose of the State, for which we are looking. People might prefer to keep a pet asp to living with a man like Torquemada. But, on account of man's propensity for change, there is more hope for a better world in the illegitimate descendants of the most repulsive priest, than in the descendants of an asp.

We need not part company with theologians or atheistic philosophers or agnostics by calling this function of observation and change morality, immorality, religion, philosophy, or black magic. Some disagreements are genuine, but unreal disagreements are often imagined as genuine because of unrealised differences of definition, and, even when definitions are agreed, by unrealised differences of understanding. These differences of understanding have been illustrated in some such lines as the following which are quoted, perhaps incorrectly, from memory:

“From a fire cloud to a planet,  
From a crystal to a cell,  
From the jellyfish to the saurion  
And the caves where cavemen dwell,  
To the sense of law and duty,  
The face turned from the sod—  
Some call it evolution,  
Others call it God.”

It might be added, “neither one nor the other party knowing what causes evolution or what God is”. Our knowledge of evolution and of God is limited by the amount of our research and further by our understanding. Our purpose is to find an object to occupy all the members of a human State.

Let us, therefore, be content to acknowledge the power that made the Law of Gravity, which we obey unconsciously, and such laws of morality—varied, magnified and diminished in consequence of meditation from age to age—as we or our forefathers have acknowledged and obeyed by common consent. Theologians, atheistic philosophers, and even savages, being human, have always acknowledged this power. On human conceptions of this power, human conduct has depended. For example, Confucius said, “If several years more of life were granted to me, I would give fifty to the study of the *Book of Changes*, and then I might live without any considerable errors”. (*Analects* vii, xvi). The *Book of Changes* treats of harmony in a universe under super-human power; and he left the world a politer place. But David said of this same supreme power, “Who is the King of Glory? The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle” (Psalm xxvi, 14); and spent the best years of his life in fighting. Pythons obey the Law of Gravity; so did Newton’s

apple. The water in Archimedes's bath obeyed the law of displacement afterwards propounded by that philosopher. The water was unconscious of the law; but Archimedes was conscious of it. And, although obeying the law of Gravity as unconsciously as the apple or the python, men, especially parachutists, are quite able to obey the Law consciously. This consciousness of the Law is human intelligence. Different conceptions of the power that made the Law have resulted in the different civilisations of David and Confucius, East and West, one century and the next.

Social animals, such as beavers, and even insects obey social laws, enjoying such highly ordered life as that of the beehive. Beavers and bees are civilised. But the changeless conduct of their life leads us to believe that bees and beavers are as little conscious of the laws and duties which guide their actions as the dozing python, Newton's apple or the water which rose when Archimedes sank. The distinguishing feature of man then is neither Law nor Duty amounting to civilisation, but knowledge of them—the *sense* of Law and Duty. The corollary is, "The face turned from the sod", and some may care to regard this attitude of men's faces turned up from the earth as they often are, to look ahead, as figurative of man's search for the power which made the Law. On this knowledge and search for further knowledge, depends the future history of human civilisation.

**FREE WILL.** As it is briefly indicated above, study of animal life will assure us that all men have, in the part of life which we have called Philosophy, functions that animals do not possess at all. But these functions include not only the conscious acceptance of super-human laws and social duties, and study of the power behind these laws, but also the application of these laws.

For instance, the parachutist, consciously obeying the Law of Gravity, manipulates its action by the aid of rather complex laws of dynamics which act on him through the strength and shape of the parachute so that he falls a great deal slower than Newton's apple. By judiciously pulling at the right moment, he can even regulate his descent and avoid striking a chimney pot. In the social law by which we should



love our neighbours as ourselves, a law of self-preservation is implied. Christ taught his disciples to manipulate or modify the social or moral law of the Sabbath, by the law of self-preservation, when he taught them that they might rub ears of ripe corn in their hands and eat if they were hungry, even on the Sabbath. Man naturally applies the law according to his conception of the law-giver. The application of moral laws, from the self-justification of the Israelites who exterminated the Amalekites, to the self-justification of the Germans who tried to exterminate the Jews, and from Confucius who put a nephew's wealth before the welfare of the State to Chiang Kai-shek who places the State before even the life of a son, the manipulations of moral laws have given to human history its whole shame and its whole glory. The study of beasts reveals in them complete absence of shame, and of any capacity to improve upon any existing glory, except under human influence. Men, to their shame and glory, are manipulators.

With shame and glory go misery and happiness. The feebleness of animals in the fifth part of life, which we noticed in the earlier pages of the present chapter, prevents them from improving their conduct. Their happiness, therefore, depends solely upon their conditions. If the steppes on which the wild cattle of Siberia are grazing are covered with snow, the instinct which drives them south can at best bring them only to their normal diet again and thus maintain their condition. If man has evolved from beast, he has done so by variation of conduct in obedience to some law which no beast could make, manipulate or understand. It will, therefore, be agreed that the glory and happiness of man depend on his knowledge and application of super-human physical and social laws: that is, on his progress in what we have called Philosophy.

**THE NEED FOR A MORAL PURPOSE.** As predicted tentatively at the beginning of the present chapter, our search for a peaceful object required by a united democracy, has been furthered by comparative study of animals, if not quite in the way which we may have expected; for we have found that social unity in man ought to employ functions not found in



animals lower than man. Pit ponies, as we remarked at the end of Chapter IV, became blind through ceasing to use their eyes; and we deduced that our object ought to occupy all the members of the State, as the "demos" in democracy means the whole people. We now see that the object must occupy in the individual human members these functions which beasts have not; otherwise our united democracy would be without the means of increasing human happiness and glory or even of controlling their decline.

We may notice in Chapter XIII that it is precisely the choice of an object, not occupying these functions, that has led to the decline of human happiness and glory in Germany, Italy and Japan.

The first of the three difficulties as found in Chapter IV, namely, unity of purpose, therefore, cannot be solved without a peaceful object involving the knowledge and application of superhuman moral laws and we may amplify the list given at the end of that chapter as follows:

The object must be

- (i) Great in proportion to the total power of the State.
- (ii) The sole object of the State.
- (iii) Sufficient to employ all members of the members of the State.
- (iv) Concerned in the study and application of superhuman moral laws.

It is now time to think of an object having these qualities and the following list suggests itself:

- (i) Equalisation of the material wealth of the State.
- (ii) Equalisation of the mental wealth of the members of the State.
- (iii) Equalisation of the spiritual wealth of the members of the State.
- (iv) Maximum production of wealth of all kinds.
- (v) Maximum population.
- (vi) Maximum wealth per head of population.

Of these, if the will of an internally united State, (1) could be achieved by a stroke of the pen and a fresh object would at once be needed. It is, therefore, too easily achieved to be considered great in proportion to the total power of the State. Let us consider the others.

**EQUALISATION OF MENTAL WEALTH.** Would this occupy all of the five parts into which we have divided national life? A glance at the list at the beginning of the present chapter will reveal several unoccupied parts. What we have called Economy, Medicine and Police would be reduced to a minimum, and results might decline to very unpleasant levels during the whole nation's sole effort to share out its mental wealth. After the difficulty of deciding who was wise and who was foolish, the wisest would experience a miserable life in trying to make the foolish wise, and the simplest solution would be to exterminate all but the fools of the lowest grade. The fourth part which we have called Progeniture, would be fully occupied in regulating the mental growth of children at a fixed rate and stopping it at the level of the grown-up fools. Otherwise it would, of course, be necessary to exterminate the foolish as well as the wise.

But the most serious defect would be in the part which we have called Philosophy, for the pursuit of wisdom would be forbidden except by everyone together after attainment of equalisation; that is, after attainment of the object, the object being not more and more wisdom but only the equal distribution of it.

**EQUALISATION OF SPIRITUAL WEALTH.** Another glance at the same list will show that this object is subject to the same defect as the previous one. And mere equalisation in any other matter will be found to be subject to them also.

**MAXIMUM PRODUCTION OF WEALTH OF ALL KINDS.** Reference again to the same list will show this subject to be a much more hopeful proposition than the first three considered. It would require the best efforts of individuals in all five parts of the national life, and may, therefore, be counted as a great object in proportion to the total power of the State. It must necessarily occupy not only all five parts of the life, but all the members of the State also. Finally, as it includes the maximum production of spiritual wealth, it will be concerned with the knowledge and application of moral laws on which spiritual welfare depends.

**MAXIMUM POPULATION.** This, as we may see by again turning to the definitions at the beginning of the present chapter, will naturally occupy Economy, Medicine, Police, and part of what we have included as Progeniture, but not all. The fifth part, Philosophy, will not be required. Although, therefore, the object may be a great one, it is devoid of the means of happiness and glory. It may indeed be the sole object of the State; but it fails to interest old maids, except as midwives, and offers doubtful satisfaction to spinsters. It may well be concerned with the application of moral laws. But, as we have seen above, at least one more satisfactory object is on offer.

**MAXIMUM WEALTH PER HEAD OF POPULATION.** This implies two things: (*a*) maximum production of wealth of *all kinds*, and (*b*) optimum population. We have already seen that (*a*) is suitable, and a glance at its qualification, above, will show us that none of them is impaired by (*b*); for, although Progeniture would be less occupied by numbers it would be more occupied with quality.

We may now claim to have found at least two objects answering the requirements stated on page 54. We can, therefore, theoretically solve the first of the three difficulties in the way of permanently united democracy, stated on the second page of Chapter IV.

Before venturing into practical politics, we may proceed to inquire whether, even in theory, the two remaining difficulties can be solved.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE SECOND AND THIRD DIFFICULTIES : MISREPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT

**EGOISM IN PARLIAMENT.** The second of the difficulties which denies us a permanent united democracy, as we saw on page 38, is the naughtiness of our legislators. They undertake to represent us in Parliament, but sometimes represent only themselves, or a small fraction of their constituents—this is an understatement, but will serve our purpose. When the majority of us knew that we were breaking our word in failing to fight in support of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and should have been arming our forces in shame and anger, on a complete war footing, these legislators represented nothing of the kind in any collective manner. Individually, some of them thanked Mr. Chamberlain and God in Westminster Abbey, that we had broken our word and secured peace in our time. Like all wickedness, this was folly. It was a breach of faith between Parliament and country, with serious results on the operation of Government Departments during the few months of preparation before the ensuing war. Those who do not care about unpleasant details are advised to skip the next six paragraphs, which are written for the reader who requires positive instances.

As an example, after Mr. Chamberlain's return from Munich in November 1938, a high official in one of these Departments rebuked a subordinate for discussing with a Director in another Department the admitted delays in his own Department. He appealed to the subordinate who was unestablished, with the prospect of becoming an established civil servant, if he would in future be more loyal to the Department. Such being the case, the subordinate replied that establishment seemed to him an empty offer; he expected to be in uniform in a year's time, fighting in a war for which this country was ill-prepared, largely by the inefficiency of the Civil Service in the Service Departments and the Treasury. He therefore believed his personal interests, as well as the country's, better served by publishing the inefficiency of the

Civil Service where and whenever he could while there might be time to improve it, than by seeking his own establishment in it. "Really X——?" replied the high official. "That's an interesting personal point of view. Do you really think we shall go to war?" Such was the effect of our legislators on our Departmental executives in 1938.

It did not represent our minds at all.

Again, one Member of Parliament may make a number of excellent speeches and continually ask questions about faults in execution of the people's will by way of Departmental ignorance, folly or amnesia. Most of these Parliamentary Questions are correctly based on facts and show an interest in national affairs, necessary for democracy. From April to June 1938, no fewer than 50 Parliamentary questions on Civil Aviation were asked by a single Member and each touched on a fault. An officer who had to prepare the answers to a series of other questions regarding another Department, nearly resigned because this work entailed what appeared to him as so many lies. It is significant that this was a uniformed officer and not a civil servant. The good of the country was ill-served, he thought, by Parliamentary answers concealing the truth.

These fifty and more instances are enough to show that the inquisitive Member was seeking to expose real faults in the execution of the people's will, in that important year. But in so doing, he represented only a minority of his constituents. The primary concern of most of them was personal profit in wages or dividends from industry; for they took no more notice of the unsatisfactory answers than did anyone else in the country.

Another Member sat for three years without saying a word. It was enough for him to follow his leader into the "Aye" or the "No" lobby.

Interest in the execution of the people's will by the Government Departments may vary between one constituency and another; for a majority in one constituency—in the absence of a supreme national object shared by all—may be opposed to what passes for the people's will as a whole. But even such an unfortunate constituency is interested in the inefficiency that wastes money gathered in taxes; the inefficiency that prevented the Navy Estimates from being enough to



arm the Navy of 1938 against the U-boats mustered by a far smaller navy for 1939. All constituencies are interested enough in public expenditure to justify their Members in opening their mouths at least once a year. The fact was that the inquisitive Member represented his own dynamic character and the silent one his own sheepish nature.

The remedy for this defective representation is obvious. Members of Parliament should study what they ought to represent, namely, their constituents, and represent them, not themselves, except in the proportion of one to the number of their constituents. But all Members do not even believe this to be their duty.

For example, a prospective candidate once told the leader of the Party which he proposed to join, that he intended to go to the constituency concerned and ask the people what views they would wish their Member to represent—if he agreed with their views he would offer to represent the constituency; if not, not. The leader denounced this proposal as a fundamental error, and has not seen the author of it from that day to this. The correct procedure, he said, was for the candidate to tell the constituents what to want and go on telling them until they agreed; if they did not agree before Election Day, he would not get into Parliament but would have said the right thing outside that assembly.

The leader's method may at present be correct practical politics. But, if it is a remedy for our second difficulty, it is more—it is a method of political instruction. As a remedy, it is not likely to be permanent. The time spent on election platforms is comparatively short and the teaching given from them is inclined to be rather superficial. People forget it, go back to willing their own will and, a few weeks after the election realise that they have elected someone who neither knows their will nor has even tried to learn it. They may know that they have been untrue to themselves and democracy—but, what alternative had they? Only another candidate with another appeal and an equal disregard of their own will. So they turn away disgusted with politics, call democracy a farce and decide not to vote at all next time.

Their absence from the poll does not invalidate the leaders method so far as concerns his return to Parliament at the next election; for they are non-voters and of no account.



But it prevents Parliament from being democratic by increasing the number of unrepresented wills.

In a united democracy, as we saw on page 38, it is necessary for all members of the State to have the same purpose. It might be imagined that all their wills would therefore be the same so that one Member of Parliament would be enough for the whole country. As noted on page 42, control of information is able to control our wills as regards day-to-day affairs once a common purpose has enabled unity to be established, but we need here to see a little more clearly what we mean by "will". We have perhaps assumed that our will includes a will to have our needs provided. But in a united democracy it is possible for the will not to include these needs, because, as we remarked on page 29, the system requires complete unselfishness. While information and therefore will, can be controlled, needs are not so amenable and cannot be uniform. Some people in Durham have very different needs from others in Devonshire. The Members representing them would have to be different, representing very different people. A common will does not imply that a single individual can represent in Parliament a whole nation.

Neither does this difference of representation admit the idea that in a united democracy Members of Parliament would represent only their constituents' needs. To represent them politically in any full sense they must represent their rights and their wills, as well. What it does admit is that there would be no Opposition. When the people and the Senate of Rome united in the heroic and successful defence of their city against Lars Porsena of Clusium, "Then none was for a party; then all were for the State"—there was for that moment, in which the self-sacrifice of Horatius achieved perpetual fame, a united democracy. Members of Parliament would not oppose the Government as such, but represent their constituents' rights and needs. These rights could be limited by the Government except the great and essential right that the chosen object of the people should be achieved in the most efficient manner possible. Members would therefore watch, criticise, and when necessary, turn out the Government and form a new one, promising better to achieve the great chosen object.

Under such efficient democratic representation, in-

OPPOSITE : ' *Some People in Durham* '  
... *Or take Leicestershire ; New Lount*  
*Colliery, 1943.*

OVERLEAF : ... ' *Others in Devonshire.*  
*On a Devon farm, 1941.*





efficient Government Departments would mend their ways, for it is within the power of the Government to change their personnel, and within the power of the people to change the Government; and ambitious men are always forthcoming. And the increasing inefficiency, which we noticed on pages 42-45, would cease and give place to growing, until perfect, efficiency. As we saw on page 43, there was a glimpse of democratic efficiency in Nelson's day. Thus, Members truly representing their constituents—and not the unkept promises, not the catchwords, not the folly, nor the selfishness of a Party—would not only solve the second of our three difficulties, but also ensure the efficient execution of the people's will, permanently and not by chance. This happy state of affairs would save the land of Nelson's glory from the unpleasantness of being unable to sink a German battleship with less than a fleet, and a great people would be truly represented by a proud Parliament.

**THE STATUTE BOOK.** The last of the three difficulties which deny us a permanent united democracy, was described on the second page of Chapter IV as failure to keep legislative and executive action in accordance with the people's will when one desire or another is abandoned by the people.

At present, many laws on the Statute Book date back to the nineteenth century, during which period we were very different people from our modern selves. These laws are not the old and fundamental laws which we know from childhood such as those forbidding murder and theft. They are detailed laws, affecting particular walks of life such as commerce, and framed with the mentality of the age for the purpose of that age. We may suppose that many people in the twentieth century have lived to be a hundred years old without knowing more than a little of some of these laws and nothing at all about most of them. Laws which are not common knowledge cannot be known to coincide with the public will.

In addition to these out-of-date laws there are very recent laws which confer on Government Departments power to make regulations having the force of law. These regulations are made without any public discussion at all. The result is, that having passed the initial law, the legislators go



on unconsciously making laws of which neither they nor the public know the why or the wherefore. The people cannot, of course, tell the legislators that they have ceased to wish something when they have not even heard that they, by proxy, did wish it—or when they do not know on what facts the wish, by proxy, was based.

It is perhaps necessary for day-to-day uniformity of will throughout the nation that this will should be dictated or controlled by the control of information as we saw on pages 38-42, the will being directed to attainment of an object desired by all. But this does not mean that the mere making of a regulation is enough to induce the people to desire it. In democracy, no law or regulation is proper unless it is the will of the people; and will is not a passive, but an active thing. Until enough information has been given, to engender in people's minds the active desire for a law, no law can be democratically passed; and, when the information is forgotten by the people, the desire ceases and the law becomes undemocratic.

The remedy for laws failing to represent the public will is to repeal them. The duty of Parliament is to know what laws the people desire and do not desire; to provide the former and prevent the latter. This may entail repealing laws which the Government may consider to be necessary for the attainment of the people's object. In that case, the Government must publish information until the people want the law. But this task will be found impracticable if the laws run into thousands of pages; because only few and simple laws can be remembered by a majority of the people.

Laws such as the Railway Companies, Air Navigation and Naval Discipline Acts which respectively create differences between naval and civil servants and between air and rail transport, need not be laws at all. Under a united democracy where the object of the State would be the object of all, so much of these laws as might be needed could be issued in the form of orders to those concerned and only to those concerned. The same control of information which makes people desire laws can make people desire orders, and, desiring their chosen object which would be the object of the State, they would be willing servants of the State and willingly obey these orders. Something approaching this state of

affairs was seen in the willing obedience of large numbers of fire-watchers guarding buildings against incendiary bombs from German aircraft in 1942-44.

Such arrangements would enable Ministers to have dictatorial powers subject to the laws of the State, which could then be as essential, simple and easily remembered as the Ten Commandments. These laws, democratically introduced and kept in being, willingly obeyed by the Ministers, would at least enable people to know in accordance with what laws Ministerial action should be. It would be their duty to report to their Parliamentary representatives any action contrary to these laws as very clearly shown by the boxing analogy on page 47; the laws presumably being conformable with the great chosen object of the State.

There is a close resemblance to these arrangements in business houses where there are not ten laws, but one law. Servants of a commercial company know that all actions by their superiors are intended to conform with the single law of profit. If anyone sees a profit being missed, it is his duty to report it. And, if someone is degraded or dismissed he knows that this is because he is considered to be unprofitable. He may doubt the judgment, but he knows the law.

The case of a civil servant is not like a boxer at all, but is governed by a multitude of laws and indefinite objects, and is very different. He cannot be dismissed for being unprofitable, but he can be badly treated for many other reasons. An instance occurred some time ago where two unestablished civil servants after some dozen years of service were deprived of their positions, and so little did anyone know what laws governed the case that an inquiry was ordered. This resulted in a judgment which did not state that a Rule of the Civil Service had been broken—in that adverse reports had been made without the knowledge of those on whom they were made—but, that the “need for frankness” had not been “sufficiently appreciated” by those who handled and acted on the reports. It recommended that the Directorate concerned should be strengthened not by a change of Director but by an additional appointment of an ex-Treasury man with a four-figure salary to prevent similar occurrences. No reprimand was declared against the high administrative officials who connived at, instead of preventing this scandal.



In this case, facts were not in question. The rule had been broken. The inquiry was to decide what action was required by the laws governing such cases. These were so open to different interpretations that different members of the Civil Service, although experienced enough to draw four-figure salaries, differed in interpreting them. As a natural result, the two civil servants deprived of their posts did not learn what fault had been committed by whom; and, in accordance with what laws the inquiry was conducted, remains a mystery to this day.

These references to business and the Civil Service illustrate the effect on the one hand of a simple law which ordinary people understand, and on the other hand complex laws of which no one can be sure even of the immediate consequences.

Reduction of the Statute Book to a few and fundamental laws therefore suggests itself as a solution for the last of our three difficulties. Generations after generations of lawyers have aided Parliament in elaborating on a selection from the Ten Commandments and Roman Law and aided the public to get the best that could be got out of the consequent complications, until it became possible in Sierra Leone\* in war time to win a Rent Restriction case against a naval officer in charge of billeting, by quoting a judgment given by a Judge in England in peacetime; and until it became possible for a 'bus driver who had run into a perambulator on a pedestrian crossing, to win his case against the Crown for the reason that a perambulator is not a pedestrian. To some it may seem barbarous to suggest cutting down the entangled branches of so historic a growth as English Law. But in its present form it has perhaps served its purpose. Its disadvantages have been seen, and an adaptation of something even more historic could be made with the advantage of simplicity.

Like the suggested solutions for the first two difficulties above, this solution for the third requires (1) correct Parliamentary representation of the people, and (2) Government Departments efficient in handling great tasks. Possibilities in these directions will be examined in the following chapters.

\* The Law in Sierra Leone is an adaptation of English Law.

## PART TWO

### *METHODS*

## DIFFERENCES OF METHOD

*The four following photos show :*

1. H.M.S. BARHAM, similar to the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Warspite*, about 30,000 tons, 15-inch guns, blowing up when torpedoed in the Mediterranean in 1941. Taken from the next ship ahead.

2. H.M.S. QUEEN MARY, similar to Lord Beatty's flagship *Lion*, about 28,000 tons, 13.5-inch guns, blowing up within four minutes of the 27,000-ton, 12-inch gun German battle-cruiser *Derfflinger* opening fire on her at Jutland on the 31st May, 1916.

3. The German battle-cruiser SEYDLITZ, about 25,000 tons, 11-inch guns, on fire and low in the water after sustaining 15-inch gunfire from the most powerful ships of the British fleet while fighting ahead of the German battle fleet on the 31st May, 1916. Taken from a German auxiliary vessel.


4. The SEYDLITZ, still able to steam, down by the bows and heeling to port, returning to harbour on the 1st June, 1916. Taken from a German aircraft.

As the *Queen Mary*, *Invincible* and *Indefatigable* blew up at Jutland, the *Barham* and the mighty *Hood* blew up during the war of 1939-45. As the *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger* survived the day at Jutland, and the *Seydlitz* being mined, and both she and her sister ship *Moltke* being torpedoed, during the war of 1914-18, so the *Bismarck* with only an escorting cruiser survived an action with the *King George V* and *Hood*, destroying the latter, before being destroyed in turn by a whole fleet ; and the *Tirpitz* survived submarine attacks and was not at once destroyed even by the R.A.F.'s heaviest " earthquake " bomb. There is also a long tale of heavy British ships capsized and sunk, for example, the *Royal Oak* of more than 30,000 tons ; not so the German ships, whatever the odds against them. These results in battle imply differences of method in the Naval Construction Departments of the two countries. There has been an influx of German scientists into England in 1945-6, especially for employment by the Admiralty, because, without a doubt, they possess something that the Admiralty needs. Admiral Scheer in his *Introduction to Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War* (Cassell) page xi, asks ; How could Germany in her relative poverty become powerful except by efficiency ?














## CHAPTER SEVEN

### EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

BEFORE returning to the vital question of improving the legislature, let us consider the executive personnel through whom the legislature must work.

Careful readers have been able to detect between the lines of such papers as the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Evening Standard*—and perhaps other newspapers—a tale of inefficiency during the tragic inactions of 1942–44 and other years. The Dickensian tradition of the Circumlocution Office remains alive. Mr. Churchill characteristically did something at the Admiralty in 1939 to reduce the prolixity of internal correspondence. But, what proportion of the war effort of our people under the direct or nearly direct control of Government Departments can even now be turned to useful effect against an enemy, must remain a mystery. We formed some idea of it on pages 43 and 58, observing much waste.

Mr. Churchill claimed in the Commons on the 30th October, 1945, that we had suffered fewer casualties than in the previous war, through better management. But we were thinking of the men and material avoidably lost by that management, and we are here concerned with the origins of disasters in the inefficiencies of Whitehall, which were, in 1939–45 as bad as in 1914–18 but neither more nor less appalling. Evidence of their avoidability appears on p. 66.

The loss of 70,000 men at Singapore in 1941 may have been the result of pure bad luck. It may have been an Act of God. But efficiency is the ratio between energy expended and useful work done. Useful work was done during the retreat through Malaya; for although Malaya was lost, substantial numbers of the enemy were killed and time was gained. The soldiers at Singapore, on the other hand, were ordered by their officers to surrender—and laid down their arms, soldiers with names like the Black Watch, and the Seaforth Highlanders, some of them weeping with the bitterness of their frustration it is said—without substantially opposing the enemy at Singapore at all. The effort expended

in transporting 70,000 troops to Singapore must necessarily be great, even if they are not provided with means to enable them to fight. The ratio between the effort and the useful work done in this case, therefore, represented almost perfect inefficiency. If, therefore, it was an Act of God, it was an Act of God through the medium of inefficiency. This may have been caused by some failure of Brooke-Popham; the appointment of Mr. Duff Cooper in Malaya may have had something to do with it; or, indispensable war material may have been torpedoed in transit. We do not know. The inefficiency may have been excusable.

In a vast affair of this kind, the public can never be sure of knowing the truth. The public may receive hints; and should disregard them—or a few facts; and should avoid being misled by them. To learn all the facts relevant to an operation involving scores of experts and high executives, often sharing one another's judgment by word of mouth without written record, would need weeks of work by a man of the capacity of a Judge who might even then not be sure of which, if any, of the experts and high executives was to blame. The fact remains, in such matters, that execution of the people's will is frustrated by inefficiency. The public cannot learn how much each individual has really failed, or judge as to what is excusable in each case. The chief matter is not excusability. Inefficiency must be prevented. If democracy is to function, when inefficiency comes to the public notice, the public must act; and curative action is suggested in the remedies tabulated later in the present chapter.

Those who do not care about unpleasant bureaucratic details should skip the next eight paragraphs which supply instances for those who desire them, exemplifying the inefficiency pervading bureaucracy in all countries and how it occurs. In small matters, the facts are few and can be stated clearly. A Government with which another Government was co-operating in some long-distance flights, desired to know how much more fuel an aircraft could lift off an aerodrome of given size with the increased acceleration possible on a hard runway, than with the drag of a grass surface. The Directorate handling the appeal did not know the answer as it had not previously examined the question, but an approximate answer was found and given to the Director. He shelved it for fear

that it might be wrong. Soon afterwards a noted engineer supplied confirmatory figures in a scientific journal. The Director ignored this unofficial information.

In this case the ratio between the effort of the Government applying for the information, and the result, was infinity, as the effort was something and the result nil. These facts are few and simple enough to enable most people in this country to form the correct judgment, that the Director was, in this matter, completely inefficient. He may be placed in Class I of the categories below.

In thousands of cases weekly, such deficiencies may be traced to some or other of the millions of people charged with executing the public will, and normally the public cannot allot responsibility or even know the relevant facts. But in disasters in war, and backwardness in peace—such as we noticed in the case of pre-war aircraft development on page 22—the public is reminded of this element of inefficiency which converts effort into nonsense; and the public must then act, because Departments permeated with inefficiency are obviously unaware of the fact, and the Government, equally obviously, is equally incompetent.

An officer, the author of a standard scientific work, on retiring from one of the then-called Defence Services, joined a Government Department as a civilian specialist. One day he remarked to another officer who had done the same, "Well, X——, I've been in this place for three months now, and I haven't found a happy or a contented person." There were, these two agreed, three classes of people in the Department: (i) the ambitious and frustrated, or intensely disliked, (ii) the conscientious and sad, (iii) the majority, without the slightest sense of vocation, penning away day after day to keep a home together.\* Could such people efficiently execute the nation's will?

Before they arrived every morning at the office where the effects of incapacity, of square pegs in round holes and of laziness, if any, took effect, they were initially handicapped by depression. Class (i) thought the Department no good to them, or feared that it might become too hot for them. Class (ii) thought it no good to the public, and Class (iii) less

\* A similar situation is perfectly described by another brilliant Service writer, Nigel Balchin, in *The Small Back Room*: Collins.



correctly thought it no use to anyone: as they could not fail to be paid while their conduct was "satisfactory", useful output by the Department seemed unnecessary even to gain a livelihood. As a four-figure civil servant of, according to his superiors, "very wide experience" expressed it, this Department lacked *esprit de corps*. Three-figure men on the staff murmured, without any French metaphors, that there was no sense of purpose in it.

It is apparent that this Department lacked a common object which is essential to unity. The energies of individuals were divided between diverse objects. The Bible tells us that a house divided against itself cannot stand; and we find the same in experience, for, when internal dissension reaches a certain pitch, as in the case of Mr. Hore-Belisha at the War Office, somebody leaves. But a Government Department divided only against the public interest can stand for ever. This is the "mock", as a cartoonist told us in November 1943, in our democracy.

The democratic remedy for this lack of unity, whether under united democracy or otherwise, is for the public through its Parliamentary representatives to demand reform of the Department. But the public cannot know what goes on in Government Departments; because everything there is secret or at least confidential, and cannot be told for a long time. In war, the public's only certain knowledge comes in the news of victories, like those of the Libyan campaigns, or disasters like the loss of half the world's shipping, of Singapore and of Tobruk. In peacetime, things happen more slowly, as did our gradual loss of prestige in civil aviation and other matters between 1920 and 1940. In that period, perhaps the public's best guide to what occurred in the Departments was the account of Questions and Answers given in Hansard. But this supplies inference rather than knowledge, and is at present far too little read to engender the great power in democracy that the mere reading of it could supply. Governments know too well that they are too little watched. Knowledge of inefficiency in Government Departments generally comes to the public too late for results of the particular inefficiency to be prevented.

Prevention of inefficiency is, therefore, primarily a matter for Heads of Departments. The public can praise or complain—the legislature can give or withhold power and the Govern,

ment can make or break Heads of Departments. But preventive detection of inefficiency must be done in the Departments themselves.

We have not stated the want of a supreme purpose to be the only cause of inefficiency in Government Departments. What we have stated is, that without such a purpose the efficient execution of the public will is impossible; and execution of the public will must be this supreme purpose. Therefore, when inefficiency is detected in a Department, the first obvious thing for the Head of the Department to do is to suppose a lack of appreciation of this supreme purpose and to look for members of the classes (i), (ii) and (iii) mentioned on page 69, and deal faithfully with them.

He needs power to deal with all these three classes, without reference to the Treasury; for, without such power he cannot, by himself, prevent inefficiency and therefore cannot be answerable, by himself, to the Cabinet for it. If he is not wholly answerable to the Cabinet, no one is; experience tells us that if no one is wholly responsible, no remedy can be wholly expected. With Heads of Departments dependent, as they are, on the Treasury and other restrictors of power, if Departments remain divided against the interest of the public in their own interest at the Treasury, the fact can hardly cause surprise.

Let us consider what should be done to the three classes of people to improve efficiency. Class (i) can be divided into (a) those, whether frustrated or not, whose ambition is personal advantage, and (b) those whose ambition is the full use of their abilities in the public service. Under current moral laws favouring personal ambition, the former receive sympathy and, when they are promoted, praise. Under a united democracy, they would be regarded as out-of-date, lacking the essential primary purpose underlying the system. We have seen in the present chapter that this public purpose is essential to efficiency, and it follows that Heads of Departments should be able to dismiss those who lack it.

Remedy for injustice to individuals could be had, as indicated on page 63, by parliamentary representation, if in no other way; for Members are under the laws of the State, and these might well forbid injustice, conformably with the purpose of a just State.



Individuals in the second division (*b*), may be square pegs in round holes or large pegs cramped into little holes, or they may be cramped and hampered only by bad office organisation. A letter has been known to take weeks to be typed out and despatched, and this sort of thing considerably cramps a writer. Heads of Departments should be able to prevent cramps, place the right pegs in the right holes, and if necessary, adjust the size and shape of the holes so that the maximum possible output of individuals may be taken up and applied to the purpose of the State.

Class (ii) would be happy in their zeal if the Department as a whole were efficiently executing the public will and this class, therefore, requires no individual treatment.

Class (iii) requires both appreciation of the supreme purpose of the State and knowledge of the part played by the Department in attaining that purpose. If the State is democratic and united, they must necessarily have the former, owing to the united will considered in Chapters IV and V. What they need is to be told the part being played by the Department in the attainment of the supreme purpose and to know that they are suited to their work in the Department. They will then have that sense of vocation, without which work is drudgery.

It may seem that these remedies for inefficiency (*a*) centralisation of responsibility and power in Heads of Departments and (*b*) willing concentration by their subordinates on a common purpose, are too idealistic to succeed in a world of selfish and sometimes ambitious individuals and complex relationships between Departments. We shall have an opportunity to examine the question of selfishness in Chapter XIII. But the suggestion can at once be refuted by pointing out that wherever a common purpose is high enough, as witness the lives given at Stalingrad, the poverty endured for and by the Association of French artisans about 1850 and the privations equalised among shipwrecked people, selfishness vanishes beneath a common will.

It may also seem that these simple remedies are too local for the complex relationships of Government Departments. It might be said that the Home Office could not be responsible for the inefficient development of rural electric power in 1938, because the Department of Civil Aviation required to examine all proposals for overhead lines and sometimes delayed appli-

cations for three or four months. But this example of delay shows how valuable these remedies would have been in the Department of Civil Aviation, part of whose work was to examine overhead lines—a work in which so much effort on the part of the Electricity Commission was involved by repeated applications, that the result can hardly have been considered as an example of efficiency.

Where Departments co-operate, it is obvious that the powers and responsibilities of Heads of Departments must be defined; and, no definition can be complete unless it defines the mutual relationship between Heads of Departments.

This relationship must depend on the relative importance of the work of each Department, and this can be decided only by some person or body of people above the Heads of Departments. In war, where efficiency is somewhat in demand and we have become in some degree united, such relative importances have been decided by the War Cabinet, whose united object was to win the war. In peace, the same could be done by a Peace Cabinet with the united object of the people's choice.

Remedies for inefficiency may, therefore, be summarised as follows:

- (a) *In the Cabinet* a plan should be made for achieving the people's chosen object.
- (b) There also, the relative importance and urgency of each Department's work in each part of the plan should be defined.
- (c) There also, power should be given to the Head of one Department to over-ride another—even the Treasury—at various points in the plan, according to the importance and urgency of work. (Some notes on urgency appear below.)
- (d) The Cabinet should assign responsibility in accordance with power given.
- (e) *In Departments*, execution of the Cabinet's plan with the greatest efficiency possible, should be known as the sole motive tolerable by the people in a public servant.
- (f) Work in Departments should be organised to this end; not to the end of preserving individuals from blame.

- (g) Power and responsibility should be allotted by Heads of Departments to subordinates on the principle governing allotment of power and responsibility to these Heads.
- (h) Work should be allotted to individuals according to ability so that the greatest possible amount of energy may be converted into the work of the Department.

Insufficiency of attention paid to the difference between importance and urgency often causes inefficiency in Government Departments. For example, in 1938 someone desired power to be supplied by an overhead line to an aerodrome but delayed the project for some time in order to decide whether the line would be a dangerous obstruction to aircraft.

In this case it was much more important that aircraft should not be destroyed by flying into the power line, than that the aerodrome should receive grid electric rather than some other form of power such as locally generated electricity. Someone regarded this relative importance as justifying delay of the grid supply. But, it was much more urgent that power should be supplied than that the probability of aircraft flying into the proposed grid line should be determined. Relative cheapness of maintenance rendered underground cables as cheap in the end as overhead lines; and by burying the supply, even grid power could have been provided without obstruction or delay. The effort of calculating probable risk therefore resulted in no useful work, and a further instance of complete inefficiency was recorded because those concerned did not differentiate between importance and urgency.

The people concerned may have had congenitally untidy minds, but even such people can be employed in Government Departments, without such delays or other avoidable inefficiency, if remedy (h) above is applied. And an example has been supplied, indeed almost a working model of united democracy, in the development of the Tennessee Valley, an area approximating in size to that of Great Britain. If nothing more than the Penguin edition of Mr. Lilienthal's book, *T.V.A.* is taken, it is enough to show executive efficiency in individual efforts harmonised by one simple ideal, backed by the Federal power.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### TENDENCIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARDS CENTRALISATION

UNITY THE AIM OF ALL ORGANISERS. Up to the present point we have considered only the tendency of the nation as a whole towards united democracy and the requirements for efficiency in this system. It is now suggested that we should examine the tendencies of some of our political organisations; because, aided by the Press, it is these that will decide the future of the unity of Britain.

About the middle of November 1942, Mr. Willkie, one time representative of the President of the United States, declared that the Prime Minister of Great Britain had shocked the world by stating that Britain at war intended to hold what she had. The tendency of Mr. Willkie's speech was against such uncompromising conservatism. He pointed out that China and Russia formed a larger part of the United Nations at war, than did Britain, and that any common object of the United Nations must depend on the will of a majority among them, which might be quite undesirous of Britain retaining her Empire, or of seeing the British Commonwealth of Nations continue.

The tendency of a State to hold what it has, especially in the way of colonies, protectorates and other dependencies, is a tendency towards large-scale unity. The opposite is individualism. For instance, if the people of Sierra Leone desired to dissociate themselves from Britain and set up an independent Government of their own, or if individuals in Sierra Leone desired to dissociate themselves from such a Government, a tendency to favour their doing so would be a tendency towards individualism. It is not surprising that the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, should have favoured the forces of unity—that is to say, integration—rather than the forces of individualism, as the Head of a Government which assumed the most comprehensive power of any British Government since the days of King John.

Tendencies towards centralisation are rooted far back in

the history of Conservative, Unionist and Tory Governments and the comparatively recent example of the Unemployment Benefit will serve as an instance as well as any of the many examples of Empire building. Years have seen fading hopes, that a Conservative Government might find means to end the unemployment and the Benefit, which continued the principle of the Poor Laws of the nineteenth century. The principle of public assistance to the poor undermines the liberties and therefore the responsibilities of the individual and places them on the State. It would not be to our purpose to consider whether Governments upholding this centralisation have been moved by a sense of duty towards the Maker of all men, by herd instinct, human compassion or some other motive suggested in Parliamentary discussion. Our concern is with the result, which has taken power from the taxpayers who supply the required money, and the sense of independence—and therefore at least in some cases, spiritual energy—from those who receive the required money, and has transferred this power and this energy to the State.

The State has employed some of this new power in making regulations, such as those governing the Means Test, for the safety or other benefit of the State, contrary to the will and even the good of individuals. It employs additional energy in opening up the attractions of State service to larger numbers of judicious civil servants, creating new posts for administrators of the Benefit.

We saw during the war, tendencies towards centralisation in the proposals of the Committees under the Chairmanship of Mr. Geoffrey Faber and Sir William Beveridge. The former recommended that all youths should be obliged to join clubs, the material and mental influence of which would be under the control of the Government. This arrangement would be the British adaptation of the ideas of the Hitler Youth and Komsomol organisations which largely caused the solidarity of young people behind the German and Russian Governments during the difficult nineteen-thirties and early forties. The action of such organisations is to control information and therefore prejudice, so that these may be uniform and in accordance with the interest of the State.

Sir William Beveridge's recommendations went into wider matters and, as he denied expressing it, would "take us half



way to Moscow". These include free education, free medical service and free pensions. It would be a mistake to regard these as three new freedoms of the individual. They are, in fact, three restrictions of individual freedom. The word "free" in this instance, means free only of money; it does not mean free of obligation. See the Parliamentary debates, 1946.

The three restrictions of individual freedom are designed to operate on three different classes of people, in three different ways. Firstly, those who are producing wealth and are in no need of the three benefits come under a new compulsion to provide a portion of the wealth to be converted into the benefits. Secondly, those who are able to provide the benefits for themselves and who, being at present direct buyers of the benefits, may choose the quality of the benefits, cease to be direct buyers and may no longer exercise this choice. Thirdly, those who apply the benefits, becoming servants of the State instead of being teachers, doctors or philanthropists on their own account, suffer restriction of choice as to their methods and of pupils, patients or dependants. Such loss of power in individuals adds to the power of the State and promotes the good and the will of the State rather than the good or the will of individuals. It marks a tendency towards unity; and the political organisations behind the Governments that act on the recommendations of such Committees have a tendency to promote this unity unless these political organisations disagree with the Government.

Other organisations are more outspoken, favouring nationalisation of the means of production of material wealth within the nation and the sharing of common laws and regulations among the widest possible group of nations in the world. The first of these proposals involves the confiscation of private capital with compensation in some form of income and is designed to fulfil the social unity principle by which production of all kinds of wealth should be directed for the good and by the will of the State, as opposed to the good or the will of individuals. The second proposal is to restrict the activities of nations towards their individual good or will, in favour of action directed by a common will for the common good.

If we now look back at the beginning of Chapter V, we shall see that these tendencies in our political organisations



towards permanent unity in peace and in war, affect four out of the five parts of our national life. The only part which no one at present proposes to centralise is what we have called Philosophy—the pursuit of wisdom, including the mental refreshment and learning necessary for this pursuit.

A further organisation among us has for its object a return to the liberties of individuals which, as we saw on pages 20 and 24, resulted in some of the world's greatest peaceful achievements of the past 300 years, but, as we noticed earlier, which were dropped as a hindrance in our war against totalitarian States. Liberty of the individual is noticed on page 18 as being contrary to unity except where the good and the will of the individual are identified with those of the State; and, of course, except in the sense indicated on page 35 in which all members of a perfectly united democracy have perfect freedom. The advocates of individual liberties may, therefore, not always be in favour of unity.

But the chief evil deprecated by those who advocate individual liberty is the inefficiency of Government Departments and the chief good recommended, the efficiency and moral value of private enterprise and independence. The remedies for inefficiency in Government Departments summarised at the end of Chapter VII are intended to make a united democracy as efficient as any State can be, and more efficient than any but the smaller private enterprises, since few employers of labour can inspire their servants with so powerful an idea as the production of maximum physical, mental and spiritual wealth. The moral value of private enterprise is confined to encouraging initiative, courage, ability and activity. These are mental and spiritual qualities essential to efficiency in the maximum production of wealth. They are as much needed in a Government office as in a private office. Among the remedies mentioned in the foregoing chapter, (*h*) includes the application of these qualities to the service of the State, and it follows that as individuals improve and expand their qualities, their work should be expanded to the benefit both of the State and of the individual.

Besides, liberty of individuals is repressed by social unity only when the good or the will of an individual is contrary to the good or the will of the State. Few individuals would advocate any unwillingness to place the good of the State

before the good of the individual; and this fact marks the importance of the differences between good and will.

For example, all may be agreed that the good of an individual requires precaution against the progress of a cold in the head which may end in the grave. But the will of one sufferer may require oil of eucalyptus taken on lump sugar, and the will of another may require camphor and quinine taken in a capsule with a little water. Similarly, all may be agreed that the good of the State demands that fires caused by incendiary bombs should be noticed and extinguished. But the will of some individuals may prefer that this should be done by firemen or firewomen paid for that work; while the will of others may demand that it should be done by people who are not firemen or firewomen and are not paid for that work.

Foreseeing the possibility of such differences of will in a peacetime free-for-all struggle for profit, those advocating individual liberty have proposed that representatives of Industry and Commerce should form a committee to advise the post-war Government on methods by which the aims of the State should be achieved. This advising is properly a part of the duty of Heads of Departments who have not only to advise but to achieve. In so far as the recommendations of the proposed committee were accepted, its members would become Government experts, benefitting in their work by the full power of the State; and any mistrust of social unity that they might have would be diminished by this benefit. But the mere formation of such a committee suggests a continued Government control of Industry and Commerce, and constitutes a tendency towards centralisation.

**DISUNITY FOR PARTY PROPAGANDA.** To the general rule that organisations favour centralisation in the five parts of life, that part which we have called Philosophy remains, since Mr. Geoffrey Faber's proposal mentioned on page 76 has been dropped, an exception; and a short study of the matter of this exception may help us to understand existing political tendencies better. Philosophy, as we have called it, includes all but the physical functions of life. It is a matter of some interest that those organisations whose tendencies we have

noticed confine their advocacy of centralisation to physical matters, and that Mr. Faber's proposal to influence youthful minds should have aroused alarm in many quarters.

Organisers in politics do not confine themselves in this way because of any lack of interest in mental or spiritual affairs. It is by acting on the brain and spirit that they bind people together in political parties, to attain physical ends. The importance of brain and spirit in national life is overwhelming and an indispensable and primary factor in all social orders as we saw on page 39; and unity implies a spiritual force as remarked on page 29. It may, therefore, seem strange that tendencies towards centralisation should be confined to physical matters. But, if centralisation were to be extended to the fifth part of life in Britain, as it has been in Russia and Germany, political organisation would become a function of Government. The information that political organisers propagate in order to obtain adherents, would necessarily be controlled by the State, as we noticed on page 42, and political organisers would, therefore, have to join the British Broadcasting Corporation in supplying this controlled information or none at all. It is obvious that in this case all political organisers but those favouring one set of ideas, would be without information to support their ideas. This is a prospect which they could not be expected to face with equanimity. None of them can know in advance which of them, under a central control of Philosophy, would have their ideas robbed of support and daily undermined by means of pointed information of State origin.

But it is not to be supposed that this is the only reason preventing tendencies towards unity in the fifth part of national life. If doubts of the direction of the national will under united democracy were the only cause of restraint, some organiser confident in the popularity of his ideas or ready to trim his sails to a change of wind, would surely by now have shown a tendency to accept the risk, aware of the value of the prize; for the political organisation having control of what we have chosen to call Philosophy need fear no rival.

There have always been trimmers, among politicians; no one unready to compromise can expect much success in the politics of a people as noted for compromise as we are. Nor is there lack of confidence among our political organisers.

Confidence is a national characteristic. We must, therefore, make an effort to find elsewhere a reason for their restraint as regards Philosophy.

This restraint prevents them all from challenging the Freedom of the Press. Many a political organiser would like to control all the organs of thought, including the Press. But there is a widely held belief that all our individual freedom, all our mental progress, all that we hold dear as English-speaking people, has arisen from and in future will depend on the freedom of the Press. Such a belief implies the forbidding fear that a political organiser advocating suppression of this particular freedom would find himself without anyone to organise.

Part of the belief is well founded. A real liberty to speak against the Government in public and a theoretical liberty, allowed to all by Law but a practical matter for few, to do the same in print, have been indispensable factors in our progress and in all that we hold dear as English-speaking people. Rival Presses have taken the place which rival barons and rival princes and priests occupied in the first 1,500 years after the Roman invasion, gathering men in support of ideas and persons according to the skill and power of the gatherer and the intrinsic values of the ideas and persons supported. But who is to say that the Press may not in turn be succeeded by some other means to this end? And, who is to say that State control of the Press would be such a loss, or so unpopular as people suppose, if the State had a popular purpose and a known programme in peace?

We may pursue these questions in the next chapter. We have already examined tendencies towards permanent centralisation in four-fifths of our national life, and, in Chapters I-III, historical arguments from which our complete and permanent social unity may be predicted by any who choose to do so. Our attention is now drawn to the effect of centralisation on the fifth part of our national life. We have seen on pages 38-45 how necessary to combined effort is the control of information, and we shall now see whether an improvement of this control would be advantageous in peace.

## CHAPTER NINE

## THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

USERS OF THE FREEDOM. The Freedom of the Press is open to all who can print; and freedom to unite readers by means of the printed word is open to those who can circulate what they print. This usually costs money.

Power to circulate the printed word in any appreciable quantity, say, by the thousand copies, is enjoyed by four groups of people, namely:

- (i) The Government
- (ii) Newspaper proprietors
- (iii) Book publishers
- (iv) Advertisers.

Anyone with a few shillings to spend can buy advertisement space in a newspaper; and it might, therefore, be thought that any wage-earner could, if he or she chose, participate fully in the Freedom of the Press. This, however, is not the case. Advertisement space may be used for uniting readers in a strong desire for the articles or services of persons advertised; but it may not be used for uniting people in thought on any aspect of their national life.

The only way in which advertising enables the advertiser to ensure or prevent the circulation of any particular information or views in print on such subjects, is to identify the will of a publisher, preferably a large newspaper proprietor, with his own will. This may perhaps be done by the offer of an attractive contract for advertising some commodity or, more probably, by a threat to withdraw large existing advertising arrangements. These methods are practical because newspapers are sold for so much less than the cost of their production and distribution that their proprietors depend on the sale of advertisement space for profit instead of loss. (See Wickham Steed's *The Press* (Penguin Books Ltd.) and Bertram Falk's *Five Years Dead*.)

It is said that the hailing of Mr. Chamberlain's policy by the British daily and weekly Press as a triumph, when that policy involved breaking Britain's word pledged to Czechoslovakia, was procured by important advertisers who advo-



cated this policy, threatening to withdraw their advertisements. The near, not to say shortsighted view, and sound common sense of most newspaper proprietors make this the most probable explanation of the printed plaudits on that sad occasion.

But few advertisers handle business big enough to enable them to enjoy the Freedom of the Press in this way.

Before the recent war, the Freedom of the Press lay wholly open to newspaper proprietors and other publishers, except for a superficial censorship of obscenities. But, how long this freedom remains open to individuals depends on the sale of the printed word. If enough people will not buy books or newspapers, their publishers may expect to go out of business almost as quickly as if they had crossed the wishes of the most important advertisers. They are, therefore, largely swayed by their beliefs as to what people will buy. The Freedom of the Press is not open to everyone with a penny to spend. But this freedom can be restricted by individuals who habitually buy a newspaper or magazine, declining to do so.

This restriction of freedom is resisted by newspaper proprietors and other publishers by means of two counter measures. The first is to advertise their productions so that people may be induced to buy them by a fear of being without something which, they suspect, other people may be buying. The second is to print, along with the kind of thing that people will not otherwise buy, something which they urgently require. Thus, those whose well-being depends on reading the opinions of a theatrical critic every Sunday may be constrained to buy a newspaper supporting a national policy which they believe to be dishonourable or dangerous to the State, and the Freedom of the Press is preserved.

We must include among publishers of books and newspaper proprietors some who are sure of their market because their productions exist mainly to keep united a group of people wishing to remain united. Examples are newspapers and magazines with strong political tendencies, journals of societies, pamphlets and subscribed books. Their circulation is large or small, according to the number of those who desire and can be informed of the existence of those productions. Before such publications can come into existence, there must



be the preliminary work of suggesting, by personal contact with like-minded people, the possibility of printing and circulating the production by means of subscriptions which the persons concerned can afford.

Attainment of this Freedom by individuals without capital and a known market, therefore, is practicable only by the laborious stage of personal contact and then only in so far as groups of like-minded people can be found to subscribe.

The greatest single enjoyer of the Freedom of the Press is the Government. The expenses of the Stationery Office are borne by the public and may be limited by Parliament; besides, there are no means of compelling the general public to read what is printed there. The Government may issue posters also at public expense, and the public cannot very well avoid reading these. But their usefulness is limited by the number of words that a poster can usefully display. By far the greatest value of the Press to the Government, apart from the Stationery Office, lies in the willingness of publishers to publish what the Government desires to be published. This willingness is stimulated by the ability of the Government to supply news of which the Government often has a monopoly and on obtaining which the reputation, and therefore the circulation and existence, of a newspaper may depend. The Press Sections of Government Departments are evidence of the importance to the Government of this co-operation. An officer on the Admiralty Staff was the regular naval correspondent of one daily newspaper until 1942, when this hand in the glove came to the notice of a member of the House of Lords other than the proprietor of the newspaper. It is the monopoly control of information given to the daily and weekly Press that entitles the Government to a principal place among those who enjoy the Freedom of the Press.

It is apparent in the foregoing survey that only a very small proportion of the adults of this country can exercise the freedom in expressing their information and views, thereby uniting others in opinion and will. Anyone doubting the evidence may prove it by sending to a newspaper office either letters or articles over some name and from some address previously unknown to the Editor, expressing briefly and clearly some view of current events not, in the writer's

opinion, correctly expressed in the newspaper; or let him write a book to the same effect and send his script to a publisher or a dozen in turn. The amount spent on postage and repairing scripts after repeated handling will give some idea of the chance which most people have of exercising the Freedom of the Press. This chance will be found to be negligible.

**CAUSES OF OPINION.** However, the main benefit of the Freedom of the Press to the individual may be thought to lie, not in his power to exercise the freedom himself, but in the ability of some like-minded person to express his opinion for him. This substitution is effective and reliable in the case of societies, which we have considered, or wherever else groups of like-minded people become in effect publishers, as long as they remain like-minded. But, if an individual sees his own views accurately expressed in a national daily paper, it is a matter of coincidence and cannot be depended on at all. This can happen only (*a*) when his views happen to coincide with those of a member of one of the four groups of regular enjoyers of the Freedom, listed at the beginning of the present chapter, or (*b*) when his views happen to coincide with those of an Editor's estimate of what absolutely must be printed in order to maintain the circulation of the newspaper. A leading article in a paper owned by a member of the Upper House condemning privilege some little time ago, was one of the best and cheapest examples of this humorous humouring of readers.

In practice, few individuals can often see their own views exactly expressed and circulated in print; but many can see something resembling their views because the large diversity of views among the four groups of enjoyers of the Freedom results in a large number of partial coincidences. This leaves a great amount of information and many views, which individuals regard as being of national importance, unexpressed in the national daily and weekly Press.

The more important the subject in the estimation of the public as a whole, the more numerous are the partial coincidences of view. But this does not follow from the diversity of views noted above. On the contrary, it follows from unification of views. For example, on the need to defeat

Germany, all were agreed. On the subject of nationalising the means of transport, as we have nationalised the telephone system, the country has been divided by two different views. On the subject of limiting the hours during which alcoholic drinks may be retailed, a number of different views exist; and as to the best method of draining Pig's Bottom to reclaim pasture for the communal feeding of sheep in the parish of Little-small Underlow, not only do the differences of opinion change every day, but the heat of opinion varies enormously in different parts of the country. Not a word of the Bottom has appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*, although the *Littlelow Advertiser* is full of it.


We see, therefore, that the diversity of views that alone enables most of us to see something like our own views circulated, in consequence of the Freedom of the Press, operates less and less as regards more and more important matters. What ensures the circulation of our views on the most important matters is common reactions of us all to a given situation.

This common reaction by which we all take the same view of a situation depends on the situation being described to all in the same way. We can react to a situation only as we know or believe that we know it, and, if the situation is described to us differently, we react to different things. Complex situations such as the economic position of the average coal miner—if such a person exists—can be so variously described, that we may all be sure of being told the same thing only about the simplest situations. For instance, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Germany could hardly be described except as an invasion. Previous relations between the two countries were complex, and various reporters could describe them differently, so that readers of different newspapers took different views of the relations; but all agreed on the simple fact that there was an invasion.

We can, therefore, expect individuals of a nation to share a common view only of the most simple facts.

This common reaction springs from some common quality in us. The news of railways being nationalised must rejoice some and sadden others. Such reactions spring from no necessarily new knowledge of the social or economic factors involved or any up-to-date information on the subject. One

OPPOSITE : *If the Situation is Described to us Differently . . . . The political situation after Mr. Churchill's "powerful and convincing broadcast," before the General Election, 1945, according to the 'Daily Mail.'*



reaction would spring from a study of the advantage of centralisation, or through prejudice from study of some allied subject. The other reaction would be produced from study of the advantages of decentralisation, or through prejudice from study of some allied subject.

A common reaction can be expected only from people who have made the same studies. Studies and their alliances must here be understood in the widest senses of these words. For instance, an individual's view of the German invasion of Poland will depend not only on his knowledge of the nature of armed invasion, the value of international law and the characters of the German and Polish nations. It will depend also on much different allied knowledge of the effect of war on non-belligerents, and particularly it may depend on his knowledge of respected acquaintances' views of armed invasion, international law and the characters of the attacking and attacked nations. He will be swayed by his father's, or by his youthful recollections of a respected teacher's opinions on the Germans and the Poles. These are all likely in Britain to be the opinions of British people, built up by generation after generation, and will describe the Poles or the Germans from a British point of view.

British observers have always seen the Poles as a distant people and a people across the water. French observers have seen the Poles as fellow-occupiers of the same Continent. French observers see in Poles what British observers do not see and the British see what the French do not see. If a Briton sees only what a Frenchman sees, he by that much ceases to be British in character and by that much will react like a Frenchman.

The reaction of the British Press to the invasion of Poland in 1939 was a characteristically British reaction. There were practically no diversities of view.

On the other hand, Gloucestershire farmers who are liable to a penalty if a rabbit is found on their land, know that this comparatively rare intruder provides good sport for an afternoon with a gun; while Pembrokeshire farmers who trap rabbits daily by the hundred, know that rabbits are pests. Even in years when many rabbits have been bold enough to breed in Gloucestershire, the farmers continue to shoot them for sport; and, even should rabbits be nearly suppressed in



Pembrokeshire, farmers would continue for years to trap them as pests. Farmers are very conservative in their habits. Experience of the same factor in farming, namely rabbits, has produced in the minds of generations of farmers in different counties, different reactions.

We must conclude that:

- (i) Any reaction to news of a situation, common to all individuals of a nation, springs not from up-to-date information on subjects regarding the situation, but from long-established opinions common to all the individuals on the subject.
- (ii) This common reaction will, therefore, always be expressed by the common view of all enjoyers of the Freedom of the Press listed at the beginning of the present chapter, when they exercise this freedom to express their own view.
- (iii) This common view can be expected only, as we saw on page 86, in cases of the simplest and most important situations.
- (iv) Diversity of views which we saw on page 86 as enabling many of us to see in print approximations of our views is characteristic of the less important subjects; and unanimity is characteristic of the more important subjects.

If, after careful consideration of the foregoing arguments, these four conclusions are accepted, it must be allowed to follow that the loss of the Freedom of the Press would affect the power of self-expression of only very few of us, and those only as regards the less important subjects. The expression of our views of the most important subjects could safely be left to anyone possessing the long-established opinions common to us all, mentioned in conclusion (i) above. Even the editor of the *Daily Telegraph* disapproved openly of Hitler, whatever the *Morning Post* thought of Bethmann-Hollweg.

**IMPORTANCE OF DISCUSSION.** It is well known that many of our valuable common opinions have been formed among us and our forefathers by free discussion. But, as we have seen, freedom of discussion by the Press is limited to members of four groups listed at the beginning of the present chapter.

The freest discussion has always been between individuals, and loss of Freedom of the Press would not in the least impair it. Loss of the Freedom of the Press does not mean loss of the Press or loss of new material for discussion. Even official reports of successes, even the absences of such reports, give us plenty to discuss.

The most valuable discussion is discussion between well-informed people. These people do not depend on the daily or weekly Press for the fact that they are all well-informed on their subjects. For example, an opinion on the best method to ensure that 600 Members of Parliament represent 60,000,000 people may be formed by a reader of a political article in the evening paper, who never in his life before has given a thought to politics. This does not mean that he would agree with the article, or that he would be well-informed. The subject of Parliamentary Representation was exhaustively examined in the last century and the literature of politics is very large, without the contribution of the evening paper. So large is it that we may doubt the possibility of the evening paper adding any knowledge essential to the subject.

To be well enough informed to give a valuable opinion on a subject, it is much more important to have absorbed the accumulated experience of a thousand years of written knowledge than to read every evening paper for a year or even the latest book on the subject; and if we all had to entertain one another instead of listening to the radio, we would certainly become more interesting people. What is deep in us would blossom. Loss of Freedom of the Press would, therefore, affect neither the freest of our means of discussion, nor the essential or even the best means of making our opinions valuable.

The need for accurate up-to-date information is felt by those who have to take action, whose consequences may be affected by the up-to-date facts. Thus, those who expect friends to arrive by the 10.48 from Brighton need to know that the train may possibly be running forty minutes late. But the news is of little importance to most of us; and even those expecting friends need not know that fog was the cause of the delay. A paragraph in an evening paper reporting the incident and casting reflections on the railway management, therefore, might be suppressed without any appreciable loss to most of us.

What could not be concealed without great loss to most of us, and what we should keep constantly in the minds of our Members of Parliament until they take the action we desire, is that trains are sometimes delayed by fog, that fog is intensified by the smoke of cities, that aircraft are able to fly at 300 m.p.h. and land safely in fog, that means to increase the mobility of trains in fog have been invented, and that Members of Parliament need not necessarily be Members of the next Parliament. These facts might well appear in an evening paper, and no democratic Government would be likely to suppress them. But they can equally well be found in books ten years old.

We may conclude that to inform our minds enough to make our free discussion valuable, the latest information as to detail and incident is not necessary. Most of us would be much more free—that is, free from ignorance and therefore from deception and disappointment—if we knew more about railways and less about the latest incidents on railways. Permanent essentials are for all of us; the latest facts for specialists. The opinion of the specialist on his special part of a subject is valuable, but his opinion on the whole subject is valuable only in so far as he has studied the permanent essentials. Discussion of public affairs by the public requires the public to study the essentials of humanity and human history.

VACANT MINDS' INVITATION TO PROPAGANDA. The arguments in the present chapter tend to emphasize that the loss of the Freedom of the Press under a united democracy could not restrict the nation's self-expression on the subjects most important to it, and that freedom of discussion, to be valuable to the individual or the State requires not up-to-date information so much as an accumulated knowledge of past experience. It is such knowledge that enables us to form wise judgments.

If under a united democracy, therefore, the Press were to be stopped for a year, except to issue Government orders, it is not our freedom of self-expression or the soundness of our power of judgment as a nation that would be impaired, but our energy.

During the past hundred years we have become accustomed to receiving printed information and comment every day, arousing our emotions and employing our brains, or lulling them, in consequence of some few of the hundreds of millions of the previous day's events. What a small proportion these are, few imagine. How much did newspapers report of the Chinese Civil War in 1944, or of the armament industry set up by the Austrian Mandl in Argentina, or of conditions in hospitals administered by our own local authorities? Little or nothing appeared of these great factors in life. Many people listen to wireless broadcasts for their small selections of news without realising how highly selective these, too, are.

Any stirring of brain and spirit both produces and directs energy; and lulling dissipates or prevents energy. The form and manner of giving the information, as well as the comment, affects the manner in which brains and spirits react.

As an example, a leading article which appeared in a daily paper in 1938 pointed out the advantages to be expected from a German occupation of Czechoslovakia and suggested that our pledges on the subject need not be kept. The German Army had not yet moved. This article was written, according to a member of the staff of the newspaper, at the instigation of one of the Secretaries of State, who thus enjoyed the Freedom of the Press. He enjoyed it, however, only as a powerful individual; for even the Government of which he was a member did not at that time suggest such perfidy. So little did this article represent any other enjoyer of the Freedom, that the suggestion was withdrawn in the leading article of the next day's issue of the newspaper in acknowledgment of public disapproval expressed by other enjoyers of the Freedom.

This failure of Chamberlonian propaganda showed the degree to which a Secretary of State believed a manner of presentation to be capable of obscuring facts. He was no fool, but he somewhat overdid it. The manner of presenting the up-to-date facts was so contrary to the nature of the facts themselves that the manner and the facts became separated in people's minds, and brains and spirits reacted to the facts, against the manner. The ever-present possibility of such a reaction restrains the mendacity of Governments and newspaper proprietors and other propagandists alike. It shows

the importance of keeping in mind some idea of well-known history and essential public morals as safeguards against misleading propaganda.

NEWS, THE STIMULUS TO ACTION. Up-to-date information on daily events is needed by us all to stimulate the fifth part of our national life. Under a united democracy the Government would not necessarily restrict the self-expression of any of the four groups of people listed at the beginning of the present chapter; but it would have power and the duty to do so if thereby efficiency in attainment of the people's object would be increased. The result would be that instead of information being presented in a manner chosen by one or other of the four groups, this manner would be chosen only by the first; namely, the Government, which has this distinction from other groups, that it is responsible through Parliament to the nation for its actions, and their results.

We may now, perhaps, have found correct answers to the two questions with which the foregoing chapter ended, viz.: (i) the Press as we know it may be superseded as a means of gathering men to support ideas and persons, to a certain extent. This extent of supersession may comprise the publication of up-to-date information. What may supersede the Press to this extent is Government-controlled information such as we have to some extent for purposes of the recent war, directed to arouse emotions and employ brains so as to increase efficiency in attainment of the national object. (ii) This arrangement would not be so unpopular as it may have been supposed, because the self-expression of few of us would be restricted by it, and the self-expression of most of us, on the most important matters, would be ensured through Parliamentary representation—not by mere coincidence as at present, so long as the Government remained democratic.

Some ideas about the preservation of democracy will occur in the following chapter.

But if the idea of an official Press monopoly is too repugnant, the alternative under a united democracy would be a Press free to all. It has been estimated that if the space in existing daily newspapers were thrown freely and equally open to everyone entitled to a Parliamentary vote in the



United Kingdom, a quarter of a column would be available once a year for every ten voters. Anyone knowing nine similar-minded people could then form a group to express their opinions on the topics of the day. Then we should at least be able to read about each other's world, instead of the phantasmagoria created by a mixture of sententious and sensational journalists heavily controlled by unpredictable influences and prejudices. Newspapers would be much more interesting and more closely related to real life. The same principle might apply to the radio and the book trade; and extra time and space might be allotted to University graduates, and still more to those with higher qualifications. Many an opinion lightly expressed now would be modified when its author saw it in writing, and public opinion would purify itself of nonsense. To help us in attaining our great object, the Freedom of the Press should either be wholly in the hands of the Government responsible for attaining our object, or else be open to all who are entitled to a Parliamentary vote.

## CHAPTER TEN

### PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

HAVING noticed how the working of our public life might be improved by better central direction, let us return to the question of making Parliament more representative, which we left at the end of Chapter VI. An unrepresentative Parliament resembles any autocrat.

THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION. Poor Tsar Nicholas II, plagued by the Tsaritsa's foolish advice under the influence of the Black Priest, Rasputin, at last summoned the Duma "that he might hear the voice of Russia". It was too late. Similarly, Louis XVI wore the red cap of liberty in token of sharing his people's desire for their liberty. It was in vain. The royal mentality was too different from the mind of the people to be able to understand them, and the royal head too near the guillotine to be saved by a hat. His Queen, Marie Antoinette, is said to have asked when told that the people had no bread, "Then why do they not eat cakes?"

How is the mind of the British people known to its Government in the United Kingdom?

Do not let anyone suppose that the Government, which described the rationing of coal in the summer of 1942 as an "imperative necessity", expressed its desire and present intention not to ration coal even in the autumn of 1942, because it knew the mind of the British people either in that summer or in that autumn. It changed its opinion not because it read in the newspapers the mind of the British people, but because of what it expected the mind of the British people to be, after the British people had read the newspapers. These papers told the British people that the 1922 Committee knew that the rationing of coal was not an imperative necessity or even desirable. What the newspapers told the people and what caused a change of mind in the Government, was the mind of the 1922 Committee.

It might be suggested that the mind of the people could always be predicted from the newspapers. But the newspapers are not always as unanimous as they were on the subject of the rationing of coal, and discussion between readers of different newspapers may end in opinions not represented in any newspaper. Besides, as we saw on pages 92-3, readers may sometimes revolt from what they read.

There are, however, two ways of learning the minds of people. One is to watch their actions; the other is to ask them to state their views. The first may fail through misinterpretation, the second may fail through concealment or misunderstanding, but at least makes use of human rather than other animal functions. Kings have always had Councils to advise the king as to his own interests involved in the condition of his subjects. Since the Great Civil War in England, however, her King has been firmly bound by the advice of Parliament, not primarily as to his own interests, but as to the interests of his subjects. This change followed from a change in the behaviour of subjects. For instance, watching the behaviour of his barons, which obviously threatened his life, King John learned their minds in time to sign the Magna Charta; and Henry VI, watching Jack Cade march into Smithfield, learned the mind of the Kentish rebels soon enough for Buckingham and Clifford to persuade them again into loyalty to the Crown. Charles I learned his people's mind with unmistakable clearness from Cromwell, but would not perform their will. They, therefore, killed him.

In order to prevent such events, it became necessary for the king not only to invite his subjects to express their minds but in some measure to perform their will. It was for that purpose that he summoned Parliament, and the measure in which he was obliged to perform the will of Parliament was governed by the power of Parliament to allow or forbid him to levy taxes on the people. The success of Bolingbroke's rebellion and consequent death of Richard II were largely caused by the discontent which Richard provoked by arbitrary exactions to provide funds for his expedition to Ireland in 1399. The power of Parliament to control taxation was, therefore, based on its power to preserve or threaten the personal safety of the king, and gradually caused the apparent as well as the real function of government to pass from the King to Parliament.

EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE. Royal councils, and afterwards Parliament, have generally represented the organised power of the nation. The barons in King John's Council were there because they could raise armies of their serfs. The members of Cromwell's Parliament were there because they could raise the army that defeated the royal army. When power was not represented, as when Bolingbroke was omitted from the councils of Richard II, there was danger of armed rebellion.

Therefore, when the King summoned Parliament, it was not to hear the voice of his whole people, but to hear the voice of powerful men—men who could govern the actions of his people. This power to govern resided in admiration and fear. The barons were able to maintain armed men who forced the serfs to provide for the barons, who in turn allotted a portion for the armed men. This division of material wealth provided better armour and better horses for the baron, than for his armed men; which increased their fear and admiration of him.

The religious houses left by the Norman conquerors, maintained by diligent monks, produced men who not only were in some cases rich, but in all cases claimed power over life after death. As Olga has it, "The rulers of old set up a God who was great and strong. . . . Priests followed quickly and quickly grew bold, seeing their strength in people's queer fear of the future: and there, with a cold and a cynical humour they build and possess a paying business."\* The appeal of the priests was to men likely to be killed by the barons; and all men, even kings, were such. The power of this appeal added to the power of riches, caused the priests to be respected as much as the barons. And, when there was any doubt about this, the priests put on armour and raised armed men. This assured in their neighbours an admiration and a fear which no one could deny. The Church militant of the Middle Ages was able to defend its lands as well as its theology, or rather better.

Members of Cromwell's Parliament were less well provided and more numerous than the barons or the priests. But they inspired admiration and fear in exactly the same way. Beginning with some claim to physical or spiritual power by

\* *She Came to Command*, Simpkin, Marshall.

which they could enable their neighbours to gain a living from the soil in peace, or save them from agony after death, priests and barons obtained admiration, fear, and the assistance of their neighbours with the result of material wealth. In the even more commercial days of Cromwell, when merchants won power by persuasion, mental power was added to the physical and spiritual, the result being the same as in the Middle Ages. Wealth afforded to its possessors leisure and diligent merchants, warriors and priests or presbyters used this leisure to improve their knowledge of the world or their arguments supporting their predictions as to the next world. They advanced beyond their neighbours in that fifth part of life which we called Philosophy and which, on page 50 *et seq.*, we found to distinguish men from beasts. Inasmuch as men are better than beasts, therefore, they became better than their neighbours; and Cromwell's Parliament was an aristocracy, able to decide, regardless of ideas originated among the majority of the people, what should be represented in Parliament. They were largely landowners, whether merchants, warriors or presbyters by profession, and Parliament largely represented the views of landowners.

Imitation of the rich by the wise poor, aided by what there was of Christianity among priests and ministers, led to the extension of physical, mental and spiritual wealth to larger and larger numbers of people. The consequence was, that larger numbers of people were held in admiration and fear by their neighbours, and therefore able to wield political power once confined to barons, priests or other aristocrats. But their power was not always represented in Parliament, and as we saw on page 96, such non-representation could not but result in the possibility of armed rebellion. The Archbishop of York who armed himself against Henry IV was not the last bishop to oppose the Crown or to foster the political will to bloodshed, failing representation in Parliament.

In 1795, the London Corresponding Society was menacing the structure of the State. Political prisoners up and down the country were tried for crying "Damn the King!" and at a performance of *The Rivals* at the Theatre Royal in Covent Garden, the National Anthem provoked hisses in the King's presence. This was in the second year of the war against the



French Revolution, and was more than treason. Thomas Paine had already written his *Rights of Man*, and, after leaving the American Congress, was a member of the French Convention. He was an Englishman sharing the ideas of Equality which at that time animated France and the New World; and the unrest in England at war with the Revolution was a threat to an aristocratic Parliament, by whose authority England was at war.

Parliament, then, was in the position formerly occupied by kings and in danger of the fate suffered by Charles I, which followed his disobedience of the people's will. It was therefore, in the interests of Parliament to learn the people's will. But, like Alexander Iden, a loyal yeoman of Kent who killed Jack Cade, Pitt, with the consent of a majority in Parliament, outlawed the London Corresponding Society. How was Parliament to learn the mind of the people, when so large a means of expressing that mind was suppressed?

The situation was saved by changes in the Government and the joy of victories at sea. But answer to the question was found in the two succeeding centuries, in successive extensions of the franchise. As a result, more and more individuals have become responsible for the election of Members of Parliament, and, whenever a majority of Members have voted against the public will, more and more members of the public have, in consequence of their own votes, known themselves to be by so much responsible.

**DEFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.** This division of responsibility between voters who, in many cases choose a candidate on the slightest acquaintance or none at all, and the successful candidate who neither knows the majority of his constituents nor intends to represent in Parliament any view but his own or his Party's view, has been a great means of preventing minor clergy from following the example of Henry IV's Archbishop of York, and of saving Members of Parliament from sharing the fate of Charles I. Under the circumstances of divided responsibility, the British character is noble enough to fill constituents with a sense of their own responsibility, to the exclusion of any thought of beheading their Parliamentary partners in responsibility. Thus, although in 1935,

at the General Election destined to govern our policies for ten years, less than half of the voters voted for Conservative policy, their votes happened to be so distributed as to bring in a majority of the Conservative Party\*; and, having chosen in this manner, to be represented by Members pledged not to represent them, few British people have expressed surprise or annoyance at the fact that they have not been represented.

But the fact remains that as the country contains political power not represented in Parliament, the danger of armed rebellion noted on page 96, however slight at present, exists. Evidence of it, apart from the published words of agitators, may sometimes be seen in articles in the daily and weekly Press, by writers whose names are not published, appealing in the language of metaphor not to brains but to emotion, not merely to represent the will of the people but to rouse anger and provoke strife. To try to increase discontent by writing anonymously in a newspaper is a different thing from entering the Palace of Westminster and expelling Members as Cromwell did, and a far different thing from trying and beheading them; but the danger of unrepresented power is none the less real and contrary to the interests of Members.

This danger to Members has been met by their efforts to fulfil the will expressible by this unrepresented power sufficiently to keep rebellion within the limits of force manageable by means of that Freedom of the Press which, as recorded on page 84, the Government enjoys much more than do writers of anonymous articles. Thus, although the popular leftward movement Government of 1930 failed to fulfil its leftward progress, the more rightward Governments of the following fifteen years adopted leftward measures; and the most important liberal reforms during several decades have been executed by Conservative or coalition Governments. The greatest acknowledged changes in our social order, recommended by Sir William Beveridge who was reported to have described them as taking us half-way to Moscow, were adopted in principle by a Government led by Mr. Churchill, the most basically English-speaking of the English; and Mr. Churchill is on the Right, while Moscow, of course, lies on our extreme

\* *The Constitutional Year Book*, 1939, p. 290.

left as we look at the Empire and face the noonday sun. Compromise between Right and Left is Parliament's answer to unrepresented power. Compromise compromised us at Munich and in many other cases that we can remember, and it is time that we looked for proper representation of simple desires that animate all of us.

These departures from party policy have followed mere partly successful guesses at the will of the people. These guesses have been based on the Press and on reports made by Party organisations through the country. Some measure of their success may be obtained from two facts: (a) armed rebellion has not occurred, and (b) strikes have occurred. Five months before Germany obtained for a while air supremacy in Tunisia, some thousands of workers in a British aircraft factory struck for several weeks on the ground that a single worker had been prevented from shopping on a certain day. Strikes affecting tens of thousands, for less foolish causes, have been equally significant. Such strikes in wartime show not only that employers are not pleasing their workers—a local matter, but that the Government is not carrying out the will of the people. Such strikes would have been impossible in 1940 or 1941 when its Government inspired the country.

Does the British Government usually know much about the will of the people?

Of its two means of guessing, one, the Press, as we saw on page 96-7 is far from being dependable, as its freedom of expression is confined to so few individuals. The second means can be much more dependable. Party organisations throughout the country know large numbers of constituents personally and correspond with many more. Meetings are held, at which free discussion takes place. These methods, better than any other, enable the mind of the people to be known to Members of Parliament.

There are three defects in this method, namely:

- (i) Most people have nothing to do with Party organisations;
- (ii) Even more people have nothing to do with the organisations of Parties other than their own.
- (iii) The organisations of Parties in a constituency, other than that of the Member, do not always place their knowledge of constituents' minds at the disposal of their Member.

As the best existing methods have these large defects, and as strikes in time of war prove failure of the Government to carry out the people's will, and the fears and hesitations of the Government are sometimes obvious, we may confidently answer the question asked above by saying that the Government knows the people's will very imperfectly.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Our interest is, therefore, still drawn towards the question faced by Parliament during the war of the French Revolution, mentioned on page 99. How can Parliament learn the mind of the people?

The British nation is not such a foolish one as to have desired and failed to find an answer to this question for 150 years. An answer was found in little more than half that time by Thomas Hare in 1859, and explained in his *Treatise on the Election of Representatives*, published in that year. It went into four editions.

The main feature of Hare's answer is that voters need not be confined to choosing one of the candidates put up in a small geographical district. The scheme might be regional. In any case, each voter would be entitled to vote for any candidate put up within a much wider area than at present. Each voter would make a list of four or as many names as he chose in order of his preference, from a list of candidates for the whole area; a much wider choice. His vote would be applied to one of the names chosen by him, if not to his first choice, to one that would benefit more, as will be explained for the benefit of those who have not read Hare's work.

The number of lists on which any name appeared first would be counted. If this number amounted to a certain figure obtained by dividing the number of the whole of the electorate by the number of seats in the House of Commons, the person named would be elected. If the number of lists headed by the name of one person exceeded the figure entitling a candidate to election, the required number would be used for his election, and the remainder amended by deletion of his name. The name then heading each amended list would receive support, as heading a voter's list, until enough such lists would be counted to entitle the person named to be elected. If the number of lists thus counted exceeded the

required figure, superfluous lists would be amended by deletion of the second name, and the names written third on these lists would be treated as heading these lists.

The result would be that no voter's choice would be doomed to be ineffective because he was in a minority in a small geographical area, or because he was in so large a majority as to be unnecessary for the election of the person chosen by him. His vote would be transferred where it would do most good. The number of effective votes would be greatly increased and the mind of the people more clearly known. The system has other advantages, but that is the one for which we are looking.

Up to the present, four classes of electors in this country have had little incentive to vote, namely:

- (i) Those who know little or nothing of the candidates put up in their constituencies and are not convinced that one Party is preferable to another.
- (ii) Those who know and mistrust all candidates and Parties seeking votes in their constituencies.
- (iii) Those who favour a candidate but believe his election to be impossible.
- (iv) Those who favour a candidate but do not believe their own voting to be necessary for his election.

These classes of people account for the fact that in one of the most politically conscientious countries in the world, which is also one of the best established democracies in the world, it is comparatively seldom that many more than three-quarters of the electors take the trouble to vote in Parliamentary elections. At the North Camberwell bye-election in 1944 less than a quarter voted.

Hare's system would enable any sufficient number of electors to put up a candidate. The number sufficient would be the number already mentioned obtained by dividing the number of the whole electorate by the number of seats in the House of Commons. Thus, this number of electors like-minded on any matters essential to them or admiring someone in particular, could join in putting up a candidate, thereby forming their own constituency, and ensure their candidate's selection. It would be a matter of personal pride and within the power of every elector to be represented, not necessarily by the choice of an organised Party of the Right or Left, but by a candidate of outstanding human quality.



Identity cards could nowadays provide a simple means of nominating candidates. Thus, great men and women who avoid the often foul conflict of politics could, in future, be invited into Parliament. A corner of each elector's Identity Card could represent him, being cut off and sent to his nominee and a nominee holding the required number of these tokens would become a candidate, almost sure of election, but not quite. A list of all candidates nominated would be published before a General Election as we have seen, and although the Identity Card would entitle each elector to nominate only one candidate, each voting paper would bear the names of several candidates. Presumably, it would be headed by the name of the voter's nominee, but not necessarily.

Hare had never heard of Identity Cards; and his simple scheme, for the sole purpose of making the mind of the people known to Parliament, is worked out for easy application even to a nation far less well organised than we are to-day. In case a system so apparently desirable and free from practical difficulty might be invalidated by some concealed defect, it was examined and recommended by some of the most critical political brains of eighty years ago. Its author went to the trouble of drafting every detail of the Act of Parliament which would be required to bring this system into effect. The draft Act was described by John Stuart Mill as a masterpiece of simplicity a great deal more likely to be understood by the public than the complex provisions of the Reform Bill adopted in 1867. An effort to place it on the Statute Book was defeated in 1885 by about 130 votes to 30. It was too good for the England of 1885, and the Leicester, Lillie Bridge and Trafalgar Square riots followed in 1886 and 1887 along with the Riots Damages Act. What fools men are!

The above sketch of the history of the necessity, progress towards and the means of effecting popular representation in Parliament, quite apart from possible social unity, reveals a trend made inevitable by the diffusion among all classes of people of the ability, mentioned on pages 97-99, to inspire admiration or fear, or both, and thus organise power. This diffusion or organised power, some of it unrepresented in Parliament, is a source of anxiety to every Government. The Press, Mass Observation, Party Secretaries and other means of guessing the mind of the people are signs of the continual

trend towards popular representation in Parliament, which, when achieved, will replace the guesses of anxious Governments by reliable information; and, it is to be hoped, a lot of inferior by a lot of superior Members of Parliament.

For a united democracy, as became clear in the early part of Chapter VI, it is indispensable that the mind, including the needs, of constituents should be known to and represented by their Members. The better this knowledge and representation, the more efficiently and safely any parliamentary system will work. It is not difficult to believe that it would be much easier for Members to have the necessary knowledge if they were elected by Hare's method of representation, than it is in the present state of Party politics.

Members could be made to know, as they do not know at present, the names of all who would nominate them. More important, they would know why their supporters desired them, and these reasons would sometimes be other than mere membership of a Party; there are few things more absurd than to give complete power over the Admiralty, Colonial Office and everything else to a group of people simply because you agree with them on some domestic problem, and candidates might be chosen for their fair-mindedness and moral courage or their knowledge of history. But, most important of all, each Member would certainly know that all of his constituents desired him as their Member, instead of knowing, as at present, that many of them must and more than half of them may be against or indifferent to him.

Confidence between Members and constituents, instead of being confined to a minority as at present, would then be general. Constituents and Members would be mutually bound by a common outlook and a common purpose. It is obvious that the political organisation of such constituencies would encourage Members to take a far closer interest in the changing minds and needs of individuals, and of the constituency in general, than is possible under the existing Party organisations whose object is as much to cajole as to represent the electorate. The whole tendency of a politician at present is to cajole and divide the electorate on some subject affecting one particular department, and thus seek to get power over all the departments of Government. It is difficult to watch the results of such nonsense without laughing or crying. Because we vote on a purely economic issue in 1932, we must have a purely

money-minded Government to cope with Mussolini in 1935. The whole tendency of Hare's system is to unite in Parliament the representatives of the virtue and wisdom of the electorate. On matters where opinion is divided, action will naturally be moderate; on matters where opinion is united, action will naturally be strong. And Governments will then not have to make the bad guesses at these divisions and this unity that make them sometimes so foolish and so dangerous; for the will of a firm and kindly people will actually be represented in its parliament.

The improved method of representation for which we were seeing the necessity in Chapters VI and VII is ours for the asking. The required Parliamentary Bill is already drafted and appears in the Appendix at the end of this book. The Proportional Representation Society, a solid achievement handed down to us by Thomas Hare exists at 82, Victoria Street, London, S.W.1., and it seems to be the unavoidable and urgent duty of everyone with the greatness and unity and human progress of Britain at heart, to support it.

An inquirer recently asked, would not Proportional Representation put more power in the hands of irresponsible voters? The answer must be an emphatic negative. Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons on the 2nd June 1931, that he considered Proportional Representation "incomparably the fairest and most scientific and, on the whole, the best in the public interest" of all methods of election, and he was right.

Under the present system, if there are 30,000 Conservative voters in a constituency and 30,001 Socialists, the Socialist Member is returned and the 30,000 Conservatives have no Member to represent them. It is, therefore, only necessary for those who have control of Party funds and propaganda to persuade, by one method or another, a single voter to change his vote in order to change the representation of the whole constituency from one Party to another. This kind of thing often happens and causes what are called political landslides. By means of persuading a few undecided people, the representation of the whole country can be altered and it is the present system, not Proportional Representation, that puts power into the hands of the thoughtless. When thousands are thoughtless and easily persuaded the landslide is even worse, big majorities representing nothing real.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### LOCAL GOVERNMENT

**CENTRAL DIRECTION AND LOCAL ACTION.** It has long been the practice to differentiate between national and local affairs, dividing them between Parliament and Municipal, County, Urban or Rural District Councils. The value of this practice is that it keeps away from the central authority a cumbersome quantity of detail and enables local features to be met with local knowledge. The same value underlies various schemes for regional control on a scale between that of Parliament and that of the most powerful existing Councils.

It may be laid down as a maxim, that centralisation is essential to co-ordination—and therefore to efficiency—and contains the essence of unity. It is equally true that local knowledge, like all other specialised knowledge, must be applied without interference of people without that knowledge, for local and specialised efficiency.

Local and specialised efficiency, like the efficiency of every individual, is essential to the efficiency of the united State.

These two principles of co-ordination and freedom of local and specialised action must, therefore, be applied to obtain overall efficiency in the united State. But the application of local knowledge without interference, must have for its primary object the efficiency of the State, not purely local efficiency, and still less must its primary object be the advantage of local people.

Freedom from interference is a freedom of power. A local authority with this freedom has, in fact, a part of the national power placed under local direction; and, as we saw on pages 70-4 power should be given only in accordance with ability and responsibility.

Money is often a convenient form of power. Rates are gathered locally and administered by local Councils. If the resultant power is applied locally, without interference from the national Government, the Councils are responsible only locally. This arrangement is a sure way of serving local interests, within the limits of local means.

Taxes, however, also provide power in the form of money which is spent in the areas covered by local Councils. Local and Government power thus operate in the same areas, and therein lies at least a latent cause of collision and consequent expenditure of power as physicists might observe, in the form of heat not motion. In practice, there are sometimes in this country losses of efficiency through confusion, misunderstanding, jealousy and all the other symptoms of disorganisation. For example, when the authorities of a city like Manchester desire a commercial aerodrome, having the necessary money to construct one and a little over for feeing a consultant on aerodrome construction, they prefer to be left alone to proceed with the work. If a Director of a Government Department sends to Manchester a civil servant of any of the three classes mentioned in Chapter VII, and if this civil servant, after surveying the aerodrome site, causes papers to be sent to London for examination or disputation with the aerodrome consultant or any other purpose involving argument or delay under threat of refusal to license the aerodrome, the civil servant is likely to be described at once in Manchester by one of the many rude words in the English language.

Similarly, local feeling is roused by a central authority when a farmer who, for twenty years has supplied his neighbours with what, as connoisseurs, they acclaim as the most wholesome and delicious milk imaginable, meets a gentleman from London who orders the cowshed to be demolished and a new one built to a specification drawn up by persons unknown to the farmer under pain of proscription from the sale of milk altogether.

At the same time, neither the Manchester Municipal Council nor the Gloucestershire farmer can know all that the Government knows about aerodromes and milk. The Government may desire the aerodrome not only to meet the needs of Manchester, but also those of a proposed New York-London air route via Manchester. The people of Manchester may mistrust this proposal, believing that the New York-London route will, in fact, be established via Bristol, and resent delay and expense which they expect to be in vain. Similarly, the Government may wish the farmer's milk to be sold in a part of London where only milk from certain types of cowshed is drunk; while the farmer's only ambition may be to profit by selling milk to neighbours.







Discussion of aerodromes and milk in the various dialects of Gloucestershire, Manchester and the London suburbs where infant bureaucrats first learn to lisp the word "must"—difference of knowledge as between the Government and governed—helps to explain the increased price of milk before 1939, the decreased profits of farmers, the costliness and inconvenience of air travel in the British Isles, the successful air competition of the U.S.A. in the West Indies, and the frequent indispensable use of the three rudest words in the English language.

That shows the danger of interference, and especially the interference of incompetence. But isolation is equally or more dangerous.

The farmer and his neighbours can preserve their village or improve it by becoming better people; and, as we saw on page 98 many people have improved themselves by progress in the fifth part of life. Manchester may be improved by the people of Manchester, for themselves. But what progress could be made in Manchester even in the first part of life, Economy, without coal and iron from other places . . . ? and are the people of these places nothing to the people of Manchester? The people of Manchester do not live by cotton alone, nor the farmer by milk. What progress in the last 2,000 years could have been made in Manchester or Gloucestershire in the fifth part of life, without Madame Curie, Newton, Shakespeare, Caxton, Wycliffe or Christ? Less, surely, than the progress of philosophy in Japan; for even the Japanese philosophy and way of life owe something to these leaders of human progress.

If mutual benefit between people is to be as great as possible, intercourse and co-operation are obviously necessary. Co-operation involves a common plan, and it is to form such a plan, that a central body is necessary.

The simplest way to avoid confusion between local and Government authorities, is to bear in mind their respective abilities which are confined by their respective positions. The central position facilitates the planning of supply and general, not detailed supervision of activity. Manchester needs milk and farmers need cotton—and who is to say that a Gloucestershire farmer will not one day fly to America via Bristol; not to see what they do to cows in the Middle West, but to fill his

mind with the magnificence of a landscape such as Gloucestershire does not possess and to think thoughts which English landscapes do not inspire? Needs are many, and the wider the sphere of Governments, the wider are the benefits which they can bring to the inhabitants of each city and farm. It is the metropolitan position of the Government that enables it, knowing the abilities and needs of all parts of a country, to plan, supply, and allot the tasks of all districts for a common purpose. The local position of the authorities who know more precisely the details of local abilities and needs, enables them to state these needs and execute these tasks more efficiently than could the personnel of the central Government. Since this book was first drafted in 1942 results in the Tennessee Valley have amply proved this manner of organisation.

If functions are to be allotted in accordance with abilities, the function of the Government will be to plan the input of supplies and the output of tasks suited to local authorities, leading to the attainment of the people's object, and, having the people's authority through Parliament, to see that the plans are fulfilled. The function of local authorities will be to fulfil the tasks allotted to them, accepting from the Government necessary powers, and in measure as they succeed, to seek of the Government authority to undertake larger tasks.

The same principle is equally suitable for application to specialists in research and applied science, as well as those in arts and manual crafts.

If this principle were adopted, the crises of despair brought on by interference with proposed aerodromes and existing cowsheds could be avoided as follows:

The Government would direct Manchester Municipal Council to provide near Manchester an aerodrome suitable—if the trouble had been about large trans-Atlantic aircraft—for the largest aircraft foreseen in the Government's plans. If a site near the centre of the city would involve large capital expenditure but save the expense of suburban travel year after year, it would be for the Council to decide on what site effort could be most efficiently expended. The question might take the form: In order to bring a given load to and distribute it throughout Manchester in ten years, how much human effort would be needed to construct an aerodrome on site A and thence distribute the load; how much on site B



and so on. Indirect factors would have to be taken into account. It might be necessary to divert a railway. If so, the Council would inquire of the railway authority what loss of human effort would be involved in moving the railway, and add this to the cost of the site concerned.

Having consulted whom it chose and having chosen the site, the Council would inform the Secretary of State concerned that it required, in order to carry out its task so much energy. This might be given in terms of money, and so much other power, such as the right to reserve so much steel and concrete out of producers' stocks, power to direct labour, to make bye-laws, etc. It might even go so far as to say that it required the advice of a Government expert. But the result would be the responsibility of the Municipal Council.

A similar arrangement might be made at Bristol. But the Bristol Council might ask for much less power. It would then be front page news in every newspaper that Bristol could construct the same kind of aerodrome at less expense of human effort than could Manchester. It would be evident that Bristol had estimated her efficiency higher than Manchester had estimated hers. That is to say, Bristol would claim to be of higher economic efficiency and of more value to the country than Manchester, at least in the matter of the aerodrome. It is not difficult to believe that efficiency and civic pride would result from such competition.

It must be made clear that responsibility of Municipal Councils would arise from the power given to them. The Councils would be responsible only to the Secretary of State, who would be responsible through Parliament to the people, for carrying out his part in attaining the people's chosen object—in this case, the provision of aerodromes, which we have supposed as part of the Government's plan for attaining the people's greater chosen object.

It would be within the power of the Secretary of State to disregard the Councils and employ an army of aerodrome constructors under a central body of technicians. These, however, would require power to draw on local knowledge, and, in view of the loss of competition between local authorities, it appears probable that for this method the Secretary of State would have to ask the Government to grant much more power than he would need for the method employing local authorities.



Public opinion expressed in Parliament, as suggested in the foregoing chapter, would induce Secretaries of State to use efficient methods; for, should progress in achieving the national purpose not satisfy the people, Parliament, without regard to Party ties or personal loyalties, would vote the Secretary out of office.

In the matter of milk, the Secretary of State would direct each farmer to produce so much milk of such and such a quality and either let it be collected, or transport it to such and such people. He might prescribe that it should contain so much cream and be free from such and such germs. The farmer would then state his needs of cattle, fertilisers, buildings, machinery and even advice, all of which could be expressed in terms of money. Local newspapers would by this means have figures, in terms of which they could publish the relative efficiency of local farmers, the value of the land being known. Alternatively, the Secretary of State might specify nothing as to germs, but require that the milk should be wholesome. If anyone died as a result of drinking milk from a particular farm, the annual output of work of the deceased milk-drinker would be a loss to the State involved in the operation of that farm, and might logically be debited to the farmer—not as a legal debt, but for the purpose of reckoning his efficiency. The farmer, and the Secretary of State to some degree, would lose his reputation for efficiency; and this kind of thing might well persuade the Secretary of State to withdraw from the farmer the means of producing unwholesome milk. This logical idea may seem absurd to some. The logical idea of making even a King responsible to Parliament seemed absurd to many in Charles I's time.

These suggested relationships between the Government and local authorities and specialists show that under a united democracy there is at least as wide a scope for individual initiative and self-distinction, as there is in sectional social systems. The difference is that power under the latter systems comes to people in money or position or some other form either through their own zeal or thrift, their ancestors' zeal or thrift, or through the favour of other persons; while under a united democracy it would be given for purposes of the State to persons chosen by the responsible Government, as the most efficient wielders of it.

**RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SOURCE OF POWER.** Under the sectional systems, power-wielders are responsible either to themselves, their ancestors or other persons; and if they acknowledge responsibility to God, it is logical for them to acknowledge it through the persons through whom they receive their power, namely, their own persons, the persons of their ancestors or others. Under a united democracy they would be responsible to the Government through Heads of Departments and thus through Parliament to the whole people; and if they acknowledge responsibility to God, they must acknowledge it through the people through whom they have received the power they acknowledge as God's.

As people's view of God like people themselves, their ancestors and others, have always differed, the sectional method of acknowledging responsibility has led to acts which many people have regarded as signs of irresponsibility, such as drunkenness in individuals and the planning of urban areas like concentration camps by speculative builders and local authorities. As the people's object, under a united democracy, must be known to all, responsibility to the people is to be expected to lead to actions by individuals and local authorities, deserving general approval.

The individuality of persons and of local authorities is as important and valuable in a truly united State, as under sectional social systems. Individual enterprise is even more valuable. But, in a united State, the relations are ordered relations, whereas under other systems they are less ordered and may be chaotic relations. The granting of power to local authorities and specialists in industry, science, etc., in the form of State subsidies is already a common practice. As it is a measure of centralisation involving increased State control over local authorities and even the affairs of individuals it is a step towards social unity in our time of the kind mentioned in Chapter II—a gradual assimilation. These subsidies are signs of the times. They support the belief that the ordered relationships between the Government and local authorities as well as individuals, suggested above, are not merely visionary, but a practical possibility.

**MEASUREMENT OF POWER.** For fairness in competition between individuals and between local authorities, as well as

for assessing the efficiency of the State, some unit of human energy is obviously required; and on page 112 the idea is suggested that human energy—and thereafter effort, which is expenditure of energy—can be assessed in terms of money. An attempt to justify this idea follows. It is, however, only in parenthesis and no part of our main theme, namely, the need and possibility of a democracy of a united people and the organisation of such a system; and the following chapter may for this reason be skipped, since effort, power and merit can be measured in other terms than those of money.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### MONEY

ONE of the most important and difficult problems confronting society is the measurement of human effort. As we saw in Chapter V, man is capable of many kinds of effort and encouragement of the most necessary and rare efforts is essential to the attainment of any purpose for which society exists.

CASH. Money has been several things in its time, from a cowrie shell to nourishment sucked up by "the root of evil",\* but it was invented as a means of exchange. For example, if a shepherd had sheep to dispose of and desired some grain, a cooking pot, a new mat and some hair pins for his wife, it was more convenient to give him for the sheep a piece of gold with which he could buy what he wanted, than to bring the commodities to him. The convenience was all the greater when it was not known precisely how much the shepherd and his wife valued various commodities, but perfectly well known how much they wanted gold.

The amount of gold given for sheep in England would naturally be the amount that could be had in England by the same of human effort as was required to produce the sheep. This same quantity of human effort could produce so much grain, such and such a cooking pot, etc., for which the gold could be exchanged. If it were easier for the shepherd to get the gold, than the sheep, he would not sell the sheep for gold. Money was, therefore, a measure of human effort.

This effort was of many kinds. The shepherds walked and watched at lambing time, spent nights in physical work, applying veterinary knowledge so that lambs might not be lost. Gold cost the physical effort of digging and refining, the spiritual effort of risking a sea passage, the mental and physical effort of navigation. All these efforts were contributed in different quantities by people differing in wealth.

The gold might come in a ship sailed by her owner, a rich man aided by seamen whom he paid little. On one passage

\* "Love of money is the root of all evil."—*I Timothy vi*, 10.

the owner might have an easy time, while the seamen employed by him worked hard. On another passage there might be fog and little for the seamen to do; the owner, despite his experience and best mental effort in navigation, might steer into a rock and lose his ship. Yet, on each safe arrival the gold which he brought would have the same value in England; and, as he would have agreed with them previously, part of this value would go to the seamen, part to the diggers and refiners, and part remain with himself.

Money was, therefore, not a precise measure of the human effort involved on each occasion of exchange, but a measure of the effort estimated and agreed by the persons involved.

It was because some people estimated their efforts high and by force of will imposed their estimation on others, that money ceased to be regarded as a measure of useful effort; and some people were considered to have obtained more money than they deserved. In fact, however, the people thus considered had put out an effort equal to that involved in production of the money; but some of their effort had been in the form of arrogance. In this way, money came to represent not only the value of goods, but the value of qualities which people disliked. It became an amoral thing, making no distinction between generally desired and generally undesired efforts. Thirty pieces of silver bought the betrayal of Christ, and, as John Masefield has it in *The Everlasting Mercy*, "Oh, the sin that's done for things there's money in!" It is simply the fault of people in a befuddled society, that they give good money for bad actions.

The departure of money from usefulness to misuse occurred, as we have seen, through the system of individual agreement by which people estimated the value of their efforts and exchanged commodities or services at rates mutually agreed. We have seen also that money, despite this departure, remained a measure of human effort, if of good and bad effort indiscriminately. Under conditions of social unity, this departure can be very largely avoided. It is in any case avoided or diminished, wherever there is competition, because the least arrogant take the market from the more arrogant; and under conditions of social unity, as we saw on page 112, there is free competition between individuals and between local authorities in achieving the main purpose of the



State. The common object of a united society provides a criterion for distinguishing between good and bad actions, and this enables the misuse of money to be recognised.

While serving its purpose as a means of exchange, money became not only a token of the power to purchase, but also a convenient means of storing that power. On account of the difficulty of obtaining gold, a bulk of it small enough to be placed in a drawer may represent all the amount of human effort needed to build a house.

The abstemious self-restraint of a man who did not spend immediately all the money that he received, enabled him to accumulate power until idea and opportunity combined to favour some enterprise apart from his normal life. In the same manner as from time immemorial farmers have saved seed from one year's crop to plant for the next, a greengrocer or a dentist was sometimes able to pay out of his savings the whole cost of living of several workmen and an architect for several months, during which they would build for him a neat row of houses. As seed yields a harvest, these houses yielded rent.

Neither workmen nor architect could build houses unless their daily needs were supplied; and, unless they were so abstemious as to have saved enough to pay for their own living during the whole time needed to build a house, their daily needs could be supplied only by some such person or groups of people as the greengrocer or dentist supposed above. Such were capitalists. If the workmen or architects were living or partly living on their own savings while working, they would also be capitalists. Anyone who, by paying out his savings, supports somebody and thereby enables work to be done, is a capitalist. Without such people houses cannot be built. Anyone who keeps seed from one year's crop to plant for the next is a capitalist, and without such people only wild crops grow.

For this reason, capitalists came to be known as the benefactors of mankind. And, as we saw on pages 22 and 24, their achievements were great. It was only when men used wealth not as capital, but as political power—progress of which we noticed on page 98—contrary to the interests of large numbers of people, that wealthy men and associations of them began to be frowned upon as the enemies of mankind.

United democracy places the good of the State before that of the individual in order that the whole power within the State may be used for the good of the State and thus for the good of all individuals—not always for the equal good of all individuals, for as we saw on pages 71-4, power, which is good, is given only in proportion to ability—nevertheless, for the good of all individuals. This use of the State's whole power includes use of wealth accumulated by individuals; and the State being controlled by the people, if it is a democracy, can be prevented from using this power contrarily to the interests of large numbers of people. State capitalism can, therefore, avoid the stigma incurred by private capitalism. So could private capitalism have avoided it had capitalists contented themselves with being capitalists.

It may be objected that if wealth accumulated by the abstemiousness of individuals is taken from them and used by the State, people would cease to be abstemious. Waste would then occur if famine did not. This objection appears to have found support in Germany and Russia, in both of which countries saving by individuals being rewarded by interest paid on Government loans. But a united State provides a preventive against this objection. If a Bristol workman is as good a worker but less abstemious than a Mancunian, works at Bristol such as the aerodrome, supposed on page 110 will entail provision of more beer, more food, more entertainments, etc. in Bristol than in Manchester. These commodities and amenities cost human effort, and the cost of the Bristol aerodrome will be greater than that of a similar aerodrome for Manchester. Consequently, more power will be given to Manchester than to Bristol to undertake further works. Manchester will rise and Bristol will fall. Similarly, between individual workers, competition in efficient service of the State will cause the abstemious worker to advance and be made a bigger man, and the big consumer remain a little man. The lesser man may require and receive from the State more power in the form of money to spend on self-indulgence until his inefficiency is discovered and published; but the big and abstemious man will receive much more power in the form of money to use in the interest of the State.

The use of money under a united democracy, so far as we have outlined it, has been confined to physically productive

servants of the State. It might be imagined that the old, sick persons and young children could be of little service and have little or no claim to money, commodities or any other form of power. The correctness of this surmise would depend on the object of the State. If the object of the State could be achieved in a single lifetime, the State would place no value on children. But, by definition on page 54, a suitable object for a united democracy must employ all the members of the State.

There are two ways of employing children. One is to let them produce as soon as they are able to do the simplest and lightest work. The other is to treat them as stores of power, exactly as money is treated when it is set aside as capital. This procedure is called education. The idea is to fill each child with physical, mental and spiritual power. The capacity and the maximum possible rate of filling are different for different children, so that it is profitable to educate some children longer than it is profitable—to themselves or anyone else—to educate others.

During education, therefore, money and other power would reasonably be given to children as required for their education. Afterwards, as servants of the State, they might require what they would, and, like other servants of the State, would be employed according to their efficiency.

The possible usefulness of old and sick people, and therefore their use of money and other power, would depend on the object of the State. If this were to include maximum production of spiritual wealth, their possible usefulness would be very large. Such qualities as faith, courage and self-control have been severely tested in hospitals before to-day, and even under the best conditions of intelligence and care on the part of doctors and nurses, patients may always expect unique opportunities for generating spiritual wealth. The same is equally true of the doctors and nurses. Their work is often unpleasant, they often see people at their worst; yet nowhere is there more inducement to kindness and the spiritual self-enlargement known as sympathy, than in a hospital for incurables.

For efficient production of spiritual wealth, these people must not be kept in the meanest physical and mental conditions known to charity, but given power to develop that

spiritual strength of which, without means of physical productiveness, they are still capable and more capable than are most other people. The same considerations are applicable to old people; for there are few more beautiful sights in the world than the face of an old person whose physical powers have been expended unselfishly and who faces death across a barrier of years or days—who knows how few?—contentedly.

If the object of the State were only production of the maximum possible physical wealth, it would be necessary to kill the old and infirm without a moment's delay and obtain from the corpses the fats, bone-meal and other articles valued in the practice of physical economy. But the voluntary support of hospitals in Great Britain and even the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals shows that people—generally without any selfish motive—appreciate spiritual wealth, so that it is not likely to be omitted from any object chosen as the supreme purpose of this country. It also shows some idea of attaching a value in money to this spiritual wealth.

As we have seen, money began by being a means of exchange and developed into a means of storing power; and, in a united democracy, it would be used for both purposes as well as to distinguish between efforts to do good and efforts to do evil.

**CREDIT.** During its history, money, like cowrie shells, corn and other articles at some time used as currency, has given place to a rival. This is known as Credit. Credit is a manifestation of faith.

Hilaire Belloc has recorded in *The Mercy of Allah*,\* how Mahmoud facilitated the business transactions of his royal master who dealt in the market for camels, by the device of writing on a piece of superfine paper the words: "This represents a Camel". Instead of supplying to merchants, in exchange for other commodities, so many camels which, in turn, the merchants would exchange for other commodities, it was convenient to supply a bundle of excellent paper. This was preferred by the merchants because of its lightness and durability. Besides, paper is not liable to lameness, starvation, fits of temper or other uncertainties of camels.

\* The detailed conception is in chapter 13 of Mahmoud's story; careful readers will notice that in the present version Mahmoud and the "insolent fellow" are treated for brevity as a single person.

The paper was exactly worth a camel because, on production of the paper, anyone could demand and be sure of obtaining from Mahmoud's master, a camel.

Mahmoud, however, did not rise to the pinnacle of his power and fame until he had hit upon the idea of writing on a piece of paper, "This is a Camel."

The purpose of this device is fairly obvious. There were times when among the domains of Mahmoud's royal master camels were scarce. At these times it was much more convenient on presentation of a demand for a camel, to give a written camel, than an animal one. Such was the faith of the commercial world, inspired by Mahmoud's management of his master's finances, that merchants accepted the paper signed and certified to be a camel by the royal hand, as readily as they accepted any other kind of camel.

It is, perhaps, doubtful whether this triumphant idea would ever have occurred to Mahmoud had Hilaire Belloc never heard of the Bank of England; because Mahmoud's first system was precisely that of a paper currency backed by gold, and his second, that of a paper currency like that of the United Kingdom, far larger than any supply of gold in the possession or at the call of the issuer.

It might be supposed that there was some flaw in Mahmoud's system of finance. Similarly, when the United Kingdom officially went off the gold standard a decade ago there was so much head shaking that a Labour Government was frightened out of power at the prospect. It remained for a Conservative Government to translate fiction into fact—a mighty example of generating faith, which no British Government in the present century could have performed by itself. The Government was helped by all enjoyers of the Freedom of the Press listed at the beginning of Chapter IX who had done everything in their power to generate the frenzy of fear which expelled the preceding Government from office.

There was, indeed, no flaw in Mahmoud's finance. There was only need for the spiritual quality of faith, to replace the mental quality which perceived the equal value of gold and camels. Mahmoud inspired confidence by methods suited to the climate and time in which he lived. So did the British Government, aided by the Press. The difficulty which had been represented in the days of the previous Government as a matter of hard economics was newly represented as a matter




of patriotism. Faith, which is known in the City of London as confidence, inspired the City, as Labour men went out of power and Conservatives came in. It percolated through the country with each daily exertion of the national Press, until lack of confidence became un-British and was regarded as a symptom of moral cowardice.


The guaranteed interest of 5 per cent. on War Loans was reduced to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. by the Conservative Government of Mr. Baldwin. The guaranteed period for payment of 5 per cent. had many years to run. Those who insisted on 5 per cent. had no recourse but to accept immediate repayment of capital and find some other investment yielding 5 per cent. This was a breach of faith on the part of the Government. But, such was confidence, that confidence healed the breach of faith, and the eventual reward of the faithful was even cash!

The capital value of the  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Loan remained almost as high as that of the 5 per cent. Loan had been. This meant, that capitalists as a whole were as willing to receive  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. under Conservative Government as they had been to receive 5 per cent. under Labour Government. The fact provides an index to the financial estimation of spiritual wealth. The Conservatives, who conserved the waning confidence, saved the country from paying to bondholders  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum on the whole capital value of the loans. The  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. saved year after year was destined to amount to millions of pounds, and this was the price of confidence, paid by capitalists as a whole to the country as a whole. By 1938 capitalists as a whole were as rich or richer than ever before. Confidence is good for business, and the recovery was complete. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was Mr. Neville Chamberlain.

In what restraint or what course of action, on the part of the Conservatives and capitalists—who included all classes of society, from eminent lawyers to small weekly wage earners—had confidence, and whether this confidence was justified, are other questions. The lack of confidence in London in 1933 may have resulted from as much misrepresentation as the confidence in Munich in 1938. Our point is, that the spiritual wealth of confidence, like other spiritual wealth noticed on page 120, was shown to have a value which could be expressed in terms of money.

OPPOSITE : 'Generating Faith.' The Governor of the Bank of England speaking, on the air, about the new  $2\frac{1}{2}$ % War Bonds.





This same confidence made everyone as willing to accept a £1 note backed by words, as they had been willing to accept a £1 note backed by the standard weight of gold.

The news that sterling, no longer bound by the shackles of gold, had been pegged to the dollar, was well presented by the Press and well received. Some witty person once said, that when a thing is too silly to be said, it can always be sung. There is something in music, which cannot be expressed in words, because the brain can form no very precise idea of it. Vagueness has charm. So in metaphor and other features of poetry—as we noticed on page 39—inexact ideas, which words fail to express completely and from which the brain is liable to revolt, may inspire the spirit, which reacts to ideas without any need for precision.

The public spirit reacted to the word “pegged” very well. The word suggested security, in place of the doubts expressed daily in the Press while a Labour Government was in power. It might be possible to peg a golden sovereign to a silver dollar with a peg of wood, metal, plastic or other suitable material. But to peg anything so flimsy and incompletely tangible as sterling, which was composed of paper and confidence, to anything at all, was a physical impossibility. What the phrase meant, was that the Government of the United States of America had promised to partake of our confidence. It promised to give so many of its dollars backed by hard gold and silver, in return for so many of our pieces of paper and confidence. So prosaic an account of the fact might have appealed to people’s brains. But confidence is a function of the spirit, and, as no one knew how long the promise would last, confidence might have decreased.

As it was, confidence increased. About this time, the Governor of the Bank of England went on several journeys, and on these occasions he was represented in the Press rather as a man of mystery, than as a competent financier. As he was setting off one day, he was reported to have told a journalist, when asked what going off the gold standard meant, that he had no idea. This was represented in the newspapers as rather a droll answer. Instead of the Governor being dismissed for ignorance or the Government falling, through committing the country to an action of which no one could foretell the consequences, confidence grew and the Governor

of the Bank of England was regarded as a man of wit as well as of mystery. If the financial position of the country was a subject for a quayside jest, as the mysterious figure boarded his liner for America, we thought, gone and forgotten were the dangers and discomforts that threatened us under the rule of Labour. There was confidence in that mystery; and mystery is essential to what cannot be understood, but must be believed.

Currency and credit, apart from the circumstances of the nineteen-thirties, however, are perfectly well understood and economists have written hundreds of pages, showing how profoundly and perfectly they understand them.

The purpose of currency is simply to facilitate exchange and to store power, and this can be done quite as well by a bill of exchange or a cheque that will be honoured, or by figures written in a Bank account, as by a golden sovereign or a pound note. In fact, if we all had bank accounts and arranged, by exchanging cheques, for these accounts to be adjusted whenever we bought or sold from one another, we would have no need for currency at all. The values of our services to one another would be recorded in our bank accounts.

Currency is only required as a record of the exchange of services or commodities between people who do not wholly rely for this purpose on bank accounts. The reason why they do not so rely is, that it is more convenient to give a taxi-driver half a crown, than to write to two bankers about a ride in a taxi.

The amount of currency needed in a country, therefore, is governed by the number of daily transactions performed, for which it is required as a record. This bears no relation to the amount of gold in the country, and it was never necessary that paper money should be backed by gold. What is necessary, is that paper money, like the gold, should be obtainable only by a certain fixed amount of human effort, so that it may, like the gold, correctly record the agreed value of services or commodities exchanged. If money can be obtained without effort, some people will do so, and confidence in money as a record of effort, and, therefore, as a means of exchange of value, will disappear. When confidence disappears, paper money has no value.



**INFLATION.** If a Government performs a useful function, such as simplifying trade by removing unnecessary restrictions, it may print money, as a record of its own useful effort, and issue it to individuals in payment for services to the State. But, if a Government performs no such function, yet issues new paper money, then, as trade has not been simplified, exchanges made will be no greater than before, yet there will be more money. People will, therefore, give more of this abundant money for any service or commodity than they would previously have given. As a result, money fails to be a reliable record of services, and confidence disappears.

Enjoyers of the Freedom of the Press, especially members of group (ii) mentioned at the beginning of Chapter IX, used to enjoy it particularly in suggesting during the nineteen-thirties, that such countries as Germany and Italy could not fight a war lasting longer than a few months, because they had little gold and their money, therefore, had little but a fictitious value. If their own internal systems of exchange did not fail, it was argued, at least they would be able to buy nothing from abroad.

How misleading these suggestions were, we can judge either by the simple facts above, or by remembering the Battle of Britain, or by recalling the amusing alleged reticence of the Governor of the Bank of England. Governments, even without gold, cannot print too much paper money, so long as they print new money only in measure as useful efforts, requiring this money to record them, increase.

**TAXATION.** Governments that need money in excess of the measure of useful work done, for example, to pay an army greater than that needed to preserve confidence, or to pay civil servants simply for being what they are, must, if confidence is to be maintained, obtain this money by taxation. This may be deferred by borrowing. But, if faith is to be kept with those who lend, borrowing ends in taxation, to repay interest or capital or both.

Taxation can be either in the form of money or in the form of services or commodities. Barons used to tax their serfs, when they armed them for battle, very heavily in the case of barons who were not successful generals. Those who

were successful taxed their serfs very lightly, won easy victories and amply repaid their serfs with booty captured. Among the most heavily taxed of us in war are the members of the fighting services. They receive duty-free tobacco, their pay is so small that income tax may be negligible, but their services are enormous. The Press is free to publicise the idea of equality of sacrifice, but this equality generally does not exist, neither are adequate means in use for assessing sacrifice, nor is there any prospect of this equality, except among the dead. But, however unequal, taxation is a measure of a Government's failure to promote trade, and a measure of the people's willingness to pay for the existing order of things.

STATE CAPITAL. The review above, of the nature of money, enables the opinion to be formed, that under conditions of social unity taxation would not be necessary. All would serve the State, but would receive power including money from the State, in measure as the State found them efficient; and perfect efficiency, as defined on page 67, implies equality between energy expended and useful work done. An individual regarded as being perfectly efficient would receive from the State an amount of energy—which is power and can be expressed in terms of money—regarded as being equal to the useful work done by him for the State, the value of this work also being assessable in terms of money. To obtain work from a less efficient person, the State would be obliged to give energy of greater value than that of the work done; the less his efficiency, the smaller the opportunities that would be given to him. The duties and money given to a man would be a measure of his estimated efficiency.

In our present state of semi-unity, most of us receive power in the form of money from the State. Many of us are in the direct or nearly direct employment of the State and are paid by the State for so being; others have State pensions and some have interest from State loans or dividends from commercial activities controlled by the State. Large numbers of the politest civil servants are employed in seeing that we pay back to the State, after keeping a fraction for exchanges between individuals, a large part of what we receive from the State; other civil servants return from us to the State other

money in the form of taxes on beer, tobacco and other commodities. It would be far simpler to receive less from the State so that none need be returned. This would occur under a wholly rational and efficient united democracy and release a large number of civil servants for materially, mentally or spiritually productive work, which would be a great advantage to the efficiency of the State.

All power in the State, such as buildings which have the power to house people, fields which under the air, rain and sunshine, have the power to support crops, human beings who in proper circumstances have the power to produce wealth, and money which has the power to record effort expended, would belong to the State. They would be gladly given by their present owners, as would life itself, for an object worthy enough. They would be entrusted to individuals, for the service of the State in attaining this object, which would be chosen by all individuals having a Parliamentary vote. The whole difficulty is to find a worthy object and to trust fellow men for its achievement, means for which have been suggested on pp. 54 and 73 respectively.

The State, like other States, might print new money in measure as useful work done within the State increased, subject to the rule mentioned on the foregoing page. As at present, other States would accept this money, subject to confidence that the money represented the amount of work which, in that State, money of that denomination was accustomed and could be expected in future, to represent.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE. There are several ways of inspiring this confidence. A way adopted by Germans has been to conquer other States by guile and force of arms. This inspires in the conquered, for some time, a confidence amounting to conviction and German paper money has been readily accepted. Another way is to leave it to the persuasive power of the Governor of the Bank of England. The amount of commodities brought to this country since the mental and spiritual qualities of that gentleman saved us from discredit abroad, and the consequent saving of effort and increases of wealth in this country, may be incalculable, but they undoubtedly add proof to those mentioned on pages 119-122,

that other than material power has an equivalent value in money. As at home, the valuation of human effort in a given currency is a matter of agreement. It used to be done between the merchants of different countries, but the U.S.S.R. has set the example of a modern merchant State, and war has given the Governments of the United Kingdom and U.S.A. experience in valuing their efforts and currencies.

**THE PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY.** The simplest way to adopt social unity as regards money, in place of our present semi-unity, would perhaps be to give to the State all property except personal belongings and for everyone to become the acknowledged servant of the State. Do not let the mere novelty of the idea horrify us. With Income Tax at 10s. in the £, and most of us doing war work, we have been nearer to this system in fact, than in thought. Each would receive in return from the State the net income shown in each individual's last Income Tax return, or, in cases where no Income Tax return was made, some fixed income such as that proposed by Sir William Beveridge's Committee in 1942.\* The incomes of children could be paid to their parents and those of wives to themselves or to their husbands, as the wife might choose. This would ensure for individuals an easy transition in material circumstances, from one social system to another.

Subsequently, each individual's work would be assessed, as it is now, by his employer, who would be responsible to a Secretary of State through a Government Department appropriate to the work concerned. The power, including position and income, of individuals would then be adjusted in accordance with their efficiency, as described in Chapters VII and XI. The whole profits of employers—Electricity Companies, landlords, merchants and farmers, for instance—would be paid by them to the State. Alternatively, payments by consumers, instead of being paid to the suppliers at all, might be paid directly to the State, and the supplier credited, but only as a book transaction, with the value of the things supplied. In the first case, the efficiency of the supplier could be judged largely by the amount of profit returned, although other factors might be involved according to the chosen object

\* Some such scheme has been ably advocated by Douglas and his followers.

of the State. In the other case, the State might supply the requirements of the suppliers and debit them with the value supplied; the receipts from consumers, against this value, would then provide an index to the efficiency of the suppliers. In either case, the State would reward efficiency by increased power in the form of money or authority or both.

This official assessment of the individual may seem to be an alarming idea, and in the hands of a sheepish, lazy, crafty, amoral and incompetent bureaucracy it would become an appalling fact. It would legalise and increase the inefficiencies which we already know. But that would be the fault of the bureaucracy; and for this we examined remedies in Chapter VII. The official assessment as such, would ideally systematise and ensure rewarding of merit which money, as we have seen has failed to ensure. Under the new system as under the old, anyone in a position to run a cinema, who satisfied the desire for pictures more to the public pleasure than another cinema manager, would become more powerful than the other manager. But he would not be able to owe his success simply to being able to spend more than the other manager. Each would have an equal chance, the object of the system being to enable each and all to produce the best of which he or she is capable.

Individuals now depending wholly or in part upon pensions, dividends or the support of others, would, like employers, be responsible for their actions to some Government Department. In order to receive incomes above the minimum already mentioned, they would have to bring evidence of their service to the State. These services might well be of the spiritual kind mentioned on pages 119-123.

It is not to be supposed that these changes would bring any benefit to the country, unless (a) the object of the State desired by all individuals were a better object than the objects which people desire to-day and (b) Government Departments were more efficient than they are to-day. It would be wise to doubt the value of any change in our Society until we have the representative Parliament advocated in Chapter X, and corresponding improvement in Whitehall. But we have noticed in our progress towards unity, our present tendencies towards it and the above-mentioned steps by which unity as regards money might be completed among us. It may be of



special interest to some to examine the possibilities of happiness in the lives of individuals, under the conditions suggested, and these are examined in the following chapter. Our main theme, however, is the need for and possibility of the democracy of a united people and the organisation of such a system. This can doubtless be achieved without any particular study of happiness for its own sake, as it doubtless can without State capital, and the following chapter, like the present, may, therefore, be skipped without losing the main thread of discussion.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### HAVING A GOOD TIME

THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS. To examine the possibilities of human happiness under a united democracy would be less difficult than it is if all were agreed as to what happiness is. At least one person alive in England to-day, when asked, will define happiness as the surrender of self-will. Anyone who tries to point out to him that a surrender is an action, however many times repeated, whereas happiness is a condition, will be rewarded by as long and as pleasant an argument as he may desire. But he would be unlikely to alter this opinion held for twenty years, that happiness is an action.

Others, if asked to define happiness, may refer to having a good time, contentment, gaiety, satisfaction, enjoyment, well-being or some other feature of the conditions required for happiness without describing happiness itself. Any thousand people have almost as many different ideas about happiness, and to define it is almost to beg disagreement. In the present book, however, the word is used to describe the condition of a person who acknowledges the fulfilment of desires and the hope of fulfilment of other desires. Whether he is very happy or only moderately happy, depends on the qualities of the desires and the hope.

According to this definition, the surrender of self-will may or may not lead to happiness. If the only desire of a person is to be ruled by some will other than his own, as professed in the case of Christians, in measure as he governs himself and submits his will to the other will, he will recognise partial fulfilment and the hope of further fulfilment, and happiness will occur. When unselfish people are met, it may be noticed that they achieve happiness in this way, although their happiness may not be complete; and as perfect democratic unity is seen on page 29 to require perfect unselfishness on the part of all members of the State, its achievement would be certain to involve some degree of happiness in all the members of the State.

Under a united democracy, however, the submission of self-will is not fulfilment of a primary desire, on the part of

individuals, but a necessity for achievement of the object which all individuals desire. Happiness thus achieved will therefore, be only incidental and partial.

The capacity for happiness in an individual depends on his capacity for desire; and complete happiness is obtained only when he acknowledges the achievement or hope of achievement of all desires of which he is capable. If he is capable of much desire, he is capable of much happiness.

**THE POSSIBILITY OF HAPPINESS UNDER UNITED DEMOCRACY.** The individual able to partake in a united democracy is, by definition, capable of much desire; for he must be capable of desiring the great object described on page 54. He therefore must have a great capacity for happiness, and, as we have seen, will get some incidental happiness by the mere unselfish conduct of one who accepts social unity. Whether he can attain complete happiness as a united democrat, depends on whether he can acknowledge partial fulfilment and the hope of achieving his whole desire, namely, the chosen object of the State. This object, as described on page 48, must if the State is to be healthy, employ all the members of the State. It must, therefore, employ the individual, and, as recorded at (h) on page 74, the work of each member of the State must, if the State is to be efficient, occupy all the abilities of the individual.

Can the individual hope for the attainment of such an object? To take the example on page 54, can he hope for the maximum production of wealth of all kinds? If so, we must allow that in theory, at least, every member of a united democratic state can be completely happy, according to the above definition of happiness.

**THE SENSE OF HAPPINESS.** It is important that he should acknowledge both the partial fulfilment and the hope, because, united democrat or not, no man can be happy without knowing it. For instance, if a man desires to marry a certain girl and does so, there is as yet no guarantee that he is happy. If he forms the opinion that she is without understanding, ill-tempered and a good deal older than she appeared to be at

first sight, in fact, a wily woman, and that he only married her because she persuaded him, it is obvious that he has not been made happy by achievement of the desire. If, on the other hand, he acknowledged that he had married the female of his choice, he would find in the achievement satisfaction and some slight degree of happiness, encouraged by the adage, "While there's life, there's hope." In general, for his happiness to be complete, her death, or divorce without alimony or any other drawback, would be necessary; though some would accept the latter event as enough, unconditionally, and on the day of release from wedlock call themselves completely happy.

We may respect the wisdom of a certain corn merchant of the last century who said "Our happiness is found in the inequality of our lot"; and, to do him justice, must explain that he did not mean, in comparing our lot with that of some less happy person. He meant, in the ups and downs of fortune. A lucrative deal on the Corn Exchange never gave him so much happiness, as after he had lost money on an earlier deal. We cannot, however, reconcile his opinion with the definition of happiness in the present pages. Nor can we agree with widows and widowers who believe themselves to be completely happy, unless, of course, they confidently acknowledge that they have hope. What is really experienced by such people as the corn merchant and escaped victims of wedlock, is the sudden realisation of fulfilled desire. It was a previous loss on the Corn Exchange that made the merchant realise how great a desire was achieved when he made money. His experience might truthfully be expressed: "The inequality of our lot makes us realise our happiness when our fortunes rise". Had his fortune risen evenly without setback he would still have been happy, as long as he continued to hope.

**THE SPIRITUAL CAUSE OF HAPPINESS.** Dostoevsky considered that happiness could be attained only in the absence of reason; cows, he observed, were happy, and to think, he found, was agony. His thoughts were not, of course, of a kind likely to make anyone very happy. But, according to our definition above, his happiness depended on what he hoped, rather than on what he thought. His writings indicate

a condition of chronic hopelessness, and this mental trait as well as his material poverty seems to explain his extreme and continual unhappiness, without any need on his part to blame the faculty of thought as such.

But was his hopelessness only a mental trait? Is not hope a function of the spirit, inspired by reason based on experience? Had even Dostoievsky never a rise in fortune on which to base hope; and did he never see anywhere any sign of improvement in anything? It took the Cross to make Christ say the bitter words, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Dostoievsky was forsaken all his life. Christ was a "man of sorrows and acquainted with grief", but not forsaken. His mission was one of hope. It was only as the spirit left the body that reason, observing what appeared to be the failure of His mission, sent the dreadful words to the lips. Human reason died with the human body. But the spirit must have lived; because the story has inspired martyrs to die confidently and this spirit in martyrs lives to this day. Dostoievsky, we may suspect, had no spirit of this kind.

Shelley, who was perhaps as great an expert on misery, if much less admirable than Dostoievsky, makes Beatrice Cenci utter the words as dreadful as those of Christ, "Worse than the bitterness of death, is hope". But in the same play the same character is credited with the words, "The sunshine on the floor is black". Physicists have very precise information about sunshine, and they assure us that it does not contain black, never did, and on account of the nature of black, never could. We may, therefore, assume that the words attributed to Beatrice did not mean what they say, but something which in the poet's fancy seemed to be too indefinite or too awesome to be expressed exactly. An attempt to express the first of these ideas in ordinary language might be: "Worse than the bitterness of expected death, is disappointment unexpected"; and the second, "Although the sunshine on the floor looks white, I only think of black".

If we can accept the above explanations of these outbursts of experts on misery, we can rest assured that hope and reason are necessary to, and not contrary to, happiness; although in Dostoievsky's land of sorrow, reason alone may have brought little happiness or none at all.







THE LIMITATIONS OF CONTENTMENT. What Dostoevsky recommended was cessation of human reasoning, so as to restrict activity in the fifth part of life. This restriction, as we saw in Chapter V, would tend to limit human beings to the functions of unreasoning beasts. Some beasts, such as horses and dogs, are capable of reasoning, and the same beasts are equally capable of happiness and unhappiness, as every lover of them knows. Other beasts, incapable of reason, are capable of achieving desire, but not hope—if we understand hope to be a function of reason and spirit. They are capable of contentment, which means being full of desired things, but not happiness which comprises not only acknowledgment, but hope. Dostoevsky recommends contentment.

Whoever is content has achieved his purpose and may as well die, as "the beasts that perish". A more cheerful and explicit poet than Shelley, Pope, remarks that hope springs eternal in the human breast; which may be taken to mean that hope does not spring from the brain or stomach, but from the heart, which is enclosed in the breast. The heart is supposed by poetic and perhaps untrue convention, to be the source of the human spirit; presumably because its beating reacts to the spirit more remarkably and quickly than does any other part of the body. It is this eternal spirit of hope, attributed to the heart, that makes it a very different thing for a man to die, from what it is for a bird or beast incapable of reason.

African savages in their bright land of promise agree with Shelley. They have had the habit of eating the heart of a brave enemy in the hope of inheriting his spirit, thereby carrying our convention as to the heart to its logical conclusion. But neither we nor Africans have renounced chickens for a fear of becoming chicken-hearted. We believe that a chicken possesses no reason and, therefore, no hope, and the African attached no spiritual significance to eating its heart. When it has eaten and is full it has achieved its purpose, is content, and may die. It has no "heart". If we accepted Dostoevsky's recommendation, no more harm would be done in killing us, than in killing chickens.

If we desire to be better off than chickens and at least as well off as horses and dogs, we must reject the ideal of contentment and attempt happiness. Yet, others than Dos-

OPPOSITE : 'Capable of Happiness' . . . The bay mare 'June,' winner of the King George V Cup for the best-trained horse, 1933 and 1936.

toievsky have advocated contentment, and totalitarian systems of Germany and Italy have been accepted by their people in the hope of attaining contentment and nothing better.

THE GERMAN ZEST FOR CONTENTMENT. We shall see, as we foresaw on page 54, how the objects accepted as such by these peoples, but chosen by their dictators, have debarred the two countries from happiness and made the name of totalitarianism a term to abuse. In Germany, totalitarianism was accepted as the best means of making Germany great enough to right the wrong suffered by her at Versailles in 1919. It offered greatness of every material kind, social, political and economic, to Germany and to every German. The proposal was set out by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*; and Germans believed that its achievement would make Germany content.

If, during the process, at such a stage as the Fall of France, or, less probably, the Battle of Stalingrad, Germans experienced happiness, it was purely incidental and no part of *Mein Kampf*. The desire expressed was not for happiness, but for contentment—not finally to hope, but finally to have. This is a limited desire, and a great part of the programme of *Mein Kampf* was quickly achieved. Not a very large programme it concerns only command of the material forces of the world and a stoppage of what we have called Philosophy, such as some ancestors of to-day's Germans caused in Europe during the Dark Ages. To master the material power of the world and put a stop to the pursuit of wisdom seemed at one time no unreasonable five-year plan for the German, Italian and Japanese allies. Germany alone seized most of Europe in a year; and many history books and un-German text-books can be burned and their wisdom destroyed in very little time. A spiritual object and an eternal hope felt by others, frustrated the Germans' excellent plans and devoted efforts to gain material power and a hopeless contentment; and the limited nature of the German desire affords an explanation of the phenomenon, reported to have been noticed by Russian soldiers, that the sensation of killing a German resembles the sensation of killing a rat or rattlesnake. The Germans, who once produced Goethe and Beethoven, are at present too con-

fined to material aims, to rank high among races. Some of our political Party leaders might do well to think of this limitation of material values.

Had it been necessary in order to lead the Germans, for their Fuehrer to be as wise a man as, say, the President of Czechoslovakia, and had the programme of *Mein Kampf* been to master wisdom instead of material power, its fulfilment could not have been looked for in a lifetime. The prospect offered would not have been attainment, but continued achievement and continual hope—not contentment, but happiness.

Similarly, the Italians under misguided leadership, accepted totalitarianism as a means of restoring not the pure Church of the humble apostle Peter, but some part of the Empire of Rome. Totalitarian dictatorship has not needed to enter the fifth part of life except to control the spread of knowledge; for it has not needed to choose an object such as would appeal to and wholly occupy a contented people. Totalitarian dictators have been accepted only by discontented peoples to whom they need offer not national happiness—a thing unthought of in the Germany or the Italy of twenty years ago—but only the contentment of gorged and dozing pythons, “beasts that perish”.\*

**THE CAPACITY FOR HAPPINESS.** It is after physical needs have been satisfied that individuals and peoples aspire to those thoughts and manipulations of eternal laws which distinguish men from beasts—as we saw on page 52. The slighter these physical needs, the less is the energy expended on them and the more available for the fifth part of life. Thus, men who attain the greatest wisdom, look forward with the greatest hopes and enjoy the greatest happiness, generally live the most simply.

The capacity of man in the fifth part of life is much greater than his capacity in all the other four put together; his capacity to desire wisdom is much greater than his capacity to desire houses, aeroplanes, armed forces, ornaments, food or even wine; for material things lose their intrinsic value as their quantities increase, so that the total possible value is limited. But the value of wisdom attained is increased by all

\* Psalm xlix, 12 and 20.



additional wisdom attained, and there is no limit to its value, the hope or the happiness it offers.

The fear of God, we are told in the Bible, is the beginning of wisdom. Whether we believe or understand this or not, we saw on page 52 above, that it was by wondering about the power behind eternal laws and by other exercise in the fifth part of life, that man became different from a merely well-fed beast. If less contented, he, at that moment, became capable of happiness which unreasoning beasts were not. He was conscious of the power behind eternal laws, as no beast was. He could manipulate these laws. Some have added, that to know God—their name for the power behind these laws—is the end of wisdom. If so, it is not likely to be attained in this world; but infinite happiness is to be found through gradual achievement and hope, in intelligently approaching nearer to this end. This hope is open to any man.

**HAPPINESS IN MATERIAL SIMPLICITY.** The pursuit of wisdom—in other words, the understanding of things physical, mental and spiritual—is a great means of happiness necessarily promoted under a united democracy. As we saw on page 54, this pursuit is necessary in the attainment of any object fit to be chosen by a united democracy.

It may be debated whether the pursuit of wisdom, by itself, would be a suitable object for a united democracy. It was a great, if not the chief object of the Republic of Greece in the Golden Age of that country. Beauty in their houses and a sense of inexhaustible purpose and comradeship in their happy lives were the rewards of the people who listened to Zeno and Socrates.

Theirs was a simple life, and we have noticed that this is characteristic of the wise. During the recent war, we have benefited by simplification. Reduction in the choice of goods to be bought has relieved us of a great deal of trouble. A housewife, instead of asking the grocer to show her several qualities of bacon and then going home distressed, because she has chosen a piece of green back instead of a fatter cut which her husband might have preferred, asks for bacon, gets bacon and goes home grateful to all who combine to provide her with bacon, in wartime. Not only that, but her husband,

instead of wondering, whether her displays of varied dishes really make the most of the large housekeeping allowance which he gives her, thinks her a wonderful manager for being able to provide any variety of diet at all, in wartime. He gets less and is better pleased. But the greatest benefit is in reduced consumption; for, members of all classes, from the richest, if not to the poorest, to the millions who, in England before the war, spent two shillings a head a day on food at home, acknowledge that they eat less and feel better. Similarly, motor cars are fewer, noise is reduced and the nervous wear and tear of unnecessary journeys is prevented. The less we move, the better we are able to think, and because we have a great object in life, we have a subject worthy of thought. When our purpose was not to beat down a common enemy of the world but to seek only our own ease or advancement in it, we did not care to think of it and spent our holidays and most of our evenings in trying to escape from all thought of past and future. Now that we have understood the follies of the past twenty years, we can think of them with a sense of advancement and purposefully spend time in planning a more hopeful future. Let us not slip back into ethical blindness and mere material ambition.

The improvement followed the fact that life became less hurried and more orderly, in war. The organised progress of a nation at war makes life a more dignified thing than it was before and fuller employment is a daily factor in the health of the individual. The physical improvement followed the reduction of the very labour of consuming. In war, instead of jaded palates, we have healthy appetites. We are enjoying something of the simplicity of life which allows energy for thought, wisdom, hope and as a result, as we have seen, happiness.

We as a nation are said to take our pleasures sadly. So much do we desire happiness that we hesitate to admit that we have it, for fear that it may be taken away from us. Perhaps this is because, vaguely knowing of a happiness far greater than what we have, yet not seeking it diligently enough, we suspect that we do not quite deserve the little that we have. But, if we think, we shall agree with visitors returned from abroad, who say that in a grudging and ungracious way we as a semi-united nation at war suddenly

became prouder and happier than we were as a sectional society in 1926, 1935 or 1938. How much happier would we be, if we were all united democrats wholly given, as our fighting men in the face of the enemy are given, instead of half-given to our chosen purpose—if income tax were £1 in the £ instead of 10s., and if we worked wholly for the State, instead of half for our present and future material well-being, for those personal preoccupations which in the years 1926, 1935 and 1938 made us afraid to think! United democracy offers this whole-heartedness as a reasonable and a practicable possibility, as we saw in the foregoing chapter.

It may be, that neither wholehearted unity nor simplicity of life alone will give us complete happiness. But we have seen in the present chapter that the complete happiness of every member of the State is a theoretical consequence of united democracy; and that under semi-unity a new simplicity of life has already increased our happiness.

**HAPPINESS IN EMPLOYMENT OF ALL ABILITIES.** After winning the war, as we were told by leading industrialists, our foreign investments will not yield what they yielded before the war; we shall be unable to afford such large agricultural imports as we formerly enjoyed, and, consequently, will be obliged to produce more from our own soil. The fact compels us to reduce expenditure of effort on manufacture of unnecessary articles, reduce urban population and afford to larger numbers the simpler life of villages. At the same time, there is talk of improving village amenities.

Advocates of nationalising the means of production of material wealth, who are not the same people as our leading industrialists, tell us that in order to extend the benefits of modern life to coloured populations of the Empire, we shall have to deny ourselves some of the material benefits produced by those populations which we formerly enjoyed. There is, therefore, agreement, that our life after the recent war should be expected to be simpler than it was before the war. But simplicity by itself never brought happiness. It is a means to an end, and we are likely to continue to enjoy it. But full employment of our faculties, mental and physical, is a far greater means to happiness, for it is a direct means to the

achievement of desire. And we saw on page 48, that united democracy can be applied only where there is an object employing all abilities of all the members of the State.

How great a means of happiness employment is, experience of two millions of unemployed workers suggested to us in the nineteen-thirties. To be unemployed by anyone, even by oneself, is to be precluded absolutely from happiness as defined on page 131; because it precludes all achievement and, when this is recognised, all hope. What is not so commonly admitted, is that it is bad to be even partly unemployed. Yet we have seen its danger in the case of the pit ponies mentioned on page 48, that lose the use of their eyes. Irrelevant as it may at first seem, this raises the question of having a good time. Many will agree that it consists simply in exercising abilities too long unemployed.

Human beings have many different abilities to employ, yet generally gain their living by employing very few. A London bricklayer may have the following abilities:

- (i) To handle heavy weights with ease.
- (ii) To play the bassoon.
- (iii) To inspire confidence in children.
- (iv) To explain ideas clearly.
- (v) To cut a brick into 4 equal parts with his trowel by eye.
- (vi) To appreciate mountain air.
- (vii) To procreate children.
- (viii) To look down from great heights without suffering from giddiness.
- (ix) To detect the difference between back and streaky bacon blindfolded.
- (x) To drink half a bottle of champagne without losing any exactness of perception.
- (xi) To solve crossword puzzles.
- (xii) To laugh at himself.

Of these, he will generally use only (i), (v) and (viii) in earning his living, and perhaps (iv) in defending it through his Trade Union. This leaves two-thirds of his abilities unemployed. At home he may employ (iii) and (iv) in talking to the children, (vii) in begetting them, (ix) if his wife challenges him on the question of bacon and (xii) if he is wrong. He could occupy (xi) with a crossword puzzle every

evening, but unless he lived in a sound-proof house he would have to play the bassoon only under severe restrictions or at some risk. And, neither at work nor at home would he be likely to find champagne or mountain air.

Yet his capacity for enjoying mountain air might be very great. In London, he might be urged to climb roofs and specialise in repairing chimneys, by a sense of suffocation in the streets, and be half-suffocated by the smoke of chimneys. His longing for champagne might also be extreme; for its stimulation of the brain, without dulling his perceptions, might enable him to understand life with a perception, understanding and consequent hope and happiness, impossible without champagne. The restraint placed by humanity and good sense on bassoon playing might restrict his sense of the vague and beautiful, even tremendous ideas with which music, although it may mean nothing very exact, may often inspire hope and happiness.

Consequently, when on holiday, the bricklayer will rush to the lake district or climb Snowdon, purchase champagne to the limit of his purse, take the bassoon to some lonely hill-side and play to the moon, or perform such other frolics as make people on holiday different from people at work. This is his idea of having a good time; and it is both good and necessary. If frolics are sometimes excessive, the reason is understandable. They are exercising abilities that have been unexercised for eleven months and seventeen days, and, if in the remaining 14 days of the year these abilities do not get what exercise they need, they will mortify and the unsatisfied holiday-maker will never again be completely healthy.

Is any of us completely healthy? Perhaps not. But, are not the most healthy of us in body, mind and spirit, those who lead the fullest of lives and, therefore, exercise the most of their abilities? We shall probably answer, Yes; and may add, that they are the happiest and pleasantest of our acquaintances.

**THE EFFECT OF PROMOTION ON HAPPINESS.** The bricklayer supposed above may one day become a Cabinet Minister. Of his abilities he will, in that case, be able to employ in his work only (iv) and (xii). The gifts of clear explanation and



sense of humour. On Election Day and other possible occasions he may win the vote of a few mothers by (iii). He will, therefore, be a little less likely to be happy in his work than he was as a bricklayer.

In his home life, he will have the same advantages as before, with the probable addition of champagne. But the craving for mountain air and the bassoon will still necessitate a yearly visit to the Alps or Pyrenees, if not to the Lake District or Snowdon, and, if the ecstasy of a Cabinet Minister playing on the bassoon in the moonlight should be regarded as being in any way an excess, the fact should be remembered that without the bassoon and the mountain air the Cabinet Minister would not be completely healthy.

But, even without holidays, the supposed bricklayer or Cabinet Minister would be a fortunate man, having three-quarters of his abilities employed in his work and home throughout the whole year of work. Most of us are able to exercise most of our abilities only in our spare time.

**THE NATURE OF ABILITY AND OF WEALTH.** The foregoing considerations make the advantages of a united democracy, the attainment of whose object would employ all our abilities, very attractive. It is only necessary to find such an object, to find a practical way of making complete happiness for all members of the State. As we found two such objects on page 56, we may claim to have found the certainty that complete happiness for all is a practical possibility.

Both of the suggested objects involve maximum production of physical, mental and spiritual wealth. Unless wealth is defined, however, difficulties may occur, as appeared in dealing with the subject of money in Chapter XII.

For example, some of us may have the following abilities:

- (i) To pick pockets.
  - (ii) To deceive without untruthfulness.
  - (iii) To injure the reputation of other people secretly.
  - (iv) To murder without being found out.
  - (v) To prevent husbands and wives from liking one another.
  - (vi) To teach children the advantages of being selfish.
- To employ these abilities in the maximum production of

material wealth is undoubtedly possible, if material wealth is subject to no moral condition. But it would be impossible to employ them in the production of maximum wealth if wealth were defined as something necessarily:

- (i) Honestly come by.
- (ii) Without deceitfulness
- (iii) Injurious to no one.
- (iv) Dangerous to no one.
- (v) Conducive to conjugal affection and
- (vi) Representing to children the value of unselfishness.

If these six last-named characteristics be desired by everyone and if wealth be defined as that which is so desired, then, in a State having for its object the maximum production of wealth, there will be no employment at all for any of the six abilities named in the preceding list.

But we have observed that the maximum production of wealth must, by definition, be capable of employing all the abilities of all the members of a State, and that full employment is necessary for the health of the individual, as well as the efficiency of the State.

We have, therefore, arrived at a self-contradiction involving one of those doubts which, as we noticed on page 37, encouraged us to hope that we are approaching the final and whole truth of the matter. We may never reach the final and whole truth about politics. Had anyone ever done so, an ideal State would no doubt have come into existence before now. Our ideas are self-contradictory and we must do the best that we can with them.

#### THE DEPENDENCE OF HAPPINESS ON MORAL STANDARD.

As our best possible, if crude way of reconciling our apparent contradictions, we may say that our theory of a united democracy can be fully practised only when possessors of unemployable abilities discard them and convince themselves that these are not abilities at all. This is as much as to say that happiness under a united democracy like the efficient working of the system itself, depends on agreement by all the members of the State as to what is desirable in human conduct—what abilities are desirable. To obtain the agreement of the largest number of members, the simplest formula is

necessary, as we saw on page 86. Perhaps the Ten Commandments as summarised into two great principles in the record of St. Matthew (ch. xxii, v. 37) might be a guide for drawing up a list of what is desirable, if a guide is needed. But still there will always remain the difficulty of people understanding the meanings of others, as we noticed on page 51.

We are bound to conclude that happiness under any social system depends on the people under the system as much as on the system itself. Ancient Greece under the Republic was happy. France under the Third Republic, doomed. Dogs under good masters are happy; under bad masters, unhappy. Happiness depends on achievement and hope. Achievement depends on health, and this depends on employment of abilities.

As we have seen, the main difficulty in the way of happiness under a united democracy will be found to be that of common understanding as to what is desirable. Common understanding is so much impeded by metaphor and other poetical means of expression on the part of politicians, as exemplified on pages 92, 123, and elsewhere, that even the simplest facts are open to misunderstanding. An attempt to distinguish and point out unnecessary difficulties in language will be made in the following chapter, in the hope of making agreement easier.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### MISUNDERSTANDINGS

IN Chapters VII–XI we saw how nicely a united democracy will work when some such common object as that suggested in Chapter V is adopted as the purpose of the State. But it cannot be so adopted without nation-wide discussion; and discussion is impossible unless statements are clear enough to be understood.

**THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING.** It is hardly a cause for surprise, that misunderstandings mentioned on page 51 occur even between the most honest and learned people when it is realised how few, if any of us, understand the nature of truth itself. We cannot know what is a fact, until we know what a fact is.

There was a time when it was believed that whoever could or could not be relied on to deal in absolute and incontestable truth, scientists could be so trusted, especially physicists; and, if sometimes they assured the world that they knew, as they once did, that atoms were stable, or that some other phenomenon was what it was not, it was still believed that they could at least be trusted to find out the truth about the very simplest of physical matters, such as the length of a piece of steel. The length of a piece of steel, however, cannot be measured exactly, and physicists can, consequently, never tell us the whole truth about the length of a piece of steel. Once, they thought that they could; now they doubt that they ever will be able.

The reason for this limitation of science is that a particle of steel, smaller than the wavelength of a light directed towards it, will not reflect the light and, therefore, cannot be seen. No advantage is gained by means of a magnifying glass, because there is no reflection to magnify. No light reaches the observer from the particle, which, therefore, cannot by any means be seen. Addition of such a particle to the length of a piece of steel, therefore, cannot be seen and the

length of the piece of steel can be determined only as something between two lengths which differ by the size of such a particle. With wavelengths shorter than those of light, the size of an invisible object can certainly be measured by an electron microscope. But there is again a practical limit to this. And, even if physicists ever can, by means at present only theoretically possible, learn the exact truth about the length of a piece of steel, they can never, according to the Uncertainty Principle established some twenty years ago, by any means even theoretical, ascertain both the position and the speed of a movement of an electron. It is theoretically possible to determine the position with perfect exactness, and it might not be thought a great step from this, to determine also the speed of movement. But the more exact the measurement of the position, the less exact must be the measurement of the speed. The Uncertainty Principle is an eternal law and marks a limit to possible human knowledge.

Apart from practical difficulties, therefore, there is in the nature of physical science itself a state of knowledge, where all is not known and nothing more can be known or even be expected to be known. The whole and absolute truth is unattainable.

But all sorts of comparative truth can be realised. We can say that an object is an inch long, and many people may measure it and agree with us—we agree in our comparison between the object and our measuring instrument. Others may disagree, by an amount equal to a wavelength of light. This difference must remain a matter of opinion. One may be right, or the truth may lie somewhere between the two. No one can tell.

**SUBJECTIVITY.** If we say that we are absolutely sure that an object is an inch long, we deceive ourselves into thinking that we know more than we do. We can only say with certainty, that it seems to us to be an inch long. This is telling the subjective truth, the truth subject to our incomplete knowledge. The basis of the Uncertainty Principle in physics is, that the act of observation alters the phenomenon observed. This is important. It assures us, in as far as we can be sure of anything, that the only truth that we can ever have will be only subjective truth, not absolute truth.



If this is so in a simple matter like the length of a piece of steel, doubt as to the absolute truth is multiplied into many doubts, in a complex matter like the character of a man or the desirability of an action. To claim to be absolutely right about anything is, therefore, avoided by thoughtful people.

As we noticed on page 88, the Gloucestershire farmer asserts that the right action against a rabbit is to shoot it, but the Pembrokeshire farmer asserts that the right weapon is a trap. It might be said that there is no real disagreement, because the choice depends on circumstances. But who is to say with absolute truth, what the circumstances are? How many rabbits must there be, before a Gloucestershire farmer will trap them; how few, before a Pembrokeshire farmer will shoot them? It is a matter of the opinion of individual farmers. The truth of the matter is subjective. No one can ever tell with absolute truth the moment at which the gun or the trap becomes the right weapon to use.

So also with morals, all may agree that it is right for a man to say that he is too busy to lunch with an acquaintance, when he is not too busy but dislikes the acquaintance too much to enjoy lunching with him. The lie is likely to prevent an unnecessary loss of energy in annoyance, distress and bewilderment; because the fact of being disliked is difficult to understand, while the fact that someone else is busy can be understood with scarcely any effort at all. All may be agreed, also, that it is wrong for a man to say that he has done so much work and deserves so much pay, when he has done no work and deserves no pay. The lie is likely to cause mistrust between employer and employed. But between the extremes of these two cases there may be many others, in which opinion will differ as to whether it is right or wrong for a man to lie. Who shall say, who is right? Even when all agree, as we have seen, the accepted truth of the matter can be only subjective, not absolute.

Knowledge that knowledge is not absolute may cause irritation at reading or hearing positive statements. These are sometimes made on such subjects as strategy and economics, complex physical matters whose results are generally visible, and are even more often made in the most positive manner on politics and religion, complex moral subjects whose phenomena are generally less apparent. These statements can



LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION 1931  
FOR THE  
SOUTHWICK WARD


VOTE FOR

**MOUSTARDIER**

AND  
**RAY**

MUNICIPAL REFORM CANDIDATES

THE  
MUSTARDIER  
RAY  
MUNICIPAL REFORM CANDIDATES



MOUSTARDIER  
RAY

Wesley  
SOUND  
Electric  
SYSTEM

be only subjectively true, and to make them positive is to claim superhuman knowledge.

When people claiming superhuman knowledge disagree, they may be unwilling to submit what they regard as superhuman to the human faculty of reason, and so, instead of reasoning, persist in repeated statement. This occurs more often in politics and religion, where the phenomena are less easily tested by common observation and agreement, than in economics and strategy, where results may quickly subject assertion and asserter to common ridicule. In this case, however, simply to assert is to imitate a function of the hyena and the ass, and, although as human beings we can hardly avoid repeated assertion, it is wise as well as polite to offer reasons also; for, by renouncing reason, we act not in a superhuman, but in a sub-human manner. Even when thoroughly human and abounding in reasons, the most impressive reasons, we possess only our own or a borrowed subjective truth, and, until we attain absolute truth, a feat unlikely to be performed, we have no warrant that our truth is more like the absolute truth than anyone else's truth.

It is a sign of the great wisdom of our race, that we are tolerant of minorities; for they may be right, the majority of us wrong. To realise the possibility of being wrong about a detail is greater evidence of wisdom, than to be right about a detail; and realisation of the possibility of being wrong is shown in the modesty of the wisest men. After discovering the Law of Gravity, which suddenly made sense of the movements of the planets as well as all the phenomena of weight, Newton said that he seemed to himself "like a boy playing on the sea-shore . . . whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me". Everyone who argues increases his wisdom when he remembers this.

If people desire to argue themselves into Parliament, they may persuade people to vote for them, by what means they may. But if they desire to announce the truth on political subjects, they will first need to find the truth. As we have seen, all that they can possibly find is subjective truth. If they claim to have found more, any electors who vote for them will be choosing to be represented by examples of avoidable ignorance or unwarrantable arrogance.

Besides the different descriptions of truth by equally

honest and learned people, noticed on page 51 we recognised on page 88 the natural differences between the French and English views of the Poles. We may now admit even more readily than before, that we cannot say that one view is right and the other wrong. Both, though different, may be exact subjective truth and, therefore, right. The more views of the Poles we have, if the observers report exactly what they see, the more we are likely to know about the Poles; we may even suppose, that if we had an infinite number of views, we would possess the whole and absolute truth about the Poles. This being so, it is most unfortunate that politicians should ridicule one another's views. Their characters may be laughable and it is quite possible that they may talk airy nonsense or bombastic drivel. But if and when they attempt to state the truth as they see it, the only hope of our nearest possible approach to absolute truth depends on our encouraging them, listening to them and asking for more. Only by approaching as near as we can to absolute truth, can we reach a common understanding likely to be accepted by each observer as something better than his own subjective truth. This common understanding is the pre-condition for united democracy, which we noticed at the beginning of the present chapter. It is, therefore, worth all the trouble that happiness is worth.

Trouble is involved not so much in obtaining different views, as in obtaining statements of them. Instead of describing the subjective truth as they see it, crafty men describe it perhaps in some different way, in order to make an impression by which they hope to obtain some object of their own. This craftiness can only hinder us in approaching the absolute truth. What is likely to help us is the free discussion mentioned on pages 90 and 101 not between clever people but between well-informed people who will do their utmost to form clear opinions and express them well. For political purposes under a united democracy, these discussions must range over all the subjects covered by human abilities, so that the question as to what is desirable in human conduct may be answered, as on page 144 we saw to be necessary. Such answers would provide Parliament with the benefit supposed on page 104, and without these answers no democracy can be expected to work.



Besides deliberate distortion, another trouble in obtaining statements of subjective truth, is the language of poetry, metaphor, allegory and exaggeration. For example, there is no harm in calling a political or other enemy a swine, if we only mean to express contempt and ill-will. But if we are pretending to tell the truth as we see it, we must drop this metaphor and say that he is not a swine, but a human being. We can then proceed to state our facts as we see them: that he makes noises over his food, as a swine makes noises over its food, waddles like a fat swine, has a glazed-looking eye like a well-fed swine's eye, and, when hit, grunts like a swine, but reasons like a crafty and dangerous human being.

If we desire to excite passion, we may use the language of poetry, metaphor, allegory and exaggeration. But if we desire to convey what we know of the truth, we must be exact, prepared to define and explain, and, if we wish to obtain a hearing, often patient, modest and sympathetic. Otherwise, people may be so disgusted by the horrid sight of our unsymmetrical or unsympathetic faces, that they will be unwilling to spare attention for what we are trying to say. Arrogance and hatred are enemies of discussion, and therefore, of democracy.

THE USE OF SIMILE AND METAPHOR. Difficulties in language and, therefore, in discussion increase when uncommon ideas are to be expressed. When we conceive an idea for which there is no word in our language, we are obliged to use a simile. We use a word describing something like the idea and explain its resemblance. Finally, we may use the word to mean our new idea. In that case, we make a metaphor. This is what happens when physicists reach conclusions such as the Uncertainty Principle. They have to tell us that position and speed cannot exist together. According to our former conceptions, speed could not exist without position; according to our conceptions, therefore, physicists are making nonsense of the words. The fact is, that they have a conception of something new to us, which they call position; and warn us, that there is really no such thing as what we have been accustomed to call position. These changes in the meanings of words make discussion very

difficult. It is simpler to invent for new ideas new words and symbols, as in higher mathematics and the languages of all progressive arts and crafts, and as in slang. The progress of knowledge is marked by the numbers of new words expressing new ideas.

To use old words with other than their original meanings in order to express ideas that are not new, is simply to cause unnecessary confusion. For example, when journalists offer to relieve our boredom by suggesting that they have discovered a new and interesting periodic occurrence of heat or crime, they call it a heat wave or a wave of crime. If they have discovered nothing new but only events such as have happened and been described before in ordinary language, their metaphors relieve our boredom at the risk of misunderstanding. When war correspondents can find nothing in the day's news to relieve the monotony of war, they may care to suggest that some staff officer or other possesses a new and interesting conception of the fact that two forces are approaching a single place from two different directions, by telling us of a pincer movement or even a giant pincer movement; or, when in fact guns have been fired, they prefer to report that hammer blows have been delivered.

All this inexactness and metaphor tends to create a sense of unreality. It is exactly like telling the story of Father Christmas to children who know it to be untrue; and, as most of the public cannot at any time take part in the direction of a war, do much in the prevention of crime or anything to produce or prevent the heat of summer, this freedom of the Press does not much matter. It would be a different case if the General Officer commanding the Eighth Army were to have applied to the Minister of War Production, saying that he needed the means to deliver hammer blows against a bulge in the enemy's line; the Minister might have sent a supply of hammers instead of other weapons. Those who have to obtain results by co-operation must convey what they mean in plain language, not entertain one another with their pretty, awe-inspiring or irritating fancies. In politics, members of a democracy have to obtain results by co-operation, and those who confuse their minds with fancies instead of accurate subjective truth, do their country an avoidable disservice.

This language of poetry, metaphor, allegory and exaggeration, as we have seen, has two functions, namely, to excite emotion without applying for the sanction of reason, and to cause a sense of unreality and consequent inactivity. These are the two functions of newspapers, apart from simply conveying news, noticed on page 92. They are also the functions of political agents and other agitators. They have no place in any political discussion whose object is to discover truth. This is why oratory has been called harlotry.\*

DIFFERENCES OF LANGUAGE. In addition to these avoidable difficulties of language, there are unavoidable difficulties. The difference of language between theologians and atheistic philosophers noticed on page 34 and 51 is very similar to the difference between French and English views to which we referred on page 88 because the difference in each case results from something being observed by different people with different knowledge. Each branch of knowledge has its own language, and it is not always easy to translate the language of, say, physics into the language of, say, chemistry.

For example, the physicist may describe the burning of a piece of coke in January as a release of energy generating heat on a cold day, and ask for more; while the chemist may describe it as the oxidising of carbon, liable to produce carbon monoxide, and warn the physicist to stand clear. An economist may describe it as consumption of a commodity and recommend consumption of another piece to stimulate trade; and a policeman regard it as a flagrant breach of some regulation. It is in that case possible for four descriptions, each perfectly right and complete in its own way, although describing the same thing, to be entirely different; and each, perhaps, unintelligible to three out of four people, each of whom would understand only one of the descriptions. It might seem ridiculous to the chemist that anyone should make regulations about oxidising carbon — a thing that any chemist is liable to do; and it may seem scandalous to a policeman that anyone should dare to release energy unlawfully in his presence. The whole question of the nature of the act of burning a piece of coke, with its possible consequences, is a very much bigger one than it might appear

\* "Oratory is the harlot of the arts."—Froude in *Short Studies*.

at first sight. Little could be learned about it without the co-operation of four different people, each describing his own view in his own language. Nor could this be learned by all four, unless each learned the language of the others or employed an interpreter. An exactly similar difficulty confronts the theologian who recognises God but not Evolution, and the atheistic philosopher who recognises Evolution but not God; or the psychologist who says that a murderer is suffering from a complex and can be cured, and the moralist who says that the murderer is a criminal and must be punished.

If it is so hard to know the whole truth about a matter like the burning of a piece of coke, how shall we ever be able to know the nature and consequences of such complex things as the proposals of the Beveridge Committee on social security? The five giants, as Sir William Beveridge described Want, Ignorance, Squalor, Disease and Idleness, mean nothing until they are defined; and they mean different things to different people. As soon as the Report of the Committee offered definitions of want and means to prevent it, some people favoured the Report, others disfavoured it. The causes of disagreement, as we have seen, are that we cannot make ourselves completely understood by one another and that none of us knows the whole, while each knows part of the truth.

THE VALUE OF TRUTH IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT. Those who do not know the whole truth cannot expect their actions to be wholly wise. This accounts for the absence of the ideal State, noticed on page 144. Differences of view account for differences of human laws and customs adopted voluntarily, and when we have united the truth of all our views we shall have that closest possible approximation to the whole and absolute truth, which alone can persuade everyone to adopt those laws and customs which are essential to an ideal State.

The importance of truth to happiness under a united democracy, then, is this: that by all of us learning all that we can from one another we shall best be able to approach absolute truth, absolute agreement, perfect co-operation, achievement, hope and happiness.

Let us summarise the propositions so far considered in the present chapter: (i) we can each start only with our own subjective truth; (ii) we can add to this, other people's truth by free discussion and reading; (iii) in expressing our views we must be honest and use plain language, neither clever nor fanciful; (iv) we must earnestly try to learn one another's language, knowing that when the ideas of others seem most unintelligible and ridiculous we have most to learn and most obviously need to learn from them. We have nothing to learn from people with whom we agree. (v) Only by a great number of different views, including opposite views, can anything like the whole and absolute truth of a matter be seen; (vi) the whole and absolute truth is the ideal basis for that agreement which is fundamental to a united democracy and consequent happiness.

DEMOCRACY BY AGREEMENT. If it is desired to put these propositions to any practical use, means have been suggested in Chapter X by which this can be done. The associations of people which under Hare's system of representation would form Parliamentary constituencies could begin by discussing the question with which Chapter XIII ended, namely, what is desirable in human conduct; or, which is practically the same thing, the question with which Chapter V ended, namely, the purpose of the State. Members of these associations would have the advantage of a common outlook, common interests and common language and their difficulties in understanding one another would be limited, as we have seen, to deliberate distortion and fanciful expression. Such associations already exist. There are trade unions for artisans, sports clubs for athletes, the United Services Club for admirals, the Girls' Friendly Society for girls, the Automobile Association for motorists, the Conservative Association for Conservatives, the Left Book Club for leftists, the Perry-Lyle-Benn Combine for individualists and the Churches and Ethical Societies for all. Members of these and all other public associations naturally discuss matters of public importance, and, when agreement is reached, a Member of Parliament is the proper instrument for expressing this aspect of truth in the Legislature.



Local branches of these associations have the advantage of mutual understanding between members in a particularly high degree, and these associations would surely do great service to their members, themselves collectively and the country at large, by attempting to answer the question: What is the purpose of our State—is it only to maintain order—? and, For what human abilities should employment be found in the ideal State? But, with the advantage of mutual understanding between members of associations, goes the disadvantage, that those who agree have nothing to learn from one another; and the advantage of a common language in one association is likely to be accompanied by the disadvantage of complete ignorance of the outlook, interests and language of all other associations.

Under Hare's system, the representatives of these associations would meet in Parliament and there, by putting together a great many views, including opposite views, obtain something like the whole absolute truth and the will of the people. For this purpose, it would be important, for the reasons given on page 150 to return to Parliament not the richest, loudest, least tolerant, most servile or craftiest of us, but those who love truth most.

Failing Parliament, there may be meetings conducted by bishops. But these can be only makeshifts for the proper function of Parliament, and they have already given vent to the possibility of bloody revolution. Not the shouts of bishops nor the pleas of politicians, but patience and mutual understanding between ordinary people, are the requirements of democracy.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### A DEMOCRATIC UNIT IN THE WORLD

**THE NATURE OF MIGHT.** The foregoing chapters contain a study of the possibilities of a united Britain as such, but this will not satisfy us without inquiry into the possible relations between such a Britain and the rest of the world.

We have seen that an essential feature of such a State must be what we have called the manipulation of moral laws, which are, as noticed on page 50 like the Law of Gravity, superhuman. One of the most important of these laws to be understood and manipulated is the Law of Might; and we may learn about the importance of Might in dealing with the outside world, as is our habit, from the experimental mistakes of other nations. The Law of Might, like the Protestant faith, was stated in Germany earlier than in England; but, as we noticed on page 20, Protestantism has been of much more use to England than to Germany. So it has been with the Law of Might, which states that Might is Right.

Cramped by the same limitation that we noticed in Hitler's work, in discussing this on page 136, Kaiser William II asserted the Law of Might without showing any sign of understanding what Might is, except material might. With only material power, he assaulted a spiritual power that would have prevented a more intelligent man from, as he called it, "ruthless" warfare; he assailed not the material welfare of the United States of America, but the spirit of those and of other States as well, by such acts as the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*. This provoked almost the whole world to take up arms against him, and he suffered not only spiritual but also material defeat in consequence. But, however ignorant the Kaiser may have been, his advisers learned much of their theory of total war, as expounded by Clausewitz, from Napoleon. They were, therefore, perfectly well aware of that great soldier's discovery, a discovery owed to the very same local progress of human knowledge that caused the French Revolution: "The moral is to the physical as three is to one." The knowledge seemed curiously to escape such men as

Bethmann-Hollweg and Hindenburg in the turmoil of war. Acting on it as soon as they came into power, Hitler and the other National Socialists took the greatest possible pains to increase the might of the German spirit, inspiring in the country the mutual help noticed on page 29 and exciting the sense of grievance noticed on page 39.

Might is Right beyond all doubt, because Right is that which is lawful, and law is nothing but an expression of power—natural law of natural power, human law of human power. But the Kaiser to some extent misunderstood the Law and erred in manipulating it. Hitler learned from past mistakes, that spiritual might is finally even greater than material might. Confident in his learning, he put Germany again into motion with the same object that the Kaiser had chosen, but with superior method. The essentially material object in each case, was a sign of weakness. The moral causes which alone can rouse England to war, are a sign of strength.

It is pathetic and tragic to look back on the admirable plans of the Germans to dominate the world during the past thirty years, to think of the honest hopes and simple faith of their soldiers, the proud and stern faces of their generals and see their huge and even passionate efforts end in failure. They think of everything. They studiously obey all the rules laid down by the teachers of war. They are told that the moral is to the physical as three is to one. Very well, they exalt the spirit of Germany until her honour is more precious to the German soldier than life or family. By destroying the unity of their enemies' spirit, their propagandists and other agents of the so-called Fifth Column conquered whole nations almost without a shot being fired. They are told that they must concentrate material force superior to that of the enemy at the decisive point. In obedience, they wisely deploy a vast superiority of air power over London, that great city which, Barrère once told the French Convention, "tyrannises the world". They are told that Napoleon would have fared well in Russia, but for want of supplies. Very well, they requisition the factories and enslave the people of half Europe, and their Eastern Front is continuously and magnificently supplied. Why do these people, who are so strong, so well equipped, so careful and so devoted not succeed? It is a hard

question; for they have throughout many years of war been materially superior to their enemies at every point decisive in a nation's history; and what more could a nation do to increase its spiritual power, when its soldiers face death as calmly as automatons and when its Fifth Column has subdued other nations with little more than words?

The author of some fantasy like *Jurgen* can be imagined telling a story of the leader of the German Reich on the Day of Judgment, angrily approaching the Throne of Heaven and demanding justice, after these thirty years of disappointment and death. "We have never asked for Heaven", he might say. "We only desire the Earth. We have done everything required for success. We have lied, cheated and stabbed in the back. We have outnumbered our enemies by ten to one; we have carried out all the rules laid down by the great masters of fighting. We have not spared ourselves. We have preferred guns to butter, starved our minds and spirits of all that does not stimulate fighting, sacrificed our first-born and our last-born. What more could we have done to deserve success? Yet, what is our reward? Our nation decimated, our material power is exhausted and our young children are without milk—I demand justice!"

The answer to Hitler might be, that he made almost the same mistake as that made by the Kaiser. The Kaiser failed to realise that Might includes the might of the spirit. Hitler failed to inquire: What spirit and whose spirit? He employed the power of the German nation. But it has not been enough. His material power was from 1939 to 1942 ample and of the right kind; but his spiritual power deficient or not of the right kind.

Whose and what spirit has overcome that of the German nation? In the war of 1914-18, it was the spirit of other nations, which eventually armed superior forces against Germany; in the war of 1939, the spirit of the United Nations. What is the nature of the successful spirit of these nations? It is displayed in their actions. The war of 1914 ended with an attempt to prevent future war by the League of Nations. This was characterised by goodwill towards men in general, who were to be allowed to develop all five parts of life, with the exception that Economy was not to be improved by war. The mind of the victorious nations was weak, so that the League failed; but the spirit was liberal.

In depending on the Law of Might, therefore, it may be right to observe that where the spirit is liberal, greater might is displayed than where the spirit is such as that generated in Germany under Hitler. The German spirit has been one of unselfishness in individuals, for a national object selfish with regard to nations. This object has always been material and therefore incapable of being had and at the same time shared with anyone else—it could only be divided, which is not quite the same thing; unlike wisdom, which can be shared and fully possessed at the same time. We may call the spirit of Germany under Hitler that of Materialism, and conclude that it is less mighty than a liberal spirit.

This feature of the liberal spirit, that it tends to develop what can be shared, is expressed in the names of the power that crushed Germany : the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations. In a state of unity the function of sharing is essential. As we have seen, this state of unity and this function of sharing are two primary essentials of democratic unity. A united democracy will, therefore, always be very strong in relation to its size.

**THE UNITED NATIONS' SPIRITUAL OBJECT.** Neither democratic unity nor union of the States of the world has been achieved. They may never be achieved. It is not within the scope of the present examination to argue whether it is desirable that they should be achieved at once. But we have noticed in Chapter VIII our existing active political tendencies towards centralisation, and on page 77 the fact that at least one political organisation advocates the largest possible union of nations, as foreshadowed by Churchill and Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter during 1941.

It may be remarked that the British Empire and the United States of America are in a state of semi-unity, with the avowed spiritual intention of allowing nations to govern themselves and develop their own characters as they wish to do: and that the word, "empire" is derived from words meaning to design, to discover, and to achieve, as we saw on page 20. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist



Republics is almost completely united and avowed in the recent war the object of defeating not only Germany, but "Fascism". It is for the Russians to decide whether by Fascism they mean anything essentially resembling what is called materialism above, and whether, therefore, their aim is spiritual and identical with ours.

China, though throughout her long history hindered in unity as we noticed on page 53, is changing and has operated against Japan with the dogged insistence of all the United Nations against tyranny. And the spirit of China has never been materialistic; it has honoured the dead too much for that. However physically rich or poor, China has for 4,000 years been spiritually great.

**PROGRESS OR DECLINE OF EMPIRE.** A characteristic that distinguishes the present British empirical system from the French, Spanish, Greek and other empires, is that it has always been in a state of change. We noticed on page 53 the same characteristic in human, as opposed to animal conduct, and on page 135 we saw in a continual hope based on reason a justification for the continuance of life. Some experiments yield their results quickly and are soon ended. Our experiment in uniting nations under the Crown is a prolonged one, with continual hope of improvement. How long it is to last, and to what end, is for us to decide; as it was for the French, the Spaniards, the Greeks and others, in the cases of their empires.

The important characteristic of hope is in some measure a common factor in our Empire and that of Rome, which lasted for more than a thousand years until Voltaire noticed that it had at last become "neither holy nor Roman nor an empire". It was never framed to be as rigid as, for example, that of Persia; and so much did it change during a thousand years, that Gibbon was able to write several hundred thousand words about its decline and fall alone, without describing its rise and ascendancy at all. Its early changes were its measure of hope, and hope seemed to "spring eternal" in this empire. It changed not only by gradually offering to all Europeans the citizenship of Rome but admitted candidates from the remotest provinces to the throne of Cæsar. It even broke into two empires, each with its Church; Rome, with its heavy


pillars and its Roman Catholicism, Byzantium with its Near Eastern architecture and the Greek Orthodoxy which survived the change of name from Byzantium to Istanbul. Only when the Empire's democrats became sated with material well-being, like a dozing python, did hope cease and decay begin.

Churches are a second feature shared by the Roman and British empires; the Greek and Roman Churches being rivalled by those of England and her Dissenters. Indeed, it was the Church that enabled the empire, as the Holy Roman Empire, to last as long as it did. A day came when the importance of Rome and Constantinople was vested rather in their bishops than in their emperors. The Bishop of Rome became known as the Pope, and the chair of St. Peter has long outlasted the throne of Cæsar. How will it fare with the throne of Canterbury—will the Church of England outlast the British Empire? It is perhaps for our generation to answer this question. As long as an experiment continues to yield additional knowledge, it may be continued.

We have observed that the purpose of the United Nations at war appeared to be mainly, perhaps wholly, spiritual. Whether this can be stated as being more than an appearance, or not, depends on the individuals composing the nations and on prevention of the misunderstandings noticed in the foregoing chapter. If this object is wholly spiritual, material requirements being only requirements and not the object, then it is concerned with that function by which man has been endlessly manipulating eternal moral laws. Therefore, fulfilling the requirements on page 54 this object is not only the object of our own semi-unity in war, but also a suitable object for a united democratic State in peace. This manipulating of the eternal moral laws, as we saw on page 53 may well be called in figurative language, the moulding of humanity, or shaping the destiny of the human race; and as long as this is the object of the British experiment, there will remain ample opportunity for it to continue.

A RELIGIOUS VIEW OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. Whether we believe that we are capable of or suited to such a task in peace-time and whether we desire or intend to undertake it,

OPPOSITE : . . . 'The Church that enabled the Empire.' St. Paul's Cathedral during the London "blitz."





is an enquiry beyond the limits of the present examination. It is a matter for the spirits of individual democrats to determine. But, as we remarked on page 35 there are substantial numbers of people who believe that the English-speaking peoples are desired by God to perform such a task. They, like Milton, believe that God revealed himself first to his Englishmen.

We can only remark, in this connection, in discussing the possibilities of a united Britain in a world of peace, that it is hard to distinguish between the unity of a united democracy and the unity of the Church of Christ. Both demand the unselfishness of individuals for a cause whose service is perfect freedom and whose object is to approach a perfect wisdom which, as the Uncertainty Principle noticed on page 147 assures us, is superhuman and therefore divine. If this is the object of our unity, a united democracy may well enable us to reveal for the good of mankind a way of life happier than that of any present or past social order, as suggested by the lines of Milton on page 35.

A POLITICAL VIEW OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. The ideas in the foregoing paragraph are conceived and expressed in terms of the Christian religion and, therefore, cannot be expected to mean anything of much value to those who do not regard this religion as a means of understanding. They may regard the unity of the Church of Christ as the unity in error of imaginative or hypocritical people and deduce that the unity of a united democracy would be equally objectionable. Others, not using the name of God to describe anything in which they believe, may regard the idea of God desiring anything, as the common delusion of Milton and modern authors of fiction.

The views of all who can express everything in which they believe without using the word God are important, like other subjective views of the truth. Besides, the ideas expressed in religious language above, as we observed on page 149 cannot be the absolute truth, but only subjective truth. It may, therefore, be worth while to try to express something, which will be indistinguishable from these ideas in any essential respect, in other language.



To do this, we might say that the English-speaking peoples have had a large experience of self-determination and found it good. We might add from the evidence of our experiment that with the advantages of education, men and women of any class of society may show themselves to be well able to govern. Having found this, the English-speaking peoples are well suited to the task of encouraging education and self-government in the countries of the world after the war.

Alternatively, we might say that during the war the march of science has bridged the gaps between distant countries and resulted in a great diffusion of knowledge, not fully understood or appreciated earlier, which should enable all past experience of the means of mental and material communication, as an asset to unity in effort, to be utilised among the nations of the world for their common good, this experience having been largely gained by the English-speaking peoples. It would be logical to argue the continuance of the English-speaking peoples in this leadership.

AN INTERNATIONAL VIEW OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS. Those who use the language of the Christian religion on subjects belonging also to politics may object, that these last two expressions fail to convey the essence of their belief, namely, that the post-war future of the English-speaking peoples is foreseen in the will of God. As to this, we can only remark that the best human approximation to the absolute truth of a matter is the combination of an infinite number of views registered in different human brains. The three expressions of views above, respectively referring to religious, political and scientific aspects of the matter, are by no means different enough to show us the absolute truth. There are doubtless people whose sincere and carefully thought-out opinion is that the influence of the English-speaking peoples after the war should and will decline.

The absolute truth, as we observed on pages 153-5 includes mutually contradictory subjective truths. Absolute truth may perhaps be imagined as in some way resembling a sphere, the whole of which cannot possibly be seen at once by a single human being. All of it could be seen at once only

by an eye, seeing in all directions, placed at the centre of the sphere, or by an infinite number of eyes surrounding the sphere. In seeing the whole sphere, of course, diametrically opposite views are involved. This is perhaps, an explanation of the fact noted on page 37 that in approaching the absolute truth of a matter we are confused by paradoxes and other contradictions and doubts.

It may be that those who expect the influence of the English-speaking peoples to continue as it is or increase, see only what is best in these peoples; and those who believe that the time is approaching for other great races to overcome the influence of the English-speaking peoples may see only what is worst in the English-speaking peoples. In any case, as remarked on page 161, the future of a race is decided by the individuals composing the race; and on its hope and changefulness depends the continuation of every human association and organisation.

**THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS UNITY ON EMPIRE.** All that we have observed regarding the possible future of a united democratic Britain is that such a democracy in peacetime would need to exercise the function of manipulating eternal moral laws and that the British Empire has demonstrated, but in greater measure, the lasting qualities of the Roman Empire, namely, hope and changefulness stimulated by religion. It is the function of manipulation that causes this hopefulness; and religion is one of the stimulants of this function. But, as we have seen, the same conception and stimulus may be conceived and expressed in religious, political or other terms.

The Roman Empire had in its later stages only the Roman Catholic religion, except in so far as the partial adherence of the Eastern Empire to Rome admitted also the Greek Orthodoxy of Constantinople. The British Empire does more than tolerate innumerable religions and sects. The Churches in the United Kingdom have formed a body for the purpose of minimising divisions caused by differences of dogma, in the interest of a combined view which, if less detailed than a single view, is more complete. Instead of the schisms that divided the Roman Church and Empire until

such important members as the Dutch and English broke away, we may perhaps see in the British Commonwealth of Nations a growing spiritual unity, of the liberal kind whose might, as we saw on page 159 Hitler failed to employ.

In speaking of the future of an empire, a people or even a Church, the language of religion is perhaps no better than any other. That is as much as to say that religious conceptions, as expressed in any human tongue, are as likely to be different from the absolute truth as are any other human conceptions. If no one can describe God, no one can describe a Church. Religious language is even more fraught with metaphor, whose dangers we noted on page 151 and elsewhere, than is the language of ethnology or sociology. Indeed, in this respect the language of religion is perhaps rivalled only by those of such advanced sciences as physics; and the reason for this is that these subjects reach those limits of human knowledge where such factors as the Uncertainty Principle have the effect noticed on pages 51 and 151. We lack proper words for what we as yet only vaguely understand.

Careless or unnecessary use of metaphors causes perhaps as much muddled thinking and as many valueless utterances from pulpits as from political platforms. The same simple religious bases, as a matter of fact, underlie Moslem and Buddhist theology, as Christian, and these are consistent with the theology evolved by modern science from the Serial Theory of Time. In combining the progressive force of Subjective Truth in various religions and philosophies, lies the chief hope of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

**THE RELIGION OF MEN OF ACTION.** In spite of its dangerous defects, the languages of religion are more common among us than that of political or any other science. It is characteristic of our men of action in critical moments of history. General Montgomery, after winning the battle of El Alamein in 1942, could not content himself without attributing the victory to God. As his ships prepared for action off Cape Tragalgar in 1805, Nelson took the trouble to inscribe in his diary a long and perfectly original prayer to a power described by him as God. Cromwell's New Model Army was so religious in language and thought, that soldiers

assumed biblical names, and "like a servant of the Lord, with his Bible and his sword, the General rode along us, to form us for the fight". Whatever the high merits of Saladin and low motives of others, Richard I and his crusading knights invaded the Holy Land to fight the Saracens for none if not religious reasons.

It is not to be supposed that these practical people wrote meaningless expressions in diaries or uttered words that meant nothing to them, for the sake of inspiring their subordinates or to conform with some absurd fashion. Vague as human conceptions of superhuman factors must be, these men devoted thought to the power that lies behind the eternal laws, for this reason, that whether in victory or in defeat and death, they confidently expected some practical value from this communion. Such men have sometimes been defeated. That which is practical is not necessarily physical, nor are the physical effects of the spirit always immediate; for example, the souls of men have taken years to combine against the materialistic German Empire, and the spiritual influence of the life of Christ has been affecting the physical actions of men for nineteen centuries since his death.

Unlike Germany under Hitler turning her attention inward to her own spirit and exciting it self-consciously, British men of action, after using their brains to arrange the best disposal of material power for battle, turn their attention to powers of the spirit not confined to their own and take part in activities which, being superhuman, are not to be understood by human brains. The limitation of the spirit of Germany, controlled by the brains of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Ley and other able and painstaking but limited people, naturally resulted in a serious limitation of the power of Germany and that waste of thirty years' effort already noticed.

British generals have not always been saints. The Duke of Marlborough was treasonably responsible for the death of Tollemache and the failure of the expedition to Brest in 1694. Captain Bligh of the *Bounty*, who might have admired wholly the modern German spirit, as an admiral surrendered his flagship the *Alexander* to the French in 1794. But these two were exceptions. The spirit of Montgomery, Nelson and Cromwell is the common spirit of the British men and women who filled our churches on the Sunday after the battle of

El Alemein, occasionally induced by crises to attempt the express in words that which brains recognises as being incomprehensible and, therefore, inexpressible except in some such indefinite language as that of religion.

THE SUPERHUMAN QUEST OF POETRY AND SCIENCE. But, like the children of Israel from whom doubtless many of us are wholly and still more of us partly descended, the English-speaking peoples have always possessed prophets and poets in a measure denied to other races. The duty of these individuals is that verbal expression of spiritual affairs which, for the reason given in the foregoing paragraph, other people are reluctant to undertake except on rare occasions. Prophets and poets are believed to have some vague but true understanding of the spirit, which is quite beyond the understanding of others.

In expressing any such understanding, prophets and poets are in precisely the difficulty that hinders the attempts of Einstein and others to tell us of Relativity and the Uncertainty Principle. It is on account of the defects of our knowledge that prophets, poets and scientists of the first order have the right and the need to address us in the vague language of the metaphor, or appeal to our emotions and impose convictions on our minds without expecting completely reasoned understandings. Bad luck to the preacher or politician who attempts the same, in a matter that our brains can quite well understand; for this is use of mere assertion we observed on page 149 as being sub-human.

By prophets, poets and scientists of the first order, we must surely mean only men who have freed their minds from every personal consideration, for the sake of a feat to be attempted; comprehension of the nearest possible approximation to absolute truth. St. John tells us of Heaven; Einstein of Relativity. Both are of infinite practical importance every day, just as Gravity was important even before Newton told us of it; both are totally incomprehensible, but perhaps rightly, if faintly imagined respectively by the prophet and the scientist.



## THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CONSCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION.

Some, who are bold enough to interpret the vague metaphors and allegories of prophets into ordinary language, tell us that the company of nations promised to Israel in his offspring is the British Commonwealth of Nations, that the great people promised to Manasseh are those of the United States of America, and that Satan in *Paradise Lost* is that Materialism which is exemplified by Germany under Hitler and by Japan. But there is no guarantee that these people's interpretation is any better than any other. It is for every individual to undertake that pursuit of wisdom, including meditation on the power behind the eternal laws, which we noticed on page 52 as equally distinguishing all men who do so from beasts. This equality in interpretation must be admitted especially by Christians, for the subject is not to be understood by brains; and Christ said of the grasp of superhuman abilities, according to St. Luke (ch. x, v. 21) "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes". It seems that all who know the limits of brains are capable of being babes in this sense. A common simplicity of faith in the destiny of the human race and this equality in study of the eternal moral laws, are of the essence of democracy.

It is not especially for the great men of a nation, unless they be poets or prophets, but essentially for the great numbers of the spirits of the individuals composing the nation, to make progress in spiritual and superhuman perception. The instrument of this perception is known as conscience; and, because of the difficulty of words in expressing what brains cannot understand, it is difficult to distinguish between the expressions of conscience and superstition.

For this reason atheistic philosophers have rashly called all religion—that is to say, acknowledgment of God or gods—superstition. In this, they overlook the evidence of exactly that same spirit which Hitler overlooked, and commit with him the serious blunder of regarding their own subjective truth as the whole truth; or else, recognising that powerful spirit, but not using the word God in describing it, they regard as superstitious a belief which they themselves hold, simply because it is expressed in language which they do not use.

The difference between expressions of conscience and

superstition is perhaps that we have evidence which brains can note—such as the course of the wars of 1914 and 1939, for instance—of spiritual power perceived by conscience; whereas the course of history disproves merely superstitious beliefs. But the evidence acceptable by brains comes only after the perceptions of conscience or of superstition, as the case may be; and, pending this proof, it is difficult for anyone but the possessor of the conscience to distinguish between divine revelation and mere superstition. The present pages are not the place for descriptive writing, but for those who care to observe facts at work this contest between conscience and superstition is represented by Olga in *She Came to Command* (Simpkin, Marshall), where she begins with the challenge in Act II, Scene 5, line 130:

From the birth of an ape  
To the birth of a nation  
There is nothing at all  
But a chain of causation.

She makes a brave effort in Act IV, Scene 2, to the unhappy end described by Philipka, who begins at line 90 of Scene 4 and continues:

But I have eyes and I have inward sight . . .  
And in the night whose vast and dark display  
Reveals my smallness, priests might say I pray.

These Russian ideas translate very well into English.

We are not generally considered as a people to be among the most superstitious, and the function of wisdom is to detect and reject superstition; but we undoubtedly have a national conscience whose effect, as we have seen, has been to guide our actions by that spiritual power which, to her shame and disaster, Germany under Hitler disregarded. But when an individual takes it upon himself to express the national conscience, a thing of the spirit that cannot be expressed exactly in any human words, there is great danger that, like the Members of Parliament noticed on page 57 they may express only their own perceptions, which may be wholly superstitious or prejudiced. All the difficulties of expressing truth, noticed in the present and foregoing chapters, make it hard to distinguish between a necessarily faulty expression of conscience and an expression of superstition or prejudice.

THE SPIRITUAL HISTORY OF THE THRONE. A name for one of these superstitions is Jingoism. This implies an idea that superiority of the British over other peoples justifies a British Empire procured by force of arms, primarily for the benefit of the British people. The evidence of history does not justify such a conception. The Empire has been made by physical, mental and spiritual conquest and, under the Throne of England which became the Imperial Throne, all the peoples concerned have made progress in that fifth part of life which distinguishes men from beasts and, in so far as it is spiritual, distinguishes the United Nations from Germany under Hitler.

The Throne, under which this benefit has been shared, is regarded by some as an object of foolish superstition, by others as the chief symbol of national conscience. Whatever the absolute truth of this matter may be, it is remarkable that the Kings of England have shown in their history all the hopeful progressiveness and the religion which we observed on page 161 as characteristic of the Empire itself.

King John governed the material power of the nation. As we saw on page 96 this power slipped into the hands of Parliament. Our present King exercises little material power, but vast spiritual influence. King John believed that he ruled by virtue of a divine right, as master of material things. Our present King rules by the will of his peoples, obeying Parliament in all material affairs. But his title, as we see written on our shillings and pence, is Defender of the Faith. It is as the seat of this Defender that the Throne is supreme; and under the Throne archbishops ought to serve God. Parliament comes between the Throne and the material affairs of people, but not between the Throne and the minds of the people. The Throne has become less a material and more a spiritual factor.

This affects the manner of life of our Kings. Richard III married and murdered as seemed to him expedient, even his Queen being the widow of a victim. Henry VIII divorced three wives and killed two. But Edward VIII abdicated because he desired simply to marry a divorced woman. This change of moral standards in the lives of our Kings is infinitely greater than the change in the lives of their subjects, during the same period of less than 500 years. It marks the changed function of kings. What has changed as rapidly, has been the material welfare of the country. The physical needs of Richard III's England were poorly satisfied, and the Crown

represented material advancement. The physical needs of present-day England can easily be satisfied by mechanised production, and the Crown represents spiritual advancement. The honour of the Royal Family depends no longer on its splendour, but on its beauty.

Those who believe that the great people of the United States of America are the descendents of Manasseh, believe also that the Throne of England is that of David; that is, the Throne to be assumed by Christ at the second advent foretold by the prophets. Whether history will sanction this belief or not, we who are alive to-day may never know. But the mere thought of it alone is of great importance to the conception of a united democracy as a system resembling the Church of Christ in the essential features mentioned on page 163. It shows that the minds of many thousands of people are already prepared at the present time, for self-government implying unselfishness, unity and service in perfect freedom, under a Throne whose function is spiritual and influence world-wide.

All these conjectures as to possible relations between a Britain and the rest of the world after the war, are stated on the three foregoing pages in the language of religion. Similar conjectures can be stated in other language. The history of the Speeches from the Throne is the history of an ever-widening and more powerful liberal spirit.

**THE MATERIAL BASIS OF SPIRITUAL PROGRESS.** AS LONG as we are human we shall need physical things. As remarked on page 137, it is when physical needs are satisfied, that men are able to develop into something more than men. Escaped prisoners of war, the populations of countries occupied by Germans and the materially poorest of our own people will join in telling us that three if the five conditions mentioned on page 154, Want, Squalor and Disease, are not the conditions under which men become supermen, but conditions which conduce either to lassitude and hopelessness—that is to say, toleration of the two other conditions, namely, Idleness and Ignorance; or else, conduce to that limited hope and desire for possession of material things, which we saw on pages 136–7 to be the bestial defect of Germany under Hitler.

If we are to remain human beings, therefore, we need material things, though not many; for, the simplicity noticed

on page 138 characterises human progress. But this progress requires that those material things which we do need should be in plentiful supply: that food, clothing and shelter should be as common and easily had by all, as water has been in England, but not always in other countries, during these past hundred years.

Under such conditions of material plenty, men are likely to turn their attention to making the means of learning—the pursuit of wisdom, agreement, co-operation, achievement, hope and happiness—equally plentiful.

Whatever the executive inefficiency, our plans in aid of European reconstruction show understanding. These are based on the free distribution of food and medicine from the United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere, over an impoverished Continent. That is to say, that having control of the fourth part of life, we set out to supply the needs of the first two with which it becomes possible for the third and fifth parts of life to be developed. Cherishing the fifth part of our own life, we intend to leave to others the development of their fifth part according to the genius of their own race. And, to let the wisdom of the nations freely develop, is the purpose of our plans. From this wisdom, we believe, we have nothing to fear and much to gain. After freedom from Want, freedom in practical public philosophy, namely, politics, is what we once offered to the world in the Atlantic Charter—the charter of democracy.

**AN INTERNATIONAL OBJECT IN PEACE.** It was the United States of America that set humanity the example of freely giving, by the Lease and Lend arrangements for supplying our war requirements in 1940. Money was not necessary, for the reasons shown in Chapter XII—the resistance of our cities to air attack convinced the Americans that useful work was being done. If our object in peace is desired as much as our object in war, then, between nations sharing desire for that object, the exchange of money will continue to be unnecessary. Nations able to produce with ease material things in plenty will gladly supply them to those needing them, not in exchange for other commodities but in an effort shared by all to achieve an object desired above all, by all.

Such an object could be stated in many different kinds of language—in terms of science, religion, sociology, etc. In the



language of the present essay it would be described in the terms defining a suitable object for a united democracy; for example, "the pursuit of wisdom", or "the search for human happiness".

Even beasts show wisdom: as the Book of Proverbs advises, "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise". What human beings need is to advance their wisdom, to increase men's power to understand and manipulate the eternal laws and to diffuse this power more widely among men. More wisdom and less folly means more constructive success and less war, more understanding and fewer mistakes, more humour and less snarling. Wisdom enables ants to build dwellings, to cultivate and store food, to share it for the common good, to care for their sick, bury their dead, unite in peaceful co-operative work and advance in armies. Yet for all their industry and discipline, they will always have enemies and will always be ants. Their wisdom does not increase.

If the people of Britain or the United States of America in the future are to seek satisfaction at home or abroad solely in providing themselves or other people with houses, viaducts, power stations, surgical instruments, safety razors, canned fruits, paper fasteners, air, land and sea transport services and other material things, they will be seeking to enjoy no more than the Germans and the Japanese, had they won the war, would have sought to enjoy—the ambition of human ants, as recommended by poor Dostoevsky, who lived too soon to know happiness. Only the advance of wisdom will enable material wealth to be produced and distributed without angry competition, conflict, spite, disillusionment and misery. Only the advance of wisdom offers mutual understanding instead of mutual contempt, agreeable conversation instead of stony silence, co-operation instead of antagonism, love instead of bewilderment and glorious beauty instead of the order, productiveness, decay and death of an ant-heap.

It is fairly obvious that the spiritual aim which we have seen to be the chief need of Britain, is also the chief need of every other country; and Britain is likely to help in this connection in no other way so well as in the way of a united democracy, for the aim of unity in progress is the outstanding future cause able to keep British unity and democracy in being.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

### SUMMARY

LET us sum up the desirable and undesirable things we have seen.

Let there be comfortable homes for everyone—but they can be smashed with bombs. Let the people be led by the most eloquent politicians into some plan for material plenty—but it is easier to provide a little luxury for a very few than to provide satisfactory comfort for very many; and envy makes the worst of distinctions between classes and between nations. The whole aim of a materialistic people is to make other people work for them on the lowest terms permitted by economic law, and lower, when physical force can be added. So material wealth grows and force gives rise to force, and the nation with less latent material wealth and more force seeks seeks to acquire latent material wealth by threat of force. After the war, let them all begin over again, reconstructing their destroyed wealth, before the next war——?

This manner of life—surely too foolish to continue for ever—is still, as it has always been and must be, the consequence of listening to eloquent politicians whose main programmes are for material plenty.

Or, apart from the big affairs of nations, in domestic affairs at home, let us build fraternally for common use. Let us have horn-rimmed-spectacled politicians bobbing up and down on their platforms all over the country, telling us that they have a new ethic—but only for the supply and use of material things. Then splendid public palaces will arise, outshining the glory of bourgeois England and the marble arches of the Moscow Underground—but you hate me and I hate you; and the whole pleasure of the palace will be spoilt for me by the impossibility of avoiding your face whenever I go there. I don't say that you're bad or that I'm good. I simply don't understand you. I can put up with you for a few hours each day, but that's more than enough. I must have a home of my own.

That brings us back to comfortable homes. Mine must be as good as yours, or I shall be jealous. Let's compete for

better material in our good homes of materialism. It brings us back to the exploitation of other men, the conflict of nations and the fall of bombs.

The German—and Nietzsche represents him—has believed in the inevitability of such an eternal return. But we have been thinking about the English-speaking peoples. We have been studying the history of progress. We see man as the developer of wisdom and material progress as a means to that end. The Law of Might has taught us, especially in the last twenty years, the might of the spirit; and the spiritual and political enfranchisement of Europe is the concern of the United Nations there, avowed in the Atlantic Charter. We are committed to the enfranchising of India and the only justification that we have seen for the continuation of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is the continuance of enfranchisement and spiritual progress. Not “change and decay in all around I see”, but “change and co-operation and increasing wisdom and happiness in all, we all must bring”—or neglect the lesson of our times, and let our children bear the consequences.

The United Nations, in the dire stress of 1941, gasped for a sign, and it was given them. The Atlantic Charter spoke the first great hopeful words heard for nearly two long years in a world fouled by material might. Even high living Government officials and politicians felt it necessary to throw this crust of moral comfort to the peoples of the world committed to purgatory; but no sooner had the struggle of three or four years decided the fate of Germany, than the rulers of the conquering nations began to contract out of the spirit of the Charter. Southern Italy was conquered and democracy there postponed. Eastern Poland was claimed by those who ousted the Germans. The Rumanian dictator was recognised in Moscow in 1944, with the concurrence of the United States of America, on the eve of a Russian invasion that seemed to have little to do with democracy, while the patriots of Warsaw perished. The Patriarch, in the *Church Bulletin*, described the Pope as “inconceivable”. Old frontier enmities, old animosities in the name of religion and old divisions between the rulers and the ruled began to foreshadow another circle of Nietzsche’s eternal return.

It is not in the nature of things that, in war, the rulers



should suffer as much as the ruled. On the contrary, the pressure from outside makes the people of a country readier than usual to sustain the harshness and the blunders of their rulers. A known evil seems to them better than an unknown one, of which they are told horrors, and they become easier to rule. By this much, from the point of view of the rulers, war is a convenience; and it has been taught in British schools for many years as a matter of history that certain wicked foreigners have sought victory in war to divert their peoples from attending to the misgovernment at home. But democracy, if it works, is the union of the rulers and the ruled, so that war is painful to everyone alike; and no democratic country in the past thousand years has gone to war in aggression.

The hope of escape from Nietzsche's circle lies in democracy.

We are back at the point of our first chapter. Can democracy be made to work? We have seen that it works very imperfectly even in the land of the Mother of Parliaments. But these are days of great changes. Russia became a manufacturing country with a democratic constitution in the course of twenty-five years, a development the like of which, in the days before electricity and cordite, no country could have accomplished in less than two hundred. The machinery of democracy is not costly or difficult to understand. It was explained by Hare and Mill in the eighteen-sixties and a form of it is repeated in the appendix to this book. The subject has been obfuscated by Party politicians, who prefer representing Party interests to representing a constituency.

Let the people be united in self-government and not divided by Party-government, and Nietzsche's ring will at once be broken. No people can ever desire war; but the evil genius in Party politics that can produce the financial crisis of 1932, noticed in Chapter XII, can also face peaceful men with a dilemma in which they choose war as the lesser of two evils. This genius is not possessed by the multitude. But for their Governments, the nations of the world could live side by side to all eternity, hardly conscious of each other's vices, but valuing each other's products. Even Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who can hardly have financed the purchase of a sixpenny tumbler at Woolworth's in the nineteen-thirties without



buying a Czechoslovak product, called the Czechoslovaks "a distant people of whom we know little". Hatreds are fomented in newspapers, which inject half-truth into public ignorance, to cause the first inflammation. Commerce is a notoriously peaceful occupation, requiring men to know one another and co-operate.

We are back on the inner circle of our theme. We pay for the newspapers that do us harm. We elect the Parliaments that misrepresent us and at which we limply laugh, or from which we turn away in disgust to side with clergy who talk of bloody revolution.\* We would prefer to stop this nonsense, and the way is clear. We must unite to rule, not to over-reach one another; for, from over-reaching one another comes class war and the bitter distaste that has made Rabelais, Charles Dickens and others detest lawyers. Nor must we unite in commercial or any other kind of conquest of our fellow men, for from foreign aggressions spring foreign wars. We must unite for the one thing that can be shared by all in common without loss in the sharing, and which is enriched for all by the enrichment of each—the advance of human knowledge. The advance of humanity is the inborn wish of the highest and lowest peoples, from the furthest East to the furthest West. The advance of human wisdom towards understanding the power that turns the fire-cloud into a planet and wheels the worlds from night into day, that makes heat hot and divides the living from the dead—this forward march of understanding is the ambition that can unite the simplest black man with the most complex statesman in his less ambitious moments.

But to understand the power that made right and wrong is far more difficult than politics and no Western politician will offer to undertake the task. To discover the unit, ordaining the Yang and the Yin, is a sterner task than to remove Japanese commercial interest from China, and no Eastern government is likely to undertake it without a mandate from the people. A true people's mandate can be given only by the most representative form of voting in the election of spokesmen. Democracy offers the only hope of lasting peace in the world and the first principle of democracy is true representation of the people in the legislature. The method universally acknowledged to be truest is that of proportional representation. It is perhaps not by chance that

\* "... the struggle is likely to be bloody indeed."—*Christians in the Class Struggle*, a pamphlet with foreword by the Bishop of Bradford.



lands whose governmental bodies are elected in this way stay at peace, whether or not others may claim advantages over them in other respects. The Senate of Eire is elected in this way, as the Government of Sweden has been for thirty years. A two-party or three-party system in India would be absurd, and the method of election in the offer carried to India for her franchise by Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 was that of proportional representation. The principle has been recognised in seven Acts of Parliament, but it is not applied to electing the members of that Parliament! It is too good to please a majority of those returned to Westminster in the strange circumstances of 1935. It was too good for the England of the eighteen-eighties, which preferred the Riots Damages Act, as we saw in Chapter X.

But if we agree that it is the first essential thing, and perhaps only just good enough, for the world of the nineteen-forties, we must make an effort soon. As the war in Europe moved to a close, the old animosities in England emerged ready to be blown into flames, and some of our bishops and lay preachers are in good wind. The complaints of Poles in 1945 were no less dismal than they were in 1939, the warning of more famine in India in 1946 read no better than the story of 1943; and when the signs of such times are noticed, the time is ripe for English-speaking peoples to set an example of a Government that shall represent the people, and not a mixture of the prejudices and fears of a dictator, or of a mere Party.

It is difficult to consider the state of democracy, without wishing to take part in some public effort to improve it, and the most obvious first step is to aid the effort for representative government by proportional—that is to say, true representation—which a Londoner began after the Crimean War.

It is difficult to consider the state of the world without seeing how many good and wise men and women are governed by less good and less wise governments. But it is difficult also for good and wise—and that means ordinary, reasoning—people to express their goodness and wisdom in the government of their country or of the world. Influence can be exerted by writing to Municipal Councillors, Members of Parliament, Editors of newspapers, and the like; even if no apparent notice is taken some effect takes place. It is the duty of the

thinking human being to make his or her sense noticed amid the nonsense of the world. Otherwise, men slip without a protest into the evils whose dangers they foresee.

The happy artist, who at the present rate of Income Tax works six days a week for a daily paper and pays the whole of the sum thus earned to the Government, and does one night's work a week for *Punch* on the proceeds of which he lives, and seems thus to work for the love of it and of the civilisation which enables him to work—this happy philosopher, who has often brought a smile to our lips when the stress of war and irritations of tedious bureaucracy have seemed almost unbearable—exemplifies in his work the human being ascendant over mere "economic man." Through the savage, revolting and exasperating facts which the cartoonist is obliged as a wage-earner to portray there appear the happy fancy, personal feeling and whimsical decorations which are quite gratuitous; without which a deft and witty cartoonist can well reach the highest salary grade. The philosophic artist is right; for we know that the grim or idiotic situation portrayed, in itself, is not the whole truth. There is still humanity, the humanity that gratuitously emerges in his art.

In exactly the same way, besides the indispensable work of life surely most people feel a desire to improve a dangerous and wicked world—if individuals could. So individuals can. Each can express his and her humanity, views and unselfish will; and see these represented in Parliament and in the actions of the world-wide forces of the Crown. While proportional representation is delayed by party policy, if the means of communication suggested on page 155 are not enough there are always, for British people, facilities such as those offered by Major Leith-Hay-Clark in the Democratic organisation at 4, Dean's Yard, Westminster, to afford publicity and Parliamentary expression to every elector's written expression of will, in matters of national policy. Britons need never be the expressionless slaves of a bureaucratic or Parliamentary minority.

It is hoped that, having reached this point, the reader will feel inclined not so much to judge the foregoing chapters, which matter only as questions, but rather to consider from his or her own point of view the matters discussed, the need for improvement and the possibility of it.

## APPENDIX





SIMPLE FORM OF THE  
ACT OF PARLIAMENT

Proposed by Hare

NOTE.—Reference is made in each Section to the most relevant Section of Hare's draft, as given in the Third Edition of his *Election of Representatives* (Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, London, 1865).

Readers are referred also to *Parliamentary Representation* by A. J. S. Ross (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1943).

## NOTES

SECTIONS I-III are simply to enable a candidate to be put up; instead of the existing money qualification of £150. Dividing lines between constituencies need not be geographical ; they may be divisions of ideas.

SECTION VII applies equally to the existing geographical constituencies and the possible new constituencies of ideas ; it instructs returning officers in what order to handle voting papers.

The certificate required by SECTION IX is only for the purpose of SECTION X and does not prejudice the effect of the other names on the voting papers.

SECTION IX comes into operation only if there are not enough strongly-supported candidates who will easily get the quota, to fill the House, but a large number of poorly-supported candidates.

SECTION XII is to allot a Member to represent a voter who has voted only for unsuccessful candidates.

FOR FORMING AND RECONSTRUCTING  
CONSTITUENCIES FROM TIME TO TIME.

SECTION I                      Any group of ten thousand electors or  
(HARE'S SECTION V)        more may apply to His Majesty in  
                                    Council by Petition, praying that such a  
group may be empowered to return a member to Parliament,  
such return being, however, dependent on enough votes being  
given as prescribed in Sections IV to XI of this Act; and such  
Petition shall state who is proposed as the returning officer  
and what hall or public building it is proposed to provide for  
the purpose of election and in what manner it is proposed to  
meet the cost of the procedure required of each constituency  
by this Act; and upon the hearing of the said Petition of  
which not less than three month's notice shall be given in the  
London and Edinburgh Gazettes,<sup>1</sup> and also upon hearing any  
person who may apply to oppose the Petition, if it shall appear  
to His Majesty in Council proper to accede to the Petition, a  
writ shall be issued accordingly. Every constituency repre-  
sented in Parliament shall be treated as a constituency at the  
next general election but any constituency or group of  
electors not so represented shall be so treated only after  
application for and issue of a writ as above prescribed.

FOR THE NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.

SECTION II                      Between a dissolution of Parliament  
(HARE'S SECTION VII)        and the next general election every  
                                    person offering himself or herself  
as a candidate for the next Parliament shall signify the same  
to the Registrar for England or Scotland<sup>2</sup> respectively accord-  
ing as the constituency concerned is in England or Scotland  
and when the constituency is not geographically defined the  
place of duty of the returning officer shall be deemed to be  
the location of the constituency.

FOR PUBLICATION OF CANDIDATE'S NAMES.

SECTION III                    The registrars shall each publish daily  
(HARE'S SECTION VIII) a corrected list of the candidates  
                                    declared to them and the constituencies  
for which the candidates are nominated respectively in the

1. *Hare included Dublin ; Belfast and Caernarvon could be so treated.*

2. *See note above. Wales and Ireland also could furnish registrars, and this idea may be read into the succeeding Clauses.*

London and Edinburgh Gazettes or supplements thereto; and shall transmit copies of these lists to the returning officers of the constituencies named therein to be printed and published for the use of electors at a price not exceeding 1d. each.

FOR ENABLING THE ELECTOR TO CHOOSE  
A PLACE OF POLLING.

SECTION IV                      Each elector may record his or her  
(HARE'S SECTION XIV)      vote at any polling place on surrender of a part of his or her Identity Card or other proof of identity prescribed from time to time so that more votes cannot be recorded than there are properly qualified electors.

FOR REGULATING THE FORM OF THE VOTE.

SECTION V                      Every vote shall be given on a paper  
(HARE'S SECTION XIV)      stating the name and address<sup>s</sup> of the elector and in order of preference as many names of candidates published in the Gazettes as the elector may choose; and this paper shall be given to the returning officer or his deputy, at the place of polling.

FOR ASCERTAINING THE QUOTA.

SECTION VI                      At the close of the poll the returning  
(HARE'S SECTIONS              officer of every constituency shall  
XVII AND I)                      certify to the registrar for England or Scotland as the case may be the number of voting papers delivered as above prescribed, and the registrars after communicating these numbers to one another shall divide the total of them by the number of seats in the House of Commons, rejecting any fraction, and declare the result in reply to the several returning officers as the quota of votes immediately entitling a candidate to serve in Parliament.

FOR THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF CANDIDATES  
HAVING THE QUOTA.

SECTION VII                      In each constituency the first papers  
(HARE'S SECTIONS              to be appropriated to each candidate  
XVII AND XIX)                      for that constituency shall be those on which the name of no other candi-

3. Or voting number, if the ballot is still desired to be secret.



date for that constituency appears; and if such papers be fewer than the quota determined as above then the papers naming only two candidates for the constituency then only three and so on shall be dealt with in order and each shall be appropriated to the candidate (for that constituency) first named thereon, until any candidate shall thus be found to have the quota of votes; and when the quota is obtained the returning officer shall set apart the papers thus appropriated to the candidate and forthwith return the candidate as a member to serve in Parliament and cause the name of the candidate to be cancelled on all other voting papers.

FOR THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF FURTHER  
CANDIDATES HAVING THE QUOTA.

SECTION VIII                      Papers polled in each constituency  
(HARE'S SECTION XVIII) bearing names cancelled as prescribed above shall then be appropriated to the candidate for the constituency first named among the uncanceled names, until this candidate thus be found to have the quota; and when the quota is thus obtained the returning officer shall set apart the papers appropriated to the candidate and forthwith return the candidate as a member to serve in Parliament and cause the name of the candidate to be cancelled on all other voting papers.

FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF UNAPPROPRIATED  
VOTING PAPERS TO THE REGISTRARS.

SECTION IX                      When no candidate for the constituency can be returned as having the quota by the foregoing rules the returning officer shall forward the unappropriated papers polled in the constituency to the registrar aforesaid accompanied by a certificate of the votes given for each candidate, whether a candidate for the constituency or not, counting for this purpose only the candidate whose name is the first-written uncanceled name on each paper, together with a certificate of the candidates returned as members and the number of registered electors of the constituency who have not voted.

FOR THE RETURN OF CANDIDATES HAVING  
THE QUOTA FOUND BY THE REGISTRARS.

## SECTION X

(HARE'S SECTION XXIV)

On receipt of the unappropriated voting papers by the registrars the first papers to be appropriated to each candidate shall be those on which the uncanceled name of no other candidate appears; and if such papers be fewer than the quota for each candidate than papers bearing only two uncanceled names of candidates and then only three and so on, shall be dealt with in order and each shall be appropriated to the candidate whose name is the first uncanceled name thereon; until any candidate shall thus be found to have the quota of votes; and when the quota is obtained the registrar shall set apart the papers thus appropriated to the candidate and forthwith return the candidate to serve as a member in Parliament and cause the name of the candidate to be cancelled on all other voting papers. If the number of members allowed to the constituency for which the candidate is gazetted be not already returned the candidate shall serve for that constituency, and if the number be already returned the candidate shall serve for the constituency not yet having its full number of members and in which most votes have been polled for the candidate according to the certificates of the returning officers.

FOR THE RETURN OF CANDIDATES HAVING  
MAJORITIES LESS THAN THE QUOTA.

## SECTION XI

(HARE'S SECTIONS  
XXIV AND XXV)

When no candidate can be returned as having the quota by the foregoing rules the registrars shall take note of the number of seats in the House of Commons still vacant and endeavour to make up the quota for the same number of candidates, choosing first those to whom the most papers shall have been appropriated already, until enough candidates shall have been chosen to fill the vacant seats. The papers appropriated to unchosen candidates bearing also the names of chosen candidates shall then be reappropriated to the chosen candidates by the following rules:

- (i) Papers bearing the smallest number of uncanceled names

of candidates shall be dealt with first and those bearing the largest number last.

- (ii) Each paper shall be appropriated to that one of the chosen candidates named thereon and not having the quota who shall be gazetted for the constituency nearest to the constituency of the voter; and in case of constituencies not geographically defined the paper shall be appropriated to the candidate named thereon and not having the quota who shall be gazetted for the constituency most similar in nature with that of the voter.

FOR THE APPROPRIATION OF OTHERWISE INEFFECTIVE  
VOTING PAPERS TO SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES  
NAMED THEREON.

SECTION XII

When the required number of members shall have been returned to serve in Parliament unappropriated voting papers shall be appropriated each to the successful candidates whose name appears thereon whether cancelled or not; and papers bearing the name of no successful candidate shall be appropriated to the successful candidate belonging to the same political party as the candidate first named on the paper who shall be gazetted for the constituency nearest to that of the voter; and where there is no such identity of party then to the successful candidate for the voter's constituency, and if there be more than one then to the one to whom fewest papers shall have been appropriated already.

FOR THE INSPECTION OF PAPERS BY VOTERS AND  
ADHERENCE OF VOTERS TO CONSTITUENCIES.

SECTION XIII

The registrars shall return the papers which they have appropriated to each candidate to the returning officer of the constituency for which the candidate shall have been gazetted and the returning officer shall permit each voter to inspect his or her own paper and see to which candidate it shall have been appropriated; and the voter shall belong to the constituency of that candidate until the next election of a member for that constituency.

## FOR THE RECALL OF MEMBERS.

## SECTION XIV

(HARE'S SECTION XXIX)

If any member after his election shall dissatisfy his constituents they may inform the returning officer for the constituency in writing of their dissent from such a member continuing to represent them and on receipt of such writings from one-quarter of the number of electors in the constituency the returning officer shall acquaint the Speaker of the House of Commons with such dissent and the Speaker shall declare the member's seat vacant.

## FOR REGULATING BYE-ELECTIONS.

## SECTION XV

(HARE'S SECTIONS  
XXX AND XXXI)

When a seat shall become vacant through any cause other than the dissolution of Parliament, the vacancy shall be published in the *London Gazette* if the constituency affected be in England and the *Edinburgh Gazette* if the constituency affected be in Scotland and the names of candidates shall be registered and published as prescribed in Sections II and III of this Act; and votes may be given for any or all such candidates as prescribed in Section IV of this Act, and the candidate being first named on the greatest number of papers shall be returned by the returning officer as a member to serve in Parliament; and in the case of a tie the candidate whose name also appears on the greatest number of papers, whether first or not on each of them, shall be so returned.

